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PREFACE 
As the title of this work suggests there was both progress and 
setback in China in terms of human rights. The fact that the reform-
ists remained in power made possible more free market activity, trade 
and the movement of people and goods. As demonstrated throughout 
the world, capitalism produces democracy and democracy engenders 
more significant and widespread respect for basic human rights and 
liberties. This was fundamentally true about the People's Republic of 
China during the period under study. China's citizens had more free-
doms compared to those during the Maoist period. 
Events in Tibet offset gains elsewhere. Some observers suggested 
that the regime's "opening to the outside world" caused the outbreak 
of demonstrations, which gave the impression that the Tibetans took 
advantage of greater freedoms to protest their harsh treatment in the 
past. This is no doubt true. Yet Tibet was a human rights problem 
that was bound to become known sooner or later. The fact that Tibet 
garnered little attention during 1988, quite unlike 1987, suggests that 
government repression combined with controls over the reporting of 
events there--especially driving out the foreign press-returned Tibet 
to its original situation. Tibet is now a "hushed up" human rights 
case. 
Meanwhile, inflation in China, which became acute by mid-1988, 
undermined the political power and status of the reformers, as well as 
the reforms. Gains made by the hardline political left because of infla-
tion made some observers hark back to the anti-spiritual pollution 
campaign of 1983 and the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign of 
1987. During both of these periods, an ascendency of the hardliners in 
the Chinese Communist Party had a negative effect on the human 
rights condition in China. Evidence revealed that this had happened 
again in 1988, though perhaps the impact was still uncertain. It had 
not yet played itself out by the end of the year. 
One Step Forward, One Step Back is a continuation of work by the 
two authors on human rights in the People's Republic of China. It is a 
follow-up on Reform in Reverse: Human Rights in the People's Repub-
lic of China, published in 1988 by the same publishers. Reform in 
Reverse was an annual or update book covering events in late 1986 and 
1987. For background details and further analysis of human rights in 
China, the reader should look at two other works the authors have 
(i) 
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been involved in: Human Rights in the People's Republic of China and 
Human Rights in Post-Mao China, both published by Westview Press. 
As in the previous update, the authors focused on critical human 
rights areas of concern. These include minorities, women and intellec-
tuals. The authors also were concerned about basic freedoms, civil 
and political, and about the large number of executions in China. The 
plight of political prisoners and subjects of reform through education 
and labor also deserved attention. 
The authors also give special attention to changes and happenings 
affecting China's political and economic systems. These are the ba-
rometers of human rights in the People's Republic of China. They 
give evidence of why the human rights condition is as serious as it is; 
they indicate why such human rights problems prevail in China. 
As in previous works, the authors want to draw attention to 
human rights in China because it does not get much attention. The 
average person does not know that Mao Zedong commanded the tak-
ing of more human lives than any other person in history and that 
human rights abuses under his political leadership were among the 
worst in the world. Similarly, few realize that, notwithstanding the 
downgrading of Mao by China's current leaders and the vast change 
China has experienced politically, economically and in other ways, its 
human rights practices are not all that different. 
Also, when a Chinese, or even a Tibetan, is killed, tortured or 
sentenced to labor camp, few people in the world know about it. 
Human rights abuses get media coverage when they occur in South 
Africa or the Soviet Union, or even Northern Ireland. The contrast 
between the attention showered on Soviet nuclear physicist/dissident 
Andrei Sakharov in the West and the scanty attention devoted to Chi-
nese astrophysicist/dissident Fang Lizhi (who was rudely barred by 
police from attending President Bush's party in Beijing in February 
1989) is a case in point. Human rights abuses become news when they 
involve whites or blacks, or even more, if either race violates the 
human rights of a member of the other race. Abuses of Chinese, espe-
cially by Chinese, is of little concern. The authors feel that such a 
double standard should not be applied and so they seek to draw atten-
tion to the latter category. After all, Chinese suffer and hurt as much 
as anyone else and it does not matter to the victim who is the perpetra-
tor of the mistreatment, torture or killing. 
Finally, the authors want to thank Professor Yuan-Li Wu for 
contributing the draft of chapter four on the Chinese economy and its 
relationship to the human rights condition during the period under 
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study. Professor Wu also helped with the rest of the study, but did not 
want to take full credit for his labor. 
The period under study extends from late 1987 to late 1988. An-
other volume next year will further update the study. It will assess 
most of the areas covered in this volume, plus any new topics of 
concern. 
John F. Copper and Ta-ling Lee 
September 1, 1989 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCfiON 
Taking a broad look at human rights in the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) during late 1987 and through the fall of 1988, the situa-
tion in Tibet attracted the most attention. It also reflected the fact 
that little-much less than was generally assumed-progress had been 
made toward improving the human rights condition in China in recent 
years. And it mirrored the realization of a long festering human rights 
problem in Tibet and the seriousness of past human rights abuses in 
China. Finally it seemed to overshadow the fact that reforms had 
made China a freer place in many respects, especially in the realms of 
economic opportunity and certain political freedoms that had to ac-
company an effort to create a free market. 
On the PRC's National Day on October 1, 1987, marking the 
thirty-eighth anniversary of Mao's establishment of a government in 
Beijing (Peking), Tibetan monks demonstrated en masse in Lhasa. 
Laymen joined. Though the protest was peaceful, police and govern-
ment officials were angry about earlier protest marches and anti-Chi-
nese, independence demonstrations. As a result, the police arrested a 
large number of protestors and brutally beat some. This provoked 
many Tibetans, who subsequently gathered at the police station and 
started throwing rocks. Rioting followed. The police reacted by 
shooting into the crowds, killing a sizeable (but still unknown) number 
of people. The government then imposed a curfew and set up road 
blocks. Telephone lines were cut so that foreign journalists could not 
report on events; this prevented other Tibetans as well as the outside 
world from knowing what had happened. Journalists were ordered to 
leave; foreign tourists were sent elsewhere. 
The causes of the riots were many. They certainly include the 
years of repression and human rights abuses in Tibet. In 1950 and 
1951, at the onset of the Korean War, the Chinese People's Liberation 
Army marched into Tibet. Tibet essentially has been under military 
occupation ever since. During Mao's Cultural Revolution, which 
lasted from 1966 to the Chairman's death in 1976, Tibet was brutal-
ized by leftist fanatics who despised Tibetan Buddhism, not to men-
tion the culture and people of Tibet. A million and a half Tibetans 
(1) 
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were killed; many more were tortured or imprisoned, or both. The 
loss of life amounted to one quarter of Tibet's population. 
Conditions got better after Mao. But Tibetans could not forget 
what had happened. China's opening up to the West, more freedom of 
movement, and particularly the regime's policy of allowing tourists 
and reporters into Tibet (to earn foreign exchange) gave the Tibetans 
an opportunity to vent their pent-up hostility. They also were dis-
pleased that many of the government's new policies; while they made 
for less religious persecution, did not help Tibet as they promised. In 
fact, the new policies allowed the Chinese to exploit Tibetans. A quar-
ter of a million Chinese troops remained in Tibet, along with nearly 
that number of Chinese officials, businessmen and "immigrants." 
Rioting and protest demonstrations spread to other parts of Tibet 
and to Qinghai province-China's notorious gulag where millions of 
political prisoners undergo reeducation and reform through labor. 
Many released from these camps are given pardons on condition they 
will remain and work in the camp factories-a situation that many 
describe as slave labor. The fact that large areas of Qinghai are popu-
lated by Tibetans, including the birthplace of the Dalai Lama, drew 
some attention to a gulag area that, in terms of the numbers of victims, 
makes the Soviet gulag pale in comparison. 
Closing off these areas reduced media attention. Journalists could 
not report on what they could not see or even hear stories about. 
Thus, human rights abuses in Tibet ceased to be front page news, or 
news at all, in most parts of the world. This was so even though the 
killing of Tibetans by the police and the military in Tibet increased 
during 1988. Some Tibetans had managed to draw attention to their 
plight, but only for awhile. They ultimately failed and paid the price. 
Indirectly, the situation in Tibet tells yet another story: that the 
human rights situation in the People's Republic of China has long 
been much worse than the outside world has known. Many people in 
other parts of the world had no conception of the human rights 
problems in Tibet in the past, or elsewhere in China. This says some-
thing about the fact that China has had an advantage not granted to 
other nations in the human rights area. Western nations have long 
given Beijing the benefit of the doubt. In short, the outside world has 
ignored the nation with the largest number of political prisoners, vic-
tims of torture and abuse and the lack of basic freedoms that exists 
anywhere in the world. 
Was the benefit of the doubt being withdrawn? It certainly ap-
peared so for awhile. The U.S. Congress held public hearings. The 
People's Republic of China was condemned. Chinese leaders in Bei-
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jing were no doubt embarrassed, and they were worried. The biggest 
concern for them was that China would be treated fairly in terms of 
human rights critiques. 
But this concern for China's human rights condition passed. The 
Department of State played down China's human rights abuses in Ti-
bet and elsewhere. When it published its human rights country re-
ports in early 1989, China got coverage similar to other nations, with 
only a handful of human rights cases noted. Few numbers were pub-
lished. Good relations with Beijing proved to be more important to 
the United States government than the fate of Chinese human rights 
victims. 
Another question arises: Why did Beijing allow events in Tibet to 
get out of hand so that it attracted world attention even for awhile? 
Events in Tibet seem to parallel political change in China itself. 
Clearly there appears to be a causal relationship, perhaps in both di-
rections. In late 1987 the Party right-Deng Xiaoping and the re-
formists-seemed to be in command. They had survived the anti-
bourgeois liberalization campaign of early 1987. Deng had to sack his 
heir apparent, Hu Yaobang, as Party General Secretary. He had to 
shift to the left politically and make some concessions. Yet many ob-
servers said Deng and the reformists emerged stronger than ever. In 
any case the reformists continued apace with their programs in late 
1987 and early 1988. They spoke of democracy. And they even, in 
some cases, put up more than one candidate in Party and government 
elections (though not for top positions). 
It appeared Deng wanted to keep the left-the hardliners and the 
Maoists--on the defensive. This may explain Tibet. It was to be a 
model. 
Elsewhere, the reformists did not want to see democracy weaken 
the Party. Thus, the separation of powers, which at times they 
flaunted, was not allowed to affect the Chinese Communist Party's 
control over the government. In fact, Party control was increased, no 
doubt because the left had a bit more influence in the government at 
the top after Li Peng replaced Zhao Ziyang (who replaced Party Gen-
eral Secretary Hu). The reformists also took steps to strengthen ties 
between the Party and the military. Zhao assumed a position of lead-
ership over the People's Liberation Army as First Vice Chairman of 
the Party Central Military Commission and began to make decisions 
openly on military policy. This seemed to enhance the influence of top 
military leaders by bringing them into political decisionmaking. Per-
haps the reformists anticipated that the left would try to incite polit-
ical instability to undercut the reformists actions. 
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Either the left succeeded, or else incidences occurred spontane-
ously because of more political freedoms, or at least because of more 
talk about political freedoms. Some political observers said: "Take 
your pick about explanations." In fact, the impression of more polit-
ical freedoms was probably more contributory to political instability 
than the real loosening up of political controls that accompanied re-
form. Another factor, of course, was inflation. The "final" economic 
reform in the minds of many of the reformists was ending price con-
trols. This was being tried-and it caused inflation to skyrocket. Offi-
cially, inflation was around twenty percent in 1988. However, many 
observers put it at more than fifty percent in many cities. This made 
much of the population insecure and set the scene for various kinds of 
protest, crime and violence. 
Beijing used the instability caused by anti-government demon-
strations (including many organized by students and some by farmers) 
as well as crime, especially crimes of violence, as an excuse for bolster-
ing and improving the police forces and security organizations in 
China. Already China was moving in the direction of linking police, 
military and intelligence functions. This continued; in fact, it was in 
many respects completed. Crackdowns on crime escalated. Govern-
ment officials used the term "liberal totalitarianism" to describe these 
political changes or the system that would result. What they meant by 
this term was: maintain political stability and keep only democratic 
reform the Party hierarchy approved. Some said that only reform nec-
essary to make the economy work would be allowed. Others opined 
that reform was to be controlled and experimented with-granted and 
withdrawn at various intervals. 
Meanwhile the government took a hard line on economic crimes. 
If one were to argue that the human rights condition in the People's 
Republic of China improved in recent years because of better eco-
nomic opportunities and the political freedoms allowed to make them 
work, and, of course, the prosperity the free market and capitalism 
had brought, one also would be dismayed by the punishments meted 
out to economic criminals. Stiff sentences were given to "economic 
criminals"-much stiffer penalties than are given to white collar 
criminals in Western countries. While white collar crime probably 
should be dealt with more severely in Western democracies, it is still 
difficult to justify the extremely harsh punishments given in China. 
Many were executed for economic crimes, clearly not in accord with 
international practices, and not justified by some other means. 
During late 1987, and even more in 1988, economic criminals 
were dealt with more harshly. They were given fewer opportunities to 
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clear themselves or to enjoy leniency for extenuating circumstances. 
The political and economic situations in China tell the reason for this. 
The reformers had to give the impression they were not allowing the 
evils of capitalism to engulf China. They had to keep the reforms from 
devolution. Another factor in the equation was factionalism in the 
leadership: the reformists pushing reform caused a backlash and inter-
nal dissension. In the past this was accompanied by crackdowns on 
both protest and crime. So it was in 1988. 
The authorities' intolerance and the limits on reform were like-
wise manifested in Hong Kong. Resentment over growing inequalities 
in income and wealth in China that are products of capitalism or the 
unusual (read unprecedented) situation of planting capitalism in a so-
cialist system, were reflected in both public attitudes and government 
policies toward Hong Kong. Beijing betrayed its promises to the peo-
ple of Hong Kong in the 1984 Sino-British Agreement (which prom-
ised not to disturb Hong Kong's social and economic system for at 
least fifty years after reversion in 1997) in a host of ways. With a 
population comprised of 70 to 80 percent people who escaped from 
China, these developments caused serious travail in Hong Kong. 
Most who could afford to left Hong Kong. Some returned, but with 
foreign citizenship or residency in another country as a kind of insur-
ance policy. Still the "brain drain" was marked. 
Specifically, in writing the draft "Basic Law" that would serve as 
Hong Kong's future Constitution, Beijing patently sought to under-
mine the development of democracy. PRC officials at times spoke of a 
"U.S. plot" and blocked the election of officials that might represent 
the population of electoral districts in Hong Kong. Beijing also put 
pressure on the British government in order to block legislative re-
form. The draft Basic Law also was used to cause confusion while 
Communist cadres infiltrated local government organs. 
Beijing also refused to be bound by its promise that the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights should apply to Hong Kong. This, 
plus ignoring public opinion regarding democratic reforms, prompted 
anti-Beijing demonstrations. Amnesty International also protested, 
saying that the law was flawed and did not protect basic rights. More-
over, the United Nations Human Rights Commission criticized Bei-
jing. Hong Kong citizens expressed alarm about Hong Kong residents 
who were held in communicado in China and about the possible dan-
gers of a nuclear plant China was building near Hong Kong. Beijing 
was either silent or obdurate regarding these complaints. 
The government of the People's Republic of China also ignored 
the complaints and pleas of its own intellectuals. Throughout 1988, 
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students and other intellectuals demonstrated about their horribly aus-
tere economic conditions. A number of students dropped out of grad-
uate programs because of economic difficulties. Many said it became 
common knowledge that education would not help in finding a job. 
Students even took to the streets offering shoe shines to government 
officials and tourists in order to embarrass the government. Students 
complained that the government had not done anything to improve 
their lot because of the trouble they caused through demonstrations, 
calls for true democracy and an end to official corruption. They also 
expressed anger about a decision that cut the number of students that 
could go to the United States each year and limited the length of their 
stays. 
In late 1987 and throughout 1988, students regularly protested 
the slow pace of democracy, corruption, special privileges enjoyed by 
government officials, lack of free speech, inflation and other problems. 
Especially embarrassing to the government and the Chinese Commu-
nist Party were statements students made to the press and to foreign-
ers to the effect that political reform in the Soviet Union under 
Gorbachev was real, but it was not in China. Laudatory comments 
about democracy in Taiwan also proved to be very sensitive. 
The security police on the one hand made some concessions to 
students. But they did this while showing force and authority. In one 
case, they quickly executed a person convicted of killing a student near 
the Beijing University campus. The security police assumed a larger 
presence on campuses, allegedly to protect students. At the same 
time, however, they arrested a number of student leaders. Chinese 
writers and literary figures continued to complain of living in fear and 
repression unknown in most parts of the world. 
Intellectuals also led protests against violations of promised open 
press and other freedoms. While press freedom has been broadened in 
recent years, including the last two years, Party and government offi-
cials were so ·embarrassed by the results that many crackdowns were 
ordered and censorship reimposed. In short, press freedom was a ten-
uous thing in the People's Republic of China during late 1987 and 
early 1988. 
One of the most difficult realities to face for Party officials was the 
fact that, given a choice, almost no one purchased or read official 
Party or government newspapers or magazines. Instead, some 60 mil-
lion Chinese listened to Voice of America each day. And they read 
gossip papers and foreign publications when they became available. 
Red Flag, the now demised organ of the Party Central Committee, 
and other official publications hardly sold and were seldom read. 
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Relaxation of press controls also resulted in a rash of porno-
graphic books and magazines. In response, the government, assuming 
a link (still a controversial point in Western countries) between por-
nography and violence, banned many publications, including art 
works. Security forces took action against writers and sellers of mater-
ials with a sexual theme. Deng Xiaoping at one point even threatened 
to execute sellers of pornography. 
This official attitude of hostility toward "impure publications" 
spread. It resulted in attacks on foreign works. Several were banned 
in 1988, including novels by Irving Wallace and Jackie Collins. A 
beauty pageant in Shanghai was also cancelled after being labelled 
bourgeois. A popular television program was banned for "insulting 
the nation." 
In another area, the human rights condition unequivocably dete-
riorated during the last eighteen months. This was criminal law en-
forcement. In response to what the Ministry of Public Security said 
was a huge rise in serious crime in 1988-more than 34 percent over 
1987-the government took extreme means to reduce the crime rate 
and in the process disregarded legal proceedings and civil and political 
rights. According to observers, the government's policy was to allow 
limited freedoms to ensure that the partly capitalist economy could 
work and also that foreign countries perceive that democracy was be-
ing implemented in China-in order to keep the flow of technology 
and investments coming in. Meanwhile, criminal codes would be en-
forced harshly and many would-be criminals would be "sacrificed" or 
made examples of in order to instill fear in the population (referred to 
as education) to prevent them from going too far in taking advantage 
of the new economic and political freedoms. 
Most noticeable among criminal punishments was the widespread 
use, and gross misuse, of executions. While the Constitution of the 
People's Republic of China prohibits public punishments and recent 
laws have been passed allowing lawyers in trials and defendants to 
enjoy proper procedures, these stipulations were ignored routinely. 
Convicted criminals were executed regularly with a bullet in the back 
of the head at close range in front of crowds, sometimes 20,000 or 
more in packed stadiums. Most of the executions take place within 
days or weeks of the trial. (The requirement that the Supreme Court 
confirm such sentences has been dropped.) Most of those executed 
were convicted of crimes that are not capital offenses in Western coun-
tries, such as embezzlement. 
That capital punishment was being used more to intimidate po-
tential criminals and the population as a whole was given more 
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credence in late 1987 and 1988. A U.S. Congressman said publicly 
that two Tibetans were executed to send a political message. Accord-
ing to various foreign journalists, a rash of public executions in No-
vember 1987 was timed to coincide with the 13th Chinese Communist 
Party Congress. At the meeting, more strict measures were taken to 
deal with the rise in crime. Executions of criminals who had perpe-
trated crimes against foreigners were given much more publicity. So 
were the executions of economic criminals and anyone using weapons 
or violence in the commission of a crime. 
Beijing also exhibited a tougher attitude toward noted political 
prisoners already in jail or labor camps. In late 1987, noted political 
prisoner Wei Jingsheng was reported to have died in prison. The Chi-
nese government denied the report, but refused to provide information 
on Wei's health. Other dissidents were kept in jail and not allowed 
visits, or allowed very few. Many of the prisoners in jail are there for 
crimes that probably would not now be considered a crime. At a mini-
mum, their sentences were questionable. They appear to be kept in jail 
to avoid friction between the factions in the government and the Com-
munist Party. 
Finally, two groups of people saw their human rights conditions 
seriously deteriorate during the period under study: women and chil-
dren. The causes were economic reform, the removing of controls on 
the treatment of women, stringent population control policies and offi-
cial corruption. 
Because of the expanding free market and more freedoms given to 
managers and others in control of economic decisions, traditional dis-
crimination against women in the workplace reappeared. Thousands 
lost their jobs or were moved to less meaningful and more physically 
tedious work. Just over five percent of businessmen, according to a 
survey conducted in 1988, were willing to hire women for jobs that 
ordinarily could be filled by men. Routinely in 1988, women suffered 
pay cuts, were given longer hours, denied maternity leaves and were 
kept further away from their children by their employers. Prostitution 
and the selling of brides also increased during 1987 and 1988. 
Birth control policies were even more strictly enforced than in the 
past because of population increases exceeding Party expectations. 
More women were coerced not to have children and more were forced 
to have abortions--even in the last months of pregnancy. There were 
even reports of babies being killed-by being hit on the head with a 
hammer at birth-that were treated as abortions. Forced sterilization 
also increased and involved mostly women. In an increasing number 
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of cases it was done because of the woman's low I.Q. The number of 
women receiving an education meanwhile continued to drop. 
The use of child labor, the number of neglected children, the sell-
ing of babies and infanticide (almost all female babies) also increased 
during 1987 and 1988. Suicides among young people increased. All of 
this seemed to stem from confused economic policies that mixed the 
bad of both socialism and capitalism, combined with corruption 
among officials on the one hand and a lack of caring on the other. 
In sum, late 1987 through 1988 was a period of increased eco-
nomic and political freedoms, especially the former. But it did little to 
improve the human rights condition generally in the People's Republic 
of China. Improvements in human rights practices in some areas were 
offset by declines in others. The record was mixed; it seemed to reflect 
both transition and systemic problems. There was much new change, 
but old corruption. It was indeed one step forward, one step back. 
CHAPTER II 
TIBET BECOMES A HUMAN RIGHTS CASE 
INTRODUCTION 
As indicated in the introduction chapter human rights problems 
in Tibet attracted more attention than in any other part of China dur-
ing 1987-88. The situation in Tibet also provoked more criticism of 
the Chinese government because of its human rights abuses than else-
where. In short, it was the "hotspot" during the period under study. 
This is not to say that Tibet suddenly became a human rights 
problem. A bad human rights situation had been present in Tibet 
since 1950-51 when the Chinese People's Liberation Army invaded Ti-
bet. The situation at that time, therefore, deserves mention. Tibet had 
been independent throughout most of its history. Though it was in-
corporated into the Chinese empire during the Qing dynasty (1644-
1911) for a period of two centuries, its relationship with Beijing during 
that time resembled that of European kingdoms with Rome under the 
Holy Roman Empire. Tibet was for the most part free of outside con-
trol. It was certainly quite autonomous in religious and social matters 
and in most other respects. 
In 1913, two years after the Qing dynasty was overthrown, Tibet 
declared independence. The British colonial government in India con-
cluded treaties with Tibet, but other nations of the world community 
had no reason for seeking diplomatic or other ties with Tibet. Thus, 
Tibet was not seen in the international community as a nation-state. 
Tibet, however, remained de facto independent until 1951. 
In 1950, when Chinese troops entered Tibet, most Tibetans re-
sisted, many with weapons. The resistance was quickly overwhelmed, 
but not before Tibetan authorities on November 7 appealed to the 
United Nations, stating that Tibet was not part of China and that the 
Chinese military presence in Tibet constituted "unprovoked aggres-
sion." A "compromise" was subsequently reached: a Sino-Tibetan 
"agreement" was signed giving Tibet a number of guarantees, which 
together may be seen as amounting to the granting of autonomy. Bei-
jing promised not to alter the existing political system; the status, 
power and functions of the Dalai Lama; religious beliefs and customs; 
and lamaseries. Reforms were to be carried out by local governments. 
(10) 
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Tibet was given the title of autonomous region. 1 
But Beijing did not keep its promises. Chinese Communist Party 
cadres in cooperation with the People's Liberation Army proceeded to 
"eradicate feudalism and serfdom" in Tibet, even though these condi-
tions were not really present in Tibet and Tibetans did not want to be 
"liberated. " 2 Because of the mistreatment of the Tibetan population, 
the humiliation and killing of lamas, property confiscation, religious 
desecration and efforts to populate Tibet with Chinese (where there 
had been almost no Chinese before), Tibetans began to engage in guer-
rilla warfare against the Chinese military and government authorities. 
Tibetan hostility toward Beijing increased steadily through the 
early 1950s. In 1956, the Dalai Lama met Zhou Enlai in India and 
requested that Chinese military forces be withdrawn from Tibet. 
Zhou refused, viewing the request as an effort to gain independence. 
In early March 1959, when the Chinese military commander in Tibet 
asked the Dalai Lama to visit him without his escorts, Tibetans per-
ceived that he was going to be kidnapped and maybe killed. They 
gathered in large numbers and surrounded his summer palace in 
Lhasa to prevent this. On March 17, Chinese military units attacked 
the palace with heavy weapons, killing large numbers of people. The 
Dalai Lama fled to India with thousands of his followers. Others 
stayed and carried on a resistance campaign. It was suppressed, with 
considerable loss of life. Human rights violations subsequently 
abounded, with more desecration, executions and torture. 3 
During the Maoist-inspired Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion in the mid and late 1960s, Tibet was again brutalized. It is esti-
mated that one and a quarter million Tibetans (of a population of 6 
million) lost their lives during this time. The army destroyed religious 
buildings, including their historic treasures. Further efforts were 
made to populate Tibet with Chinese, in order to make the Tibetans a 
minority and establish total control over Tibet. The post-Mao govern-
ment later admitted that what happened in Tibet appeared to be "at-
tempted cultural genocide."4 
The human rights condition in Tibet improved under Deng 
Xiaoping's leadership in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But many 
Tibetans saw the improvements as marginal and mostly for the benefit 
I. See Yuan-Li Wu, Franz Michael, John F. Copper, Ta-Ling Lu, Maria Hsia Chang 
and A. James Gregor, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, (Boulder, Co: 
Westview Press, 1988) pp. 276-77. 
2. Ibid., p. 278. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
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of foreigners who began to visit Tibet in larger numbers, providing 
Beijing with badly needed foreign currency. Moreover, they could 
hardly forget what had happened in the past. Also, new problems be-
gan to appear. China's atmospheric nuclear tests, conducted up to 
1983, had begun to result in birth defects and other health problems in 
Tibet where much of the fallout landed. Most Tibetans perceived that 
illnesses and deformities caused by China's nuclear tests were inflicted 
intentionally. Education was ignored compared to the rest of the 
country. Efforts to wipe out the so-called residual radicalism of the 
Cultural Revolution years resulted in efforts to destroy the Tibetan 
language in schools and work areas. Tibetan religious practices were 
allowed and then banned again. In short, Beijing's more moderate 
policies did not ameliorate ill feelings in Tibet. 5 
In 1979 the Dalai Lama declared that the Chinese "liberation" of 
Tibet had denied Tibetans their birthright and the "freedom to deter-
mine their own destiny themselves." They talk, he said, of an "imagi-
nary state of glorious happiness and progress said to be existing in 
Tibet."6 He went on to describe how miserable conditions were in 
Tibet and how the Chinese government and the all-pervasive Chinese 
Communist Party delighted in abusing human rights in Tibet. That 
feeling remained during the period of reform under Deng. 
Approximately a quarter million Chinese troops remained inTi-
bet in the early 1980s notwithstanding policies that were intended to · 
promote better relations between Beijing and Tibet. Another one hun-
dred and fifty thousand Chinese officials reside in Tibet. Tibetans still 
perceive that they have been invaded and that Beijing has adopted a 
policy of assimilation that will destroy Tibetan culture and eventually 
the Tibetan people. Chinese do not make an effort to learn the Tibetan 
language. Further, they label the Tibetan culture inferior. Tibetans 
feel they have been degraded, desecrated and brutalized and that the 
Chinese government espouses a condescending and discriminatory at-
titude toward Tibet and its people and culture. 
Tibetans also think that the Chinese government has done little 
for Tibet. The per capita income is one-third the average in China. 
The illiteracy rate is the highest anywhere in China; life expectancy is 
40 years compared to the national average of 75. What money has 
been spent in Tibet by the government, Tibetans say goes for roads 
5. See Ta-ling Lee and John F. Copper, Reform in Reverse: Human Rights in the 
People's Republic of China, 1986-1987 (Baltimore, Md.: University of Maryland School of 
Law, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 6, 1987), pp. 
88-89. 
6. Quoted in "Protest in Tibet," Wall Street Journal, October 7, 1987, p. 34. 
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that benefit Beijing for security reasons and only disturb Tibetan 
culture. 7 
It is against this backdrop that serious anti-Chinese protests and 
riots broke out in late 1987 and throughout 1988. They occurred in 
large part because of Tibetans' dislike of Beijing's policies and the gov-
ernment's treatment of Tibetans. The fact that Tibetans were finally 
given an opportunity to make their feelings known, because of Bei-
jing's opening up (including Tibet) to the world, is another factor. 
THE AUTUMN OF 1987 
During mid-1987, the U.S. Congress, in response to continuing 
human rights abuses in Tibet and public criticism from various 
quarters, expressed its concern by calling for formal hearings. In 
June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment (to an-
other bill) that criticized the Chinese government for causing over one 
million Tibetan deaths since 1950 and for human rights violations and 
the "military occupation" of Tibet. At almost the same time, the Sen-
ate denounced as too lenient the U.S. Department of State's recently-
published report on human rights in China. The British and West 
German governments also made comments on the human rights con-
dition in Tibet and specific problems there. It was even suggested that 
the Tibet government in exile be given observer status in the United 
Nations. 8 
Thus, when the Dalai Lama visited the United States in Septem-
ber 1987, Beijing was both apprehensive and displeased. Two days 
before a scheduled appearance before the U.S. Congress's human 
rights caucus, the Chinese Embassy in Washington demanded that the 
Dalai Lama not be allowed to make any political statements while in 
the United States.9 The Congress ignored what some members called 
an "outrageous" request. On September 21, the Dalai Lama presented 
a five point peace initiative intended to start negotiations again that 
might lead to some solution to the problems in Tibet. U.S. observers 
considered the five-point plan moderate: it called for a "zone of 
peace" in Tibet; an end to Chinese settlement in Tibet; respect for 
human rights and dignity; respect for Tibet's ecology; and, better rela-
tions between China and Tibet. The Dalai Lama did not propose 
7. See Daniel Southerland, "New Chinese Policies Affect Monks' Rebellion in Tibet," 
Washington Post, October 7, 1987, p. A23. 
8. See "Protests in Tibet," Wall Street Journal, October 7, 1987, p. 34. 
9. Ibid. 
14 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES. 
independence. 10 
Latent anti-Chinese feelings and loathing of Beijing's treatment of 
Tibet, together with the publicity give to the Dalai Lama's trip, 
prompted 30 or so monks and 100 laypersons in Lhasa to organize a 
demonstration. They may have perceived that this was an opportunity 
to make their plight known to the outside world-long a problem for 
Tibetans, especially critics of Beijing's human rights policies. The 
demonstrators carried Tibetan flags and chanted slogans for Tibetan 
independence, but the demonstration was peaceful. 11 
When demonstrators approached a government building, police 
arrested them. A number were beaten by police. 12 According to offi-
cial Chinese sources, 26 were released two days later after signing 
"self-criticism" statements. 13 Others were released more than three 
months later, having never been charged with any crime. 14 
On October 1, China's National Day, 60 monks and laypersons 
led another demonstration in Lhasa. According to various reports 
their assembly was peaceful. Nevertheless, a number were arrested 
and some publicly beaten by police. 15 This angered onlookers, who 
shortly after gathered in front of the main police station and started 
pelting the station and police with rocks. Rioting followed, during 
which several police stations and vehicles were set on fire. The police 
responded by shooting into the crowds, killing an undetermined 
number of people. 16 A night curfew was imposed and roadblocks were 
set up around Lhasa. Then several hundred armed special police were 
flown in. 17 Troops were also sent to Lhasa. 18 State-controlled news-
papers issued warnings to "separatist elements that were stirring up 
unrest." 19 
A few days later 15 foreign journalists in Lhasa were ordered to 
leave. 20 Telephone lines were cut and foreign tourists with reserved 
10. For details, see Nilova Roy, "China Moves to Seal Riot-Shaken Tibet," Washing-
ton Post, October 8, 1987, p. A25. 
11. See "China: Detention Without Trial, Ill-treatment of Detainees and Police Shoot-
ing of Civilians in Tibet," Amnesty International Report, February 1988, p. 3. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Xinhua (New China News Agency), September 29, 1987, cited in ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Washington Post, October 8, 1987, p. A25. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
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accommodations in Tibet were warned not to go.Z 1 Chinese authori-
ties subsequently began checking on all foreigners residing in Tibet, 
perceiving (accurately, according to many reports) that they sympa-
thized with the Tibetan independence movement and agreed with Ti-
betan complaints about the Chinese government's human rights 
abuses there. 22 Foreigners reported being harassed and having their 
passports and visas checked numerous times. 23 
Chinese officials blamed the Dalai Lama for the violence in 
Lhasa. People's Daily, citing high officials, assailed the Dalai Lama 
and his "clique" for stirring up anti-Chinese feeling among Tibetans. 
The paper went on to say that he was trying to "sabotage the unity 
and stability in Tibet in support of his criminal activities 
abroad .... " 24 The Dalai Lama, from his office in India, condemned 
the violence, appealed to various human rights organizations around 
the world and called on Chinese officials to stop the execution of "in-
nocent Tibetans" and release those in prison. 25 
In the meantime, in late September anti-Chinese demonstrations 
occurred in Xigatse, Tibet's second largest city. Monks, and report-
edly some foreigners, were involved. Tibetan monks also led protest 
marches near the Tibet-Nepal border.26 Participants in the latter were 
mostly Tibetan refugees living in Nepal. The fact that Chinese forces 
had occupied part of the "holiest place" (as regarded by Tibetans) in 
Lhasa, evoked continued anger toward Chinese authorities. 27 
The Chinese government was no doubt incensed by a letter made 
public at the time, sent by monks in the Sera Monastery in Lhasa to 
the United Nations calling for the independence of Tibet and criticiz-
ing Chinese human rights practices in Tibet. The letter asserted that 
China had ruled Tibet "violently" and "Tibetans want the Chinese to 
leave." It asked nations of the U.N. to support the Tibetan cause and 
do something to correct the "Chinese taking of our human rights for 
the last 30 years. " 28 
21. Daniel Southerland, "Phone Lines Cut; Foreigners Barred," Washington Post, Oc-
tober 8, 1987, p. A25. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Cited in Edward A. Gargan, "China Denounces Tibetan Leader as Responsible for 
Violent Protest," New York Times, October 4, 1987, p. 1. 
25. Ibid. 
26. "Chinese Anticipate New Strife in Tibet," Washington Times, October 7, 1987, p. 
AS. 
27. Edward A. Gargan, "Police Take Over Section of Holiest Buddhist Site in Tibet," 
New York Times, October 6, 1987, p. AI. 
28. Ibid. 
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Two other monasteries also got involved-appealing to the 
United Nations and passing out copies of an "appeal for world sup-
port."29 More letters were written, some of them making reference to 
a determination made by the International Commission of Jurists after 
the uprising in 1959 that China in 1951 had "violated the rights of a 
fully sovereign country." They also called attention to U.N. resolu-
tions in 1961 and 1965, calling (in the case of the latter) for a "cessa-
tion of the practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, including most importantly 
their right to self-determination."30 
A third demonstration took place on October 7. Protestors de-
manded the release of the monks arrested in September. 50 to 60 
young monks led the march to government offices. The demonstrators 
were arrested before the march ended, according to observers, and 
were "brutally assaulted."31 
This time the Chinese militia, armed with AK-47 rifles and elec-
tric prods, were called instead of the police. According to observers at 
the scene, they literally tossed arrested people into trucks that carted 
them away.32 The tough reaction of the Chinese government appar-
ently came because of orders to crack down after the earlier riots and 
also because this demonstration occurred on the eve of the anniversary 
of China's invasion of Tibet in 1950. There were reports that the 
Tibetans were armed and that they had thrown stones. But an ob-
server at the scene saw those arrested being searched and said none 
was armed. 33 
Chinese officials subsequently organized "political meetings" and 
"reeducation sessions." In one instance, 15,000 people were rounded 
up and herded into a stadium where they were instructed about polit-
ical obedience. 34 According to private reports, between 300 and 600 
people were taken into custody in October. 35 Eight "Tibetan national-
ists" were given prison sentences and two sentenced to death for insti-
29. Adi Ignatius, "Tibetans see Victory in Demonstrations Against China," Wall 
Street Journal, October 6, 1987, p. 30. 
30. See Ann Scott Tyson and James L. Tyson, "Tibetans Seek Outside Aid as China 
Sends More Troops, Christian Science Monitor, October 6, 1987, p. I. 
31. Ibid. 
32. James L. Tyson, "Chinese Tighten Grip in Tibet," Christian Science Monitor, Octo-
ber 7, 1987, p. 7. 
33. "60 Shout out Dalai Lama's Name and are Seized in Protest in Tibet," New York 
Times, October 7, 1987, p. AS. 
34. Wall Street Journal, October 7, 1987, p. 34. 
35. Amnesty International Report, supra note II, p. 4. 
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gating the demonstrations and riots. 36 One was executed immediately. 
Another "criminal" was executed at this same time, apparently reflect-
ing efforts by Chinese security forces to intimidate the population. 37 
China's Minister of Justice, Zou Yu, at this time stated that re-
ports that officials had violated the human rights of Tibetans was "sin-
ister slander." He declared that there was only one prison in Tibet 
and two labor camps where there were a total of 970 inmates, 27 of 
whom were serving sentences as counterrevolutionaries. 38 He labelled 
as false the reports of John F. Abedon, a U.S. Tibetan expert who had 
prepared testimony for the U.S. Congress in which he noted that Bei-
jing had jailed 20,000 Tibetans in 84 prisons in Tibet. 39 Amnesty In-
ternational subsequently debunked the Chinese minister's statement 
about there being only one prison in Tibet, when it reported on dissi-
dents being held in at least two different prisons in the capital city of 
Lhasa.40 
In reaction to all of this, the U.S. Senate voted unanimously (98-
0) to condemn the People's Republic of China for human rights abuses 
in Tibet. The amendment in which this condemnation was contained 
was part of an authorization bill for the Department of State. It urged 
President Reagan to meet with the Dalai Lama and called for progress 
on resolving human rights problems before the United States pro-
ceeded with new arms sales or weapons technology transfer to 
China.41 The Senate also charged that "China has made efforts to 
transfer millions of Chinese to Tibet" to "make the Tibetan people a 
minority in their own homeland."42 The State Department, however, 
refuted the Senate's claims and defended its report, published before 
the recent problems, that progress was being made on human rights in 
Tibet.43 
PROTEST AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN 1988 
After the fall 1987 demonstrations, anti-Chinese and anti-govern-
ment riots and violence, government and Party authorities in Tibet 
remained on alert. Soldiers and police with heavy weapons wet=e seen 
36. Wall Street Journal, October 7, 1987, p. 34. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Christian Science Monitor, October 7, 1987, p. 7. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Elaine Sciolino, "Beijing is Backed by Administration on Unrest in Tibet," New 
York Times, October 7, 1987, p. AI. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
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everywhere in Lhasa. Independence activists were imprisoned; many 
were tortured and some executed. There were daily warnings in the 
newspapers and on the radio that further demonstrations would be 
dealt with harshly. 
The Tibetan's hopes that foreign countries would put pressure on 
Beijing and that their cause would win outside support were damp-
ened. Foreign news reporters were ordered to leave Tibet so that they 
could not send information to the rest of the world about future inci-
dences and accompanying crackdowns and brutality. Human rights 
abuses thus would get little attention. 
The government also attempted to placate the angry monks and 
laymen in Lhasa and throughout Tibet. Some prisoners were released. 
Police were ordered not to use weapons in ordinary situations. The 
government even took actions to improve economic conditions in 
Lhasa. But this did not dampen the widespread ill-feeling among 
Tibetans about Beijing's earlier brutality and atrocities. 
On March 5, 1988 monks prepared for the annual Great Prayer 
Festival in Lhasa. The government stationed 50 police at the Jokhang 
Temple to guarantee there would be no trouble. The government-con-
trolled Chinese Buddhist Association had arranged the program that 
morning. But suddenly monks broke ranks and started shouting pro-
vocative slogans: "Independence for Tibet; Down with Chinese op-
pression; Long Live the Dalai Lama." Chinese police started 
photographing those doing the yelling to use as evidence for incarcera-
tion or even torture. The monks responded by throwing rocks at the 
photographers. 44 
Some 20,000 pilgrims and onlookers at the scene began to join in 
the chants supporting the Dalai Lama and Tibet's independence and 
chiding the Chinese government about human rights abuses.45 The 
police used percussion grenades and tear gas and arrested 100 monks, 
some of whom escaped in the confusion or with the help of 
onlookers. 46 
During the afternoon, the rioting spread. According to Xinhua, 
the official Chinese news agency, the protestors looted and set fire to 
shops and beat up policemen. They also set fire to buildings and 
automobiles. 47 Observers reported hearing gunshots through the night 
44. "Lhasa Boils Over Again," Asiaweek, March 18, 1989, p. 22. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Robert Delfs, "A Lost Horizon," Far Eastern Economic Review, March II, 1988, 
p. 24; see also ibid. 
47. Cited in Asiaweek, March 18, 1988, p. 22. 
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and into the morning.48 People's Daily reported that one policeman 
had been thrown out of a two-story building and killed and 28 others 
wounded.49 The Jokhang, Drepung and Sera monasteries, from where 
the monks that led the parade praying started the riots, were closed. 50 
There was only one non-Chinese reporter in Lhasa at the time, so 
the incidences did not get reported widely and the extent of police 
brutality and killing is not known. It probably will never be known. 
However, the single foreign journalist there said that a 15 year-old 
monk had been shot through the head and killed and that he was 
aware of eight deaths. Observers later interviewed said that they 
thought that the incidences this time were much greater than those in 
the fall of 1987, since there were 10 times as many protestors.51 They 
could not provide any information on the extent of beatings, killing or 
torture, though they did see beatings occur. 52 
On March 10, 1988, the 29th anniversary of China's invasion of 
Tibet in 1959, exiled Tibetans in Delhi demonstrated on the streets. A 
member of the Indian-based Tibetan Youth Congress told reporters at 
the time that "we are desperate because non-violent methods have not 
been working." He said that feelings were growing to get Chinese out 
of Tibet and that we must "win or perish." Some members of the 
group said they would resort to terrorist tactics. 53 Lhasa, however, 
remained quiet. Large numbers of police and paramilitary forces pa-
trolling the streets prevented demonstrations. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese military commander of the Tibet region 
publicly declared: "We must seriously punish the criminal acts of riot-
ers." But Beijing also made promises not to retaliate and to continue 
granting economic and political rights to Tibetans. Beijing's approach 
seemed to be a "dual policy" (both crackdowns and concessions) in-
tended to confuse Tibetans. Alternatively, and perhaps just as likely, 
reformists and hard line leftists in Beijing or even factions within the 
reformist camp, were in disagreement about how to deal with the 
situation. 54 
On March 10, while most of Tibet remained quiet, disturbances 
broke out in Qinghai province northeast of Tibet (China's gulag where 
millions of political prisoners are kept in "education through labor" 
48. Ibid. 
49. Cited in ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid. 
53. "Tibet: Ease Up or Crack Down," Asiaweek, March 15, 1988, p. 22. 
54. Ibid. 
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and "reform through labor" camps). Parts of Qinghai province are 
populated by Tibetans. In several "Tibetan autonomous districts" in 
Qinghai, Lamas demonstrated in support of the Dalai Lama and Ti-
betan independence. They also protested the use of forced abortions 
on Tibetans to reduce their population. 55 The protestors also de-
manded the release of monks arrested in late 1987 who were still in 
custody. 56 Little other information, particularly about human rights 
abuses was available. News reporters were not allowed in and infor-
mation had to come secondhand from travellers in the area. 57 
Later, information coming out of Lhasa indicated that, at the 
time of the March 5 riots, Buddhist monks poisoned tea and food con-
sumed by a number of policemen, Chinese Buddhists Association offi-
cials and Chinese reporters. 58 Chinese sources in Hong Kong also 
reported a large number of police injured, as well as officials were in-
jured in Lhasa. 59 In part of Tibet, monks and others oppressed by 
Beijing perceived they had to resort to terrorist guerrilla tactics as they 
had done in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In July 1988, Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden visited 
Lhasa, the first foreign government official allowed in after the March 
riots. He said that he had seen several monks beaten so badly that 
they could not remove their clothes. 60 He also stated that he had 
heard that monks had undergone Chinese rope torture: suspending 
victims from roof beams, beating them with sticks and belts and prod-
ding them with electric prods.61 
In August, U.S. Ambassador Winston Lord, who was known to 
have little sympathy for the Tibetan's cause, visited Tibet and met 
with Chinese and pro-government Tibetan officials. He expressed seri-
ous concern about what had happened in Tibet and suggested that 
American officials be allowed to visit the area. 62 Chinese officials 
55. Daniel Southerland, "Anti-Chinese Unrest Spreads to Province North of Tibet," 
San Francisco Chronicle, March 11, 1988, p. A23; Asiawatch had written a detailed report 
at this time delineating the extent of forced abortions and the application of fines and the 
denying of ration cards to third children so they would starve. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. 
58. See "China Reports 300 Cops Hurt in Tibet Riot," San Francisco Chronicle, March 
9, 1988, p. B11. 
59. Ibid. 
60. "China Breaks the Back of Tibetan Protest," Financial Times (London), July 29, 
1988, p. 6. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Daniel Southerland, "U.S. Ambassador to Beijing Expresses 'Deep Concern' in 
Visit to Tibet," Washington Times, August 17, 1988, p. At5. 
HUMAN RIGHTS CASE 21 
promised that reporters would be allowed to return in a "planned 
way."63 Lord asserted that the U.S. Administration was as concerned 
about human rights problems in Tibet as the U.S. Congress.64 
However, within days of Ambassador Lord's visit, the Chinese 
Embassy in Washington denied a visit to Representative Charles Rose, 
who had wanted to visit Tibet. The Embassy said it was the tourist 
season and it was "not convenient to arrange the trip."65 Meanwhile, 
Han Xu, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, in a letter to 
Representative Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, expressed deep concern about a bill introduced by Rose 
and five others that called for economic sanctions against China if the 
President could not confirm that the human rights situation in Tibet 
had improved. 66 The sanctions were to include cancelling China's 
most favored nation status, which allowed Beijing to export its prod-
ucts to the United States under a lower tariff schedule. 
On September 7, nuns gathered at Jokhang Temple in Lhasa and 
began shouting slogans such as "Freedom for Tibet." They were im-
mediately taken away by police.67 Some days later, police used tear 
gas and closed off at least one temple after monks began demonstrat-
ing and shouting pro-independence slogans. 68 Again no details of 
these protests became available because foreign reporters were still 
barred from Tibet. According to one source, Tibetans at this time 
were mainly protesting the presence of Chinese Public Security Bureau 
officials, police and Communist Party cadres in Lhasa and Beijing's 
assimilation policy. 69 
CONCLUSIONS 
By late 1988, it seemed clear that the efforts of Tibetans to draw 
attention to their plight and human rights abuses in their homeland 
had failed. They managed to attract world attention to Tibet for a 
short time. But when foreign reporters were banned, reporting on Ti-
bet diminished quickly. The foreign press made no real effort to keep 
the issue before the public. Western reporters were unable to get to 
63. Ibid. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Daniel Southerland, "China Denies Visa to Rose Critic on Tibet," Washington 
Post, August II, 1988, p. A28. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Guy Dinmore, "Calm Belies Tensions in Tibet Under 'Chinese Oppression' " Ja-
pan Times, September 27, 1988, p. 8. 
68. "Protests Reported in Tibet," Washington Times, September 30, 1988, p. AS. 
69. Far Eastern Economic Review, October 13, 1988, p. 26. 
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the scene and report what was happening so they went elsewhere and 
focused on new stories. Because of this, the public (in the United 
States and other Western countries) had the impression that the 
problems in Tibet had passed and that human rights problems were no 
longer so serious-which was patently untrue. 
Protestors also failed to get the United Nations or the U.S. gov-
ernment to do anything to correct the deplorable human rights situa-
tion in Tibet. The United Nations was not prepared to challenge the 
Chinese government on the issue. Clearly, the world body was in no 
mood to issue a resolution of condemnation or apply the concept of 
self-determination. Similarly, the United States was not prepared to 
challenge the Chinese government on the issue. The State Department 
was embarrassed by the situation, having previously played down 
human rights abuses in China. Moreover, it did not want to challenge 
Beijing. The U.S. Congress was more willing to incur Beijing's wrath; 
but even the Congress did not push very far. Congress, was not that 
much concerned about human rights in Tibet; after all, Tibetans did 
not have a constituency that could keep their problems before the 
American public. 
The Chinese government had sought to make money on tourists 
who wanted to visit Tibet. Allowing visitors to Tibet was part of their 
"opening to the outside world" policy. Beijing's reaction to the 
problems in Tibet was to close Tibet and reverse its policy until condi-
tions there changed-meaning when demonstrations stopped and 
Tibetans got the message that trying to do something about human 
rights abuse there was futile. In this, the Chinese government was 
successful. 
Chinese authorities made few, if any, real concessions. Their 
crackdown and brutality clearly exceeded their sometimes better treat-
ment of Tibetans. In fact, future analysis probably will indicate that 
the crackdown and the deterioration of the human rights condition in 
Tibet 1988 was much much worse than was known. 
CHAPTER III 
POLITICS IN COMMAND? 
INTRODUCTION 
As in the past, the human rights condition in the People's Repub-
lic of China (PRC) continues to be affected by its politics and its polit-
ical system. Over some of the past two years, the PRC experienced 
progress in political reform; however, toward the end of the period 
reform seemed again to be in retreat. This was not unlike the situation 
in early 1987 following student demonstrations that led to the fall of 
Deng Xiaoping's handpicked successor, Party General Secretary Hu 
Y aobang, the dashing of democratic reforms and the ascendancy of 
the hardline left in the Chinese Communist Party and the government. 
This time the primary causes were corruption, crime and infla-
tion. Alternatively, the reformers became too confident and went too 
far. Deng's new successor, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, saw his 
political power wane. Zhao's political power had been related most 
closely to the issue of inflation, though it may have been as much a 
barometer reflecting other issues as it was an issue itself. In any event, 
Zhao's authority and reputation took a nosedive in the fall of 1988 as 
he was stripped of his authority over the special economic zones and 
other economic decision-making. Inasmuch as economic reform and 
political reform were linked and an erosion of Zhao's authority 
benefitted the anti-reformist left, it appeared again to be a bad omen 
for political and civil liberties. 
Widespread corruption (or so it was perceived) and rapid in-
creases in the crime rate were issues in themselves and resulted in vari-
ous crackdowns. But they also engendered changes in the political 
system or were the cause of inauspicious (for those concerned about 
human rights) political shifts. This was most apparent in "administra-
tive" changes made to beef up the power, authority and effectiveness 
of China's police and security organizations. These changes, in fact, 
suggested that the reforms were not working; alternatively, they had 
to be protected by draconian measures. 
Hong Kong was likewise an issue that mirrored the changing 
political wind in Beijing. During the period under study, China's 
treatment of Hong Kong demonstrated some progress in human 
rights. Beijing showed a degree of confidence by taking measures to 
(23) 
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loosen political controls and make political reforms compatible with 
its economic reforms. These applied to Hong Kong. But this situa-
tion subsequently reversed course. 
POWER STRUGGLES AND THE SHIFTING 
WINDS OF POLITICS 
Almost like a rerun of 1986-87, during 1988 there was a political 
power struggle in China between the left and right-the hardliners 
and the reformers. This struggle affected the structure and workings 
of the political system. It in turn affected the human rights condition 
in the PRC. As before, an intensified struggle between factions in the 
Party and an ascendancy of the left had a deleterious influence on the 
practice and regard for human rights. 
The last half of 1987 saw the reformers in the driver's seat. They 
had survived the leftist backlash of late 1986 and early 1987. Though 
General Secretary Hu was sacrificed to placate the left or the orthodox 
hardliners, Premier Zhao replaced him as head of the party and as 
Deng's apparent successor. He advocated political reform almost as 
strongly as Hu-and was more clever. Thus the reforms seemed to be 
on track again. In fact, by late 1987 and early 1988 democratization 
was proceeding, according to some observers, "full steam ahead." 
At the 13th Party Congress, held in November 1987, Deng 
Xiaoping orchestrated a reduction in the size of the Central Commit-
tee of the Chinese Communist Party and the promotion of 60 plus new 
members to this body, nearly all reformists. He persuaded or pres-
sured more than 90 to step down. This meant that the Party hierarchy 
was now made up of only a handful of Long March veterans and a few 
leftist ideologues and Maoists. The Party leadership now was com-
prised of more technocrats, pragmatists and rightist reformers and was 
younger-55.2 years of age for the Central Committee compared to 
over 59 before. 1 
The Party Constitution also was amended to promote reform. 
Chairpersons of the Central Military Commission, the Central Advi-
sory Commission and the Commission for Discipline no longer had to 
be members of the Politburo. The relationship between the Politburo 
and its Standing Committee was clarified. Party cells in government 
as well as in factories and enterprises were abolished. Party and gov-
ernment functions were defined more clearly. In short, the composi-
tion and the structure and functional operation of the Party became 
I. "Reformists Dominate Politburo," Asian Bulletin, January 1988, p. 94. 
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more constitutional and democratic. 2 
Premier Zhao Ziyang, a staunch reformist, was voted Party Gen-
eral Secretary. Hu Yaobang, Deng's previous heir apparent and re-
form advocate, who was sacked in January, was returned to the 
Politburo. Most of the other top members of the Party and its 
Politburo were reformists. Zhao said at the time that the new leader-
ship team would "keep up the momentum. " 3 
As a result of decisions made at the Party Congress, there was a 
call for the rehabilitation of the more than 500 publications shut down 
during the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign.4 There was also a 
call for supporting a new press law that would make clear the rights of 
journalists and free speech and the press. 5 The Chinese Writers Asso-
ciation was to hold a national congress in 1987 but cancelled it. The 
Association started to make plans again for that meeting. There was 
also an announcement that a Court of Appeals, similar to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in its power and duties, would be established.6 
However, because the rightist reformists had what appeared (to 
them at least) a close call in late 1986 and early 1987, they carefully 
guarded their political prerogatives. They were cautious not to allow 
political reform or the advocates of democracy and political and civil 
rights to endanger their positions again. The lines of authority of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) vis-a-vis the government were "clar-
ified" at the Party Congress to the advantage of the Party. The CCP 
gained, even though the reformists argued that to implement democ-
racy and enhance civil and political rights (not to mention further eco-
nomic reforms) there needed to be a separation of powers. The 
proposal that the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference should be autonomous was dropped. 
Measures were taken to improve Party discipline and prevent grass-
roots opportunities for change in the lines of authority. 7 One might 
say that the reformers perceived that they had to hold on to political 
power and take a tough stance against any threat to political stability 
in order to stay in power and continue reforms. 
In March, the CCP Central Committee met at an unusual time-
just before the convening of the National People's Congress. The tim-
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. /d., p. 95. 
5. Ibid. 
6. /d., p. 97. 
7. Robert Delfs, "Guess who's boss," Far Eastern Economic Review, (hereafter 
FEER) March 31, 1988, p. 32. 
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ing of the meeting suggested that the CCP wanted to guard against the 
transfer of political authority to the government while supporting 
newly installed Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang against acting 
Premier Li Peng (a leftist described by many as a Stalinist in his eco-
nomic planning views). In other words, it was perceived the left 
would take advantage of a separation of powers.8 The Central Com-
mittee approved two of Zhao's appointments to the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference and drew attention to Zhao's speech 
in order to denigrate, or at least weaken, Premier Li's annual report on 
the work of the government at the National People's Congress.9 Nev-
ertheless, at the National People's Congress-China's "parliament"-
Li was made Premier as a concession to the left. Moreover, the Party 
right or the reformists could not block the appointment. 
Meanwhile, delegates to the Congress had been picked in a selec-
tion process that had a few more candidates than seats, a process 
widely publicized as a "differential election" to the unfamiliar popu-
lace. This made the NPC seem something less than a rubber stamp 
body, though the "democratic" selection process did not extend up to 
more important government organs. But this process did not "speed 
up" very much. The selection of more powerful organs of government 
was much less democratic. Twenty candidates to the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress ran unopposed. There were 
144 candidates for the 135 remaining seats. There was only one candi-
date each for the position of President, Vice-President, Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission (of the government) and President of 
the Supreme People's Court. Election did not play a role in selecting 
members of the State Council-the top hierarchy of the government; 
they were picked by the Party. 10 Still the PRC media hailed this gov-
ernment as the most open and democratic one yet. 11 
NPC delegates discussed inflation, agricultural prices (for the 
farmers), food costs (for city residents) and wages. 12 There was some 
"protest opposition" to certain policies announced at the meeting. But 
this did not go too far. Moreover, criticism was to a large degree 
aimed at the reforms-their defeats and unwanted consequences. Pre-
mier Li Peng's report, entitled "10 Major Tasks of the State Council," 
centered on problems of political instability; it stressed, or advocated, 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Robert Delfs, "Rally 'round the state," FEER, April 21, 1988, p. 12; "NPC An-
nounces Leadership Shuffle," Asian Bulletin, June 1988, p. 85. 
II. Ibid. 
12. Robert Delfs, "Outburst of democracy," FEER, April 7, 1988, p. 16. 
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severe punishments for crimes, especially economic crimes. 13 It had a 
distinct flavor of counterreform. 
Deng and the Party right meanwhile took actions to ensure that 
the reforms were not sidetracked. Zhao, who remained in control, put 
reformists, particularly those with political influence and connections, 
in top positions in the military: Chief of Staff (Chi Haotian), Director 
of the Political Department (Yang Baibing), and Head of the General 
Logistics Department (Zhao Nanqi). Also, a Deng confidant, Qin 
Jiwei, was made the new Minister of Defense. 14 Coinciding with these 
personnel changes, Zhao Ziyang was made (the newly created) First 
Vice Chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission. 15 Gen-
eral Secretary Zhao demonstrated his new authority in that position 
by announcing the restoration of ranks in the military, the abolition of 
the rank of marshal, the official abandonment of Mao's strategy of the 
"People's War," and the completion of a force reduction in the Peo-
ple's Liberation Army. 16 According to Western observers, Zhao was 
being groomed to set military policy in order to help him consolidate 
his power base and ensure Party control over the military and the 
government. 17 
In April 1988, the media suddenly announced a surprise reversal 
of a previously announced decision to restructure the transportation 
sector, merging the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Communi-
cations and the state airlines. Xinhua News Agency said the govern-
ment had "taken note" of different views on the matter. 18 Many said 
it was an attempt by top Party officials to embarrass Premier Li 
Peng-an advocate of change in transportation and energy. 19 
Just a few days later Yang Shangkun was "elected" president 
(though he was the only candidate). Wan Li, by the same procedure 
(a Party closed-door decision) was made head of the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress. The two, both Deng sup-
porters, again reflected Party (read Deng and Premier Zhao) efforts to 
control the government. It also reflected the continued ascendancy of 
the right-since the previous holders of these offices, Li Xiannian and 
Peng Zhen, were leftists. Other appointments also reflected domi-
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16. "U.S. Lifts High-Tech Sanctions; NPC Convenes," Asian Bulletin, May 1988, p. 
92. 
17. Ibid. 
18. "NPC Announces Leadership Shuffle," Asian Bulletin, June 1988, p. 85. 
19. Ibid. 
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nance of the rightist reformers. 20 
The offensive against the left continued. In June, a Chinese Com-
munist Party spokesman said that the Party would accelerate the 
purge started in 1980, which had already censured or expelled 800,000 
Party members. In other words, the purge, aimed at radical leftists 
and Maoists, would be put back on track. A few days later, Deng 
Xiaoping told Ethiopian President Mengistu in the presence of both 
Chinese and foreign reporters that "socialism had brought China and 
its people 20 years of great suffering." Deng also referred to "leftist 
errors" in 1956, referring to the terrible persecution of intellectuals in 
the Hundred Flowers Campaign. This followed a similar unabashed 
statement aimed at anti-reformist leftists: in May 1988 Deng told 
Mozambique President Chissano that "judging from China's experi-
ence, I advise you not to adopt socialism. " 21 
But perhaps the reformists went too far. Several events, which 
may have been spontaneous, but symptomatic of the general restive 
mood, undermined the reformists' political position. In April, there 
were riots in Sichuan province when police reported that a woman had 
committed suicide, although it was widely known that she had been 
murdered by her husband. Rioters attacked government offices and 
the police.22 In May, spectators went on a rampage at a soccer match 
in the same province, causing a large number of injuries. Mobs later 
sacked a local police station and set it on fire. This incident was re-
ported widely in the foreign press. In June, a thousand or more peas-
ants staged a demonstration near Beijing, protesting a government 
decision to release polluted water into a reservoir used for irrigating 
crops.23 At nearly the same time Beijing University students demon-
strated, calling for democracy and press freedom. 24 Fifty law students 
from another city meanwhile staged a sit-in at the entrance of 
Zhongnanhai, the exclusive area where the PRC's top Party and other 
officials live. 25 According to one report, some demonstrating students 
carried big character posters reading: "Our Ultimate Goal Is the 
Overthrow of the Government. " 26 
20. Ibid. 
21. "Peasant Protest," Asian Bulletin, August 1988, p. 75. 
22. "A Rumble of Discontent," Asiaweek, July 22, 1988, p. II. 
23. "Disputed Battle," Asia week, July 15, 1988, p. 23; "Thousands of Police Use Force 
to Quell Peasants' Demonstration Near Peking," China News (Taipei), June 30, 1988, p. I. 
24. Daniel Southerland, "Beijing Warns Universities to Control Campus Unrest," 
Washington Post, June 12, 1988, p. A22 (hereafter Southerland). 
25. Ibid. 
26. See note 22 supra. 
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Apparently there were many more demonstrations that went un-
reported in other parts of the countryY In August, riots and ethnic 
unrest erupted in Xinjiang Autonomous Region in Western China. 
According to Party documents condemning the violence, secessionism 
may have been a motive of the rioters. 28 There had been student dem-
onstrations involving Uighur groups prior to that, which may have 
been incited by Muslim problems in the Soviet Union or elsewhere and 
which may have seemed ominous to authorities in Beijing.29 
Also in August, rumors spread in Beijing, and soon around the 
rest of the country as well, that the Chinese Communist Party 
Politburo had decided on a package (a five-year plan) of price reforms. 
The rumors, suggesting the reforms meant more price increases and 
inflation, prompted panic buying. This coincided with a top Party 
meeting at the retreat area of Beidaihe, which became deadlocked and 
resulted in a setback for General Secretary Zhao and his reforms. 
Outlook Weekly subsequently blamed Party propagandists who sug-
gested that "people seek luxury before getting rich."30 People's Daily 
later said that "without the understanding and support of the masses, 
reforms cannot be carried out."31 Apparently, serious friction be-
tween the left and the right in the Party's top leadership provoked 
heated discussions on various issues and perhaps led to the leak. 
The difficulties finally led to an ascendancy of the hardliner oppo-
nents of reform. According to one report, Bo Yibo, chairman of the 
Party Central Advisory Committee and an influential old guard, met 
with a number of other left hardliners in July and plotted Zhao's fall. 
Another source claims that in August, Deng Xiaoping decided that 
things were going awry and himself opted not to support Zhao. Alter-
natively because of the seriousness of the situation, he sided with the 
left. 32 In any event, Zhao was stripped of his power to control the 
economy in August-a decision that was confirmed at the Third Ple-
num of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee meeting in 
September. 33 
Subsequently, price controls were reestablished. Workers were 
told to sell back shares of stock they had purchased. Commissions 
27. Southerland, supra note 24. 
28. A Chinese Communist Party document appeared in Xinjiang Daily on August 4, 
1988, cited in "Price reform Fuels Party Debate," Asian Bulletin, October 1988, p. 80. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Cited in "Breakdown at Beidaihe," Asiaweek, August 19, 1988, p. 18. 
31. Cited in Asia Yearbook 1989, p. 102. 
32. "Zhao Takes a Tumble," Asiaweek, September 16, 1988, p. 20. 
33. "Dealer's Choice," Asiaweek, October 8, 1988, p. 38. 
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were banned. The crackdown to resolve economic problems soon 
spread. On October 1, at a National Day event, Premier Li Peng, who 
represented the left hardliners now clearly on the ascendancy, said: 
"No department, locality or unit may pursue its own narrow inter-
ests. . . . " He went on to declare that the "principle of subordinating 
political and local interests to overall interests must be followed with-
out hesitation."34 Observers took this to mean that decentralization of 
political power and democracy were being reversed or trashed. 
At this time, Deng Xiaoping refused to discuss domestic politics 
in China with foreigners. General Secretary Zhao stated publicly that 
the four Little Dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singa-
pore) experienced economic growth and prosperity "against a back-
drop of tight political rule."35 Officials started using the term "liberal 
totalitarianism" as a term synonymous with maintaining political sta-
bility. The Shanghai Wen Hui Bao attacked the "do your own thing" 
style of the reformists and advocated strengthening ideological and 
political work and a return to the selflessness and devotion to Party 
ideals of the 1950s.36 Tough reformists meanwhile referred to Zhao's 
"totalitarian temptation" for cancelling the progress made in civil and 
political rights. 
Subsequently, the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Depart-
ment issued a directive to the media, forbidding newspapers, television 
and radio from carrying too many articles on reform in the Soviet 
Union and especially of making comparisons with Chinese reform.37 
They towed the line. When Gorbachev subsequently pushed out 
hardline ideologue Yegor Ligachev, the Chinese media made no com-
ment. Gorbachev's reforms were portrayed as encouraging factional-
ism. Some papers even declared that the Chinese reforms were 
superior because there were no divisions or dissent within the Party. 38 
KEEPING THE LID ON 
The rightist reformers learned their lesson in early 1987 that al-
lowing too much political freedom and especially criticism of the 
Party and the government would give the left an opportunity to 
weaken their position. They thus pushed continued reform-but 
within bounds. One also can say that the Deng-Zhao team sought 
limited democracy and improvement in human rights not just to keep 
34. Cited in Asia Yearbook 1989, p. 104. 
35. "Rolling Back the Years," Asiaweek, November 18, 1988, p. 27. 
36. Cited in ibid. 
37. "Different Plans," Asiaweek, November 18, 1988, p. 29. 
38. Ibid.; see also chapter 6 on Chinese intellectuals' views on Gorbachev's reforms. 
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the economic reforms moving, but to keep the left off-guard and main-
tain their own political power. This meant that there was an ulterior 
motive involved, as had been the case in 1979 and during the Democ-
racy Wall movement earlier. 39 
In December 1987, on the first anniversary of the 1986 student 
riots, students marched on government offices to protest the murder of 
a classmate. Immediately, hundreds of police took to the streets in 
Beijing in an effort to ensure that the protest went without incident. 
According to observers, the police acted very quickly and upon the 
least provocation, making arrests and bating students. 40 Police on the 
campuses increased surveillance of students and used harassment and 
intimidation to hold student activities in check.41 
The tough policies continued. When peasants demonstrated in 
June, more than 8,000 police reportedly were used to stop the pro-
test-killing three peasants and injuring hundreds more in the pro-
cess.42 Police also reportedly dragged a thousand peasants from the 
scene.43 In response to subsequent student demonstrations in Beijing, 
security police were placed on the campus permanently.44 The official 
Chinese press agency, Xinhua, in support of these policies, blamed the 
Voice of America for exaggerating the situation.45 The State Educa-
tion Commission subsequently met with students and warned them 
about future demonstrations and criticized some students for "giving 
outsiders opportunities to sabotage ... and incit[ing] students to make 
trouble. . . . "46 
In Hainan province in June, police beat a large number of stu-
dents in what became known as the "Bloody July 12 Incident." In a 
later student protest, a leaflet seen by foreign reporters said that police 
had told students that "if I beat you to death, I will only be disci-
plined."47 The same month in Beijing, students who had invited U.S. 
Ambassador Winston Lord to appear and talk to students, were ex-
39. See Yuan-li Wu, Franz Michael, John F. Copper, Ta-ling Lee, A. James Gregor 
and Maria Hsia Chang, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China (Boulder, Co.: 
Westview Press, 1988) for further details. 
40. "Student Discontent Brewing; Red Flag Ceases Publication," Asian Bulletin, Feb-
ruary 1988, p. 84. See also Chapter 5 on other student demonstrations. 
41. Ibid. 
42. "Disrupted Battle," Asiaweek, July 15, 1988, p. 23. 
43. "Peasants Protest," Asian Bulletin, August 1988, p. 75. 
44. Asiaweek, July 22, 1988, p. II. 
45. Southerland, supra note 24. 
46. Ibid. 
47. "Students Protest Police Brutality," Asian Bulletin, September 1988, p. 76. 
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pelled from the university and were not seen again.48 
The Office on the Reform of the Political Structure, an organiza-
tion controlled by Zhao, also dropped its plan to publish decisions to 
institutionalize the separation of powers (a new relationship between 
the Chinese Communist Party and the government), reform the civil 
service and broaden people's rights.49 Newspaper reporters subse-
quently were told not to print stories on such incidences as the strikes 
in Poland and the anti-government riots in Burma, because they could 
ignite student or worker protest in China. 50 Government officials also 
started paying workers not to join student demonstrations in order to 
sever links between the two, fearing that students might tum labor 
demands into a political cause.51 Press rights being discussed were 
held in abeyance or cancelled. 
POLICE AND SECURITY SYSTEM BEEF-UP 
As a result of an increase in the crime rate, but more particularly 
the perception of its threat both to the government and the Party as 
well as to the reforms (by those who supported them), the issue of 
crime and its harmful effects on Chinese society were discussed more 
frequently in public. In that context, the prerogatives of the police 
and security organs were expanded in some important ways. In fact, 
additional powers given these law enforcement agencies suggest shifts 
or changes in the political system toward tighter control with more 
sophisticated means. This view is confirmed by the fact that late in the 
year a new state secrets act was formulated. 
In January 1988, Minister of Public Security Wang Fang (also 
State Councillor) announced that public security organs at various 
levels would punish crimes against public order more effectively. 52 He 
cited to new regulations governing offenses against public order 
promulgated January 1, 1987, noting that in the first 11 months of 
1987 public security organs had dealt with an unprecedented number 
of offenses against regulations. 53 The Chinese government had not 
published crime statistics or the details of work by public security or-
gans quite like this before. 
In April, Minister Wang announced that China's police and se-
48. Ibid. 
49. "Trying to Keep the Lid On," Asiaweek, September 30, 1988, p. 29. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid.; "A Rumble of Discontent," Asiaweek, July 21, 1988, p. 11. 
52. Foreign Broadcase Information Service (China) (hereafter FBIS), January 7, 1988, 
p. 20. 
53. Ibid. 
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curity organs needed to be made more efficient. He announced that 
"reform," including unifying authority and making the police system 
highly efficient, would be accomplished by the end of the year.54 
Later, Wang referred to increases in "serious incidents"-riots at 
sports events, cases of looting, attacks on police and government offi-
cials, aircraft hijacking, bombings-as requiring stiffer sentences. 55 
He suggested cited 15 to 20 years of incarceration and death penalties 
for political offenders. 56 In September he declared: "Some people re-
gard beatings of public security officials and judicial cadres ... as acts 
of legitimate defense."57 He also cited problems of a large transient 
population (50 million in the country and 10 percent of the Beijing 
population), ineffective labor reform and education reform, increases 
in recidivism, and absence of improvements in personnel and equip-
ment in public security organs. 58 Wang even warned that the country 
"faces possible turmoil" because of this situation. 59 
Several important actions subsequently were taken to improve 
(but also change) the system. These "improvements" carried serious 
implications regarding political and civil rights. Riot control units 
were established, apparently after consultations with Polish riot con-
trol officials. 60 Ostensibly this was aimed at stopping student demon-
strations, though another target in mind may have been farmers (who 
had been protesting over the unavailability of fertilizer and pollution 
ruining their crops and who had reportedly seized weapons to support 
their civil disobedience). 61 Public security offices were set up on col-
lege and university campuses to "ensure smooth education."62 Mobile 
units were trained in order to deal with outbreaks of riots and demon-
strations with swift and overwhelming force. 63 
The Political Legal Leading Group, which was established under 
the control of the State Council in 1987 to replace the Political Legal 
Commission (an organization which supervises public security organs, 
the procuracy and the judiciary), saw its powers increased and broad-
ened in 1988. It took various actions in late 1987 and throughout 
54. FBIS, April 21, 1988, p. 36. 
55. Tai Ming Cheung, "Crackdown in crime," FEER, November 3, 1988, p. 23. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Ibid.; also see FBIS, April 18, 1988, p. 36. 
59. Daniel Southerland, "China Foresees 'Turmoil,'" Washington Post, July 7, 1988, p. 
A29. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Cheung, supra note 55. 
63. Ibid. 
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1988 to consolidate its supervisory activities, reporting directly to the 
Party (even though it is administratively under state control) any seri-
ous problems that it believed required Draconian solutions. The Min-
ister of Civil Administration and various economic ministries were 
then required to report more frequently to the Political Legal Leading 
Group.64 
The Ministry of State Security, set up in 1983 for overseeing for-
eigners and Chinese with foreign contacts and carrying out counteres-
pionage work as well as intelligence gathering abroad, also saw its role 
expanded. As a consequence, it began recruiting more students, tour 
guides, hotel workers and foreign language experts, reflecting both 
broader responsibilities and more authority.65 
The People's Armed Police, formed in April 1983 from local Peo-
ple's Liberation Army units and by 1987 500,000 strong, also was en-
larged. Its new duties included quelling serious disturbances, 
guarding Party and government buildings and personnel, and anti-ter-
rorist activities. Since it remains under the Minister of Public Secur-
ity, but reports to the Party's Central Military Commission, it seems 
to have merged military and security functions, perhaps as a means of 
getting the military involved in law enforcement (or alternatively of 
keeping it out).66 The People's Armed Police was sent into action to 
deal with problems in Tibet, farmer protest and student 
demonstrations. 67 
During 1988, a new state secrets law was formulated to go into 
effect in 1989. In this connection, a new State Secrets Bureau was 
established to replace the old Central Secrets Commission.68 It is sup-
posed to be more systematic and comprehensive and institute a new 
classification system for secret documents. Both this new organ's ac-
tivities and the formulation of a new secrets law caused some Chinese 
officials to claim that the law and the Bureau's authority were too 
broad. Coming under the new law are economic, social, scientific re-
search and development and major police decisions, in addition to mil-
itary, public security and diplomatic secrets. Punishments range from 
five years minimum to life or the death penalty. 69 Some say the provi-
64. Ibid. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Ibid.; also see James L. Tyson, "Peking shows limits to tolerance of public outcry," 
Christian Science Monitor, July l, 1988, p. 7. 
68. Cheung, supra note 55. 
69. Ibid. 
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sions are so broad that even ideological writings can be classified. 70 
HONG KONG 
The PRC's actions toward Hong Kong during 1987 and 1988 ap-
peared to reflect its attitudes toward human rights as well as setbacks 
suffered by the reformists during 1988 and concessions made to 
hardline leftists in the Party and the government. Clearly, Hong 
Kong was not being treated as Beijing had promised in the 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration (wherein London and Beijing negotiated the 
return of Hong Kong to PRC control in 1997). China's "change of 
heart," as some put it, constituted grave concern to those in Hong 
Kong who had hoped that democracy and respect of human rights 
had some future there. 
According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong Kong was 
given the following guarantees: (1) a capitalist system for fifty years 
after 1997, (2) the British judicial and legal system, (3) a court of final 
appeal in Hong Kong, (4) a chief executive accountable to an elected 
Legislative Council, (5) guarantees of human rights-including reli-
gion, travel and the press and (6) a "highly autonomous status--ex-
cept for defense and foreign policy. Beijing violated all of these 
provisions during 1987/88. 
The first draft of the Basic Law (Hong Kong's future "constitu-
tion"), which a 58-member committee had been working on for three 
years, was released in April 1988. The draft reflected China's "new 
positions" vis-a-vis earlier promises on Hong Kong's rights. Beijing 
also took specific actions to undermine the nascent democracy move-
ment in Hong Kong even before the draft was released, so that it 
would face less opposition. 
In December 1987, Ji Pengfei, the Director of the Hong Kong 
and Macao Affairs Office in the PRC government's State Council, told 
the Basic Law Drafting Committee that he "did not trust the United 
Kingdom" and declared that the chief executive of the Hong Kong 
Special Autonomous Region would in no way be elected.71 He also 
spoke against any major reform in Hong Kong during the transition 
period. Justified by suspicions of a U.S. plot, Ji opposed all demo-
cratic reforms. 72 
During 1987, a pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong called 
for electing 25 percent of the Legislative Council in 1988 and 50 per-
70. Ibid. 
71. Delfs, supra note 12. 
72. Ibid. 
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cent by 1997. Beijing pressured London and the Hong Kong govern-
ment to block this. An official "White Paper" (published by the Hong 
Kong government) subsequently called for elections of the Legislative 
Council in 1991 (as Beijing had asked) and requested that less than 20 
percent be elected directly.73 Meanwhile, the Hong Kong government 
conducted two public opinion surveys purporting to indicate that the 
population did not want elections in 1988. Nine independent polls, 
however, showed that the public favored elections by a two to one 
majority.74 Beijing then picked 19 representatives to the National 
People's Congress to represent Hong Kong-including none elected to 
office in Hong Kong. 75 The Chinese Communist Party also continued 
its efforts to infiltrate local government bodies in Hong Kong-suc-
cessfully in the case of the March District Board election. 76 
As for the promise of keeping its judicial and legal system and the 
court of appeal, the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement and the 
press noted, when the draft Basic Law was published, that the PRC's 
National People's Congress retained the right to interpret the Basic 
Law. This meant no final court of appeal for Hong Kong's legal sys-
tem. 77 The Basic Law further declared that findings of the court of 
appeal will be subject to review and should not conflict with the PRC's 
national interest. According to the Hong Kong press and advocates of 
democracy, this further undermined the ideals of an independent judi-
cial system. 78 
The draft Basic Law also envisioned a strong executive (who will 
be appointed by Beijing), thus establishing executive supremacy and 
reducing the importance of the Legislative Council. The chief execu-
tive can be impeached only by two-thirds of the Legislative Council, 
which, since it is seventy-five percent appointed, will make impeach-
ment meaningless.79 It also stated that executive-legislative relations 
will remain the same, signifying that executive power cannot be 
challenged. 80 
The Basic Law draft rejects the Universal Declaration on Human 
73. Emily Lau, "The gray paper," FEER, February 18, 1988, p. 14. 
74. See "China Jays down the Jaw for Hong Kong," U.S. News and World Report, May 
16, 1988, p. 16. A Gallup Poll taken at this time also debunked the government poll. 
75. Lau, supra note 73. 
76. Delfs, supra note 12. 
77. Emily Lau, "Breach of Promise?" FEER, May 12, 1988, p. 34. For details on the 
Basic Law, see William McGuin, Basic Law, Basic Questions (Hong Kong: Review Pub-
lishing Co., 1988). 
78. Delfs, supra note 12. 
79. Lau, supra note 77. 
80. Ibid. 
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Rights as the basis for Hong Kong's population rights (also contrary 
to promises made in the Sino-British Declaration), and bases Hong 
Kong citizens' rights on the Chinese Constitution.81 The rights to life, 
freedom from torture and freedom from forced or compulsive labor 
are conspicuously missing. Essential attributes of other rights also are 
omitted. 82 
The Draft also states that the press will not publish anything con-
trary to the PRC's national interest. Moreover, there is no right to 
receive information, which may be interpreted as a further encroach-
ment on press freedom. 83 Foreign ownership of television stations will 
be likewise limited by the Hong Kong government as a result of PRC 
pressure. 84 
The draft Basic Law, according to critics, also contains confusing 
provisions about the economy-which could be used to change Hong 
Kong's free market status. 85 In other words, the promise of fifty years 
of capitalism also may be in question. 
All of this was not unnoticed by the populace of Hong Kong and 
to some extent by the British government and the rest of the world. In 
February 1988, Hong Kong students held demonstrations and burned 
copies of the "White Paper." They protested the delay in holding di-
rect elections, the Hong Kong government's disregard for public opin-
ion and Beijing's stacking the Legislative Council with professional 
people having no experience in government (some of them having been 
involved in scandals).86 Newspapers in Britain described the "White 
Paper" as a "betrayal of the Hong Kong people" and published pic-
tures of demonstrators outside the Legislative Council building and a 
hunger strike by post-secondary students. 87 
In July 1988, MPs in London engaged in a five-hour debate on 
the Basic Law, with a number of members declaring that it "under-
mine[ d) Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy" promised in the Sino-
British Joint Declaration. 88 Members of the Hong Kong Law Society, 
the Hong Kong Bar Association and other professional groups flew to 
London to lobby against the Basic Law. They made the following 
81. Delfs, supra note 12. 
82. Ibid. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Delfs, supra note 7. 
85. Ibid. 
86. Emily Lau, "A mixed review," FEER, February 25, 1988, p. 21. 
87. Emily Lau, "Doubts emerge on degree of real autonomy," FEER, March 31, 1988, 
pp. 57-58. 
88. Emily Lau, "Basic problems of law," FEER, August 11, 1988, p. 18. 
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points: that the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress (a political body) should not have jurisdiction over Hong Kong 
legislative conflicts; that it should not have standing with Special Au-
tonomous Region Courts; that the State Council must not have the 
authority to promulgate Chinese law "which gives expression to na-
tional unity and territorial integrity"; that SAR courts have no juris-
diction over executive acts of the PRC government, thereby placing 
the latter "above the law"; and, that the PRC Constitution needs to be 
amended (since Article 1, which enshrines socialism, is contrary to the 
"one country, two system" idea and since Article 5, stating that no 
laws or local rules may contravene the PRC Constitution, makes inef-
fectual the high degree of autonomy provision of the Sino-British 
Declaration). 89 
Amnesty International also protested. Amnesty sent an 18-page 
memorandum to the Basic Law Drafting Committee, saying that the 
law was "seriously flawed" and that it did not protect human rights.90 
The memorandum specifically mentioned the right to life, fair trial, 
protection against torture and other inhumane and degrading treat-
ment, and detention of prisoners of conscience. None of these, said 
Amnesty, was provided for in the draft Basic Law. Amnesty also as-
sailed the provision in the draft which states that rights and freedoms 
can be restricted for "maintenance of national security, public order, 
public safety, public health, public morals and for safeguarding the 
rights and freedoms of other persons."91 Amnesty said that this "gen-
eral clause" undermines all human rights.92 
The Pro-Democracy Group in Hong Kong protested that the Ba-
sic Law had no bill of rights and represented the "amassing of political 
power by the state. "93 Copying the PRC Constitution's "Bill of 
Rights" would be meaningless, members contended, because it is only 
a "characterization of basic rights" and furthermore, contains no con-
cept of absolute or inalienable rights and no common law.94 The Pro-
Democracy Group also pointed out that the PRC declines tb accept 
the legality of the English version of the Basic Law, and, therefore, the 
term "in accordance with the law" means what a government body 
says rather than encompassing the ideal of natural law. They also 
89. Ibid. 
90. Lau, supra note 73. 
91. Ibid. 
92. Ibid. 
93. Ibid. 
94. Ibid. 
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complained that there is no concept of precedent in Chinese law.95 
The United Nations Human Rights Commission, in hearings on 
November 3-4, 1988, criticized Beijing and the Hong Kong govern-
ment about the Basic Law draft. The thrust of the criticism was the 
fact that the Basic Law draft was written without consultation, it de-
nied the right of direct elections in 1988, and there was no mention of 
The Hong Kong Film Censorship Ordinance-in addition to the is-
sues cited above.96 The U.N. Human Rights Commission labeled the 
Basic Law not in consonance with the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights passed in 1977.97 
Several other issues came up about PRC violation of human 
rights in Hong Kong. Early in the year, Hong Kong officials protested 
to the PRC for holding Hong Kong Chinese in prison for vague crimes 
such as collaborating with counterrevolutionaries and attacking the 
socialist system. Hong Kong's criticism centered on the PRC's refusal 
to recognize the British nationality of Hong Kong Chinese and on the 
PRC's criminal code, which refers to "all Chinese" (even those resid-
ing outside of China and holding other citizenship) and addressed 
charges against them for crimes that are not recognized in Hong Kong 
or elsewhere as crimes.98 
The issue of China building a nuclear power plant near Hong 
Kong (which some believe will be used as a means of intimidating 
Hong Kong or diverting attention from civil and political rights is-
sues) remained. So did the issue of PRC intimidation of Hong Kong 
residents. Likewise, the issue of non-Chinese becoming stateless after 
1997 and the PRC's racist policies regarding the rights of Hong Kong 
residents of non-Chinese descent who remain in Hong Kong after 
1997, still festered. None of these issues, however, attracted much at-
tention abroad during late 1987 and 1988. 
The perception of Hong Kong residents of their future under 
PRC rule was reflected in the number of people who left. During 1988 
there was a doubling of the number of applications for no-crime certif-
icates (usually needed to apply for residency in another country).99 
The number of people leaving was expected to exceed 40,000, com-
95. Ibid. 
96. See Emily Lau, "Positions for power," FEER, September I, 1988, p. 28 for a list of 
those things on the agenda. 
97. David Porter, "A blast from Geneva," FEER, November 24, 1988, p. 26. 
98. Emily Lau, "No place to hide," FEER, January 21, 1988, p. 18. 
99. Delfs, supra note 12. 
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pared to 27,000 in 1987. 100 More than half of those leaving were in 
their 30s; half were professionals or senior managers. 101 Probably 
many more people wanted to leave, but could not for financial and 
other reasons. 
100. "Brain Drain in Hong Kong is Creating Big Business for Executive·Search Firms," 
Wall Street Journal (Europe), August 10, 1988, p. 3. 
101. Ibid. 
CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese Communist Party convened its 13th Congress in Oc-
tober 1987. The rightist reformers were back in control after a move 
by leftists against reform early in the year. Economic reform was on 
track, according to most observers. Party General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang's keynote report was entitled "Marching Down the Road of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics." He declared that the "mana-
gerial system" he had used in Sichuan province to promote economic 
development some years earlier would be applied nationwide. He crit-
icized opponents of reform; in fact, he disparaged them, repeating his 
famous "anti-leftist" talk of May 13. He further stated that China is 
at the "elementary stage of socialism" that will last 100 years-mean-
ing to most observers (both Chinese and foreign) that China is in the 
stage of capitalism. 
Reporters referred to the report as the "manifesto of the Zhao 
era." Some said Zhao and the Congress legitimized Adam Smith's 
invisible hand. The giant Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, said in 
a headline: "Overseas Investors May Set their Hearts at Ease." 1 In 
short, economic reform seemed to be moving ahead. And, inasmuch 
as China's human rights record has shown some improvements in the 
realms of individual freedoms and political and civil rights coincident 
with adopting capitalism, it was expected that China's human rights 
record would also improve. 
However, this was not to be. First, the meeting did not all belong 
to the reformers. Li Peng, in his report, noted increasing incidences of 
tax evasion, smuggling, bribery, blackmail, extortion and the falsifica-
tion of documents. He blamed profiteers. He also spoke of an imbal-
ance in the economy and the Party's loss of control. Although Li was 
outnumbered, he had allies. Yao Ilin remained in the politburo. Chen 
Yun and Peng Zhen were retired, but still could exert influence. (See 
chapter 3). 
Then, in stark contrast to the political aura of the fall, by year's 
end it appeared that the left was beginning to make a comeback. 
I. See "A Congress of Reform," Asiaweek, November 6, 1987, p. 25. 
(41) 
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China's Economic Daily in early December reported that, since 1985, 
agricultural production had come to a standstill and cited the neglect 
of farming and investment in the agricultural sector. There were also 
widely circulated reports of the rationing of food and hyper-inflation 
of basic items, including many staples. 2 According to a public opinion 
poll published by Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research), the second big-
gest cause for public discontent was rising commodity prices (after us-
ing power to seek private gains). 3 
By January or February, Li Peng and the left were on the offen-
sive, making an issue of economic reforms that "caused social instabil-
ity."4 The Advisory Council controlled by retired leftists issued 
reports that chided Zhao for "publicity hogging" and called for collec-
tive leadership. Zhao was not seen in public for some days after this. 5 
Zhao attempted to reexert his authority at a government meeting prior 
to the National People's Congress meeting in late March, but was sub-
sequently upstaged by Li Peng at the Congress. 
Li's speech at the Congress shocked delegates, especially when he 
cited $51 billion in 1987 as the amount of money not accounted for in 
the state plan, suggesting this was the amount of unauthorized capital 
spending. He also cited a $2.15 billion budget deficit in 1987 and ram-
pant inflation that he said is the country's "number one problem." He 
cited agriculture as the first of ten tasks, and as a swipe at Zhao and 
the capitalist reformers, listed opening the seacoast areas (Zhao's so-
called "Gold Coast plan") as the number four task. 6 Some at the Con-
gress even openly compared Zhao's economic strategy to Mao's disas-
trous "Great Leap" of the late 1950s. They said it would put the 
economy in the hands of foreigners and referred to his "international 
circulation theory" as the "foreign leap forward. " 7 
By fall, the situation for the reformers had deteriorated to the 
point that Deng was forced to strip Zhao of his authority over China's 
"Special Economic Zones." This undermined Zhao's authority over 
2. See Robert Delfs, "Growing Troublesome," Far Eastern Economic Review, Febru-
ary 18, 1988, p. 66. See also Hsinhua dispatch of December 1, 1988 and article in Asian 
Wall Street Journal of that same date. 
3. Ellen Salem, "Measure of Discontent," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 10, 
1988, p. 564. 
4. Louise do Rosario, "Radical reforms on the defensive," Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, March 10, 1988, p. 55. 
5. "The Party Boss Lies Low," Asiaweek, March II, 1988, p. 20. 
6. See Robert Delfs, "Guess who's boss," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 31, 
1988, p. 32; "Li Peng Takes Center Stage," Asiaweek, April 8, 1988, pp. 12-13. 
7. See Ta Kung Pao, April 27, 1988, cited in Asian Outlook, May 1988, p. 17. 
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economic matters generally and gave the upper hand to the left. 8 Sub-
sequently, at an August Politburo meeting, it was decided that eco-
nomic reform would be treated as a "long-term goal. " 9 At a national 
day gathering on September 30, Premier Li Peng said that the govern-
ment "must exercise strict control over the supply of currency and 
credit." At the subsequent third plenary session of the Party's Central 
Committee, Li announced "restoring control of the economic environ-
ment and rectifying economic order." 10 Clearly the shift was to the 
left economically, and this was going to have a significant impact on 
Chinese politics and ultimately on human rights. 
In this chapter, the authors focus on the economic problems 
caused by the changes in policy and an atmosphere of uncertainty and 
distrust. The main areas of concern are economic inequity, corruption 
and economic crimes. All of these relate to the human rights condi-
tion in China. 
ECONOMIC INEQUITIES 
One of the results of the economic reforms was the creation of 
serious inequities among the Chinese population. Economic dispari-
ties, in fact, became so serious during the period under study that they 
constituted serious economic human rights violations. They clearly 
brought to question the earlier contention by the Chinese leadership 
that China puts economic and societal rights above individual and 
political liberties. Ironically, the factional disputes between left and 
right, or hardliners and reformists, both focused on and exacerbated 
these difficulties. 
After the 13th Congress in the fall of 1987, cases were publicized 
of older people suffering from economic privation because so many 
factories in China were turning to "piece work" to replace the old 
system of paying wages. "Piece work" hurt older people the most. It 
also hurt the physically infirm and mentally slower worker. More-
over, it created considerable ill-feeling between and among workers 
because of the loss of job security and the fact that workers were com-
peting directly against each other for production and jobs and were 
not used to this kind of situation. 11 
8. See Ellen Salem, "The exclusion of Zhao," Far Eastern Economic Review, Septem-
ber 22, 1988, p. 70. 
9. Robert Delfs, "Shifting economic gears," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 
29, 1988, p. 17. 
10. See Robert Delfs, "Lower gear to hold the road," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
October 13, 1988, p. 42. 
11. See "A Congress of Reform," Asiaweek, November 6, 1987, p. 25. 
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The new policies also created a gap between private and state 
workers. According to official statements, the wage rate in private in-
dustries was double that in state enterprises. 12 This resulted in wide-
spread resentment among workers, lower morale and in some cases 
severe discrimination. 13 The government's response was to raise taxes 
and make the income tax at the higher levels progressive-from 20 to 
60 percent. 14 But this did not solve the problem. Many (probably 
most) workers cheated on their taxes; others perceived the system was 
not fair because of cheating and the cooperation of corrupted officials 
in tax evasion. 
According to a State Building Material Bureau report later in the 
year, 60 percent of young workers (under 35) had applied to leave 
their jobs for positions in private companies. 15 At about the same 
time, the Ministry of Light Industry reported that 80 percent of young 
workers want to leave and that coercive means had to be used to keep 
them from exercising that freedom. 16 
A study done in early 1988 in Beijing reflected income inequali-
ties that appeared to result from the reforms. In order to parry criti-
cism from the left, the reformists intentionally did not take any action 
to raise the salaries of professional people. This created a crisis, espe-
cially for intellectuals. The Beijing city government later declared 
that, of 21 professions recognized by the city government, middle and 
primary school teachers were seventeenth and eighteenth, respec-
tively.17 It also stated that the pay of a surgeon is less than that of a 
barber. 18 The explanation was that the 1985 "wage reform" put intel-
lectuals and professionals in a very low wage category-an average of 
$26.50 per month-and this had not been changed. Li Shuxian, the 
wife of famous dissident Fang Lizhi, at the time said that the pay of 
intellectuals had declined over the last 29 years. 19 
A related problem generally unrecognized in the West was a high 
rate of environmental disease among researchers, professionals and in-
tellectuals. According to the above cited report, 81.6 percent of mid-
dle aged scientific researchers have "creeping sickness" of the kidneys, 
12. Dai Yannian, "Dealing with Unfair Income Gaps," Beijing Review, January 15-21, 
1988, p. 7. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Beijing Review, October 3-9, 1988, p. 10. 
16. Ibid. 
17. People's Daily, October 8, 1987, cited in Asian Outlook, February 1988, p. 18. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
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liver or heart. The report quoted statistics kept by the Medical Society 
in Beijing. It also said that the mortality rate of intellectuals-both 
because of exposure to hazardous materials in their works if engaged 
in research and poor diet-was twenty-fold that of the general pub-
lic.20 Because the Party (again explainable in terms of factional ten-
sion) does not recognize that intellectuals or professionals engaging in 
research are working in dangerous environments, it therefore does not 
grant any special medical benefits and takes few steps to protect 
workers. 
Because of the emphasis on productivity and the fact that state 
enterprises are at a disadvantage for not using incentives or pay 
designed to motivate workers and for resisting innovative changes in 
the production system, workers were forced to work longer hours 
under generally less pleasant and healthful surroundings. This re-
sulted in even more workers wanting to leave the public sector to take 
jobs in private businesses, mostly in the cities or the coastal provinces. 
As a result, many rural enterprises during 1987 and 1988 had to resort 
to other methods: forced labor, and ten to twenty percent child 
employment. 21 
Another undesirable effect of the competition between public and 
private sectors is the fact that literally millions of people in reeduca-
tion camps-including huge numbers of prisoners of conscience-
were kept there as "forced" contract workers. People's Daily at one 
point even bragged that special schools set up in the labor camps had 
improved the quality of the production of goods and services. 22 An 
official publication also noted that many of the items produced by 
these workers (which have been described in a host of Western publi-
cations and mentioned in U.S. Congressional hearings as "slave la-
bor") have been exported to Western countries.23 
Still another twist on the unequal income problem was the fact 
that begging in the "rich" cities of China became more common. Ac-
cording to the Beijing Review, it has become so common that 80 per-
cent of peasants in Guangzhou have reported doing it. Eighty percent 
(from selected studies) "want to make an easy living" and most report 
they can make more money than the average worker. 24 This same 
magazine told of a widely known case of a man in Anhui who built 
20. Ibid. 
21. "Putting an end to Child Labor," Beijing Review, July 25-31, 1988, p. 12. 
22. People's Daily, April 18, 1988, pp. 2-3. 
23. See Law and Order (Beijing), March 1988, pp. 32-34 and 41-42. 
24. Beijing Review, October 3-9, 1988, p. II. 
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three "nice houses" from the money he made begging. 25 It also noted 
that one-quarter of the beggars were women and another one-quarter 
children-quite different from a decade or more ago. 26 
It is uncertain just how great disparities in income had become in 
China since no figures on this were published by the government. 
Tourists and reporters noticed that this was a major complaint of the 
people they talked to throughout the country. An estimate was done 
by economists in Taiwan that said that the disparity of income index 
(the ratio of the income of the top twenty percent to the bottom 
twenty percent) was 25. This compares to just over 4 in Taiwan and 
between 4 and 4.5 in the United States and Japan. A figure of 25 for 
China indicates that differences in incomes there would be considera-
bly greater than the average in the world. 
CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC CRIMES 
Corruption had become such a serious problem by late 1987 that 
special terms were being used to describe the problem. Guan dao was 
used to mean official privateer, or bureaucrat-thief. Dai mai was in-
vented to refer to the reselling of goods at an outrageous profit, while 
referring to Marx's depreciation of the middle-man's role in the distri-
bution of goods. The term dao ye was invented as the label for the 
lawless profiteer who engaged in hawking and black market activity. 27 
In September 1987, the government announced new laws regard-
ing profiteering. The laws included such vague acts as purchasing 
(anything) at a low price and selling at a high price.28 The govern-
ment insisted on strict enforcement of these new laws, and in Novem-
ber a factory worker who had embezzled funds by underreporting 
sales and overstating expenses was sentenced to death and executed 
immediately.29 According to the official Chinese press, this was the 
third such case in Jiangsu province in a single month. In another case, 
the official press reported a couple was executed for misappropriating 
funds. 30 The candid reporting of executions of "economic criminals" 
and the use of the death penalty for crimes usually not capital crimes 
in other countries suggested the situation was grave; there also may 
have been factional fighting in the Party and each faction may have 
wanted to demonstrate it was tougher on crime than the other. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ibid. 
27. See Da Gung Bao (Hong Kong), August 15, 1987, p. 2. 
28. New China News Agency, September 24, 1987. 
29. People's Daily, December II, 1988, p. 4. 
30. Reuters Press Service, November 17, 1987, quoting a People's Daily report. 
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However, many questioned if this was enough. In February, the 
Legal System Daily reported that, based on sampling in one province, 
only ten percent of the laws were strictly enforced, while fifty percent 
were not, and the latter were primarily economic and environmenta1 
laws.31 The same paper reported that only 46 percent of the verdicts 
related to economic crimes were enforced in many areas of the coun-
try. 32 It also referred to "legal extortion" as being commonplace in 
China. 33 
In March, Premier Li Peng stated in his report to the 7th Na-
tional People's Congress that tax evasion, smuggling, bribery, black-
mail, profiteering, forgery and extortion had become epidemic. 
Following this declaration more rules were issued. Officials in China's 
Special Economic Zones were warned first, then all government de-
partments were warned. 34 Corruption and economic crimes were 
mentioned in the Chinese media more than at any time in recent his-
tory. The press even admitted that drug use was becoming a problem 
(in areas where corruption was high) and China was exporting drugs 
to the West (from the Golden Triangle and via Hong Kong gangs).35 
In August, the official Chinese media declared that 109,000 mem-
bers of the Chinese Communist Party had been expelled or forced to 
quit the Party in late 1987 and early 1988, compared to a figure of just 
above that for the previous five years altogether.36 At this same time, 
"centers" to fight corruption were established by the Ministry of 
Supervision. 37 
As a result of the ascendancy of the anti-reformist hardliners at 
this time, the anti-corruption campaign went still further and in some 
ways became personal. It involved growing government intervention 
in the economy and economic activities. The personal nature of the 
anti-corruption campaign, as with most campaigns in the past, took 
aim at top leaders. It was revealed, for example, that the Child Wel-
fare Fund for the Handicapped, a charity run by Deng's son, was in-
volved in illegal economic activities with the Kang Hua Development 
Corporation.38 Kang Hua was forced to divest 200 of its subsidiaries 
and its president and vice president (a former Minister and Mayor of 
31. Fazhi Ribao (Legal System Daily), February 24, 1988, p. I. 
32. /d., February 25, 1988, p. 2. 
33. Ibid. 
34. See Dai Yannian, "Clean Up Government," Beijing Review, July 4-10, 1988, p. 7. 
35. "Drug Use up in South," Beijing Review, July 11-17, 1988, p. 11. 
36. Beijing Review, August 22-28, 1988, p. 12. 
37. Beijing Review, June 15-21, 1988, p. 12. 
38. "Deng's Big Clean-Up," Asiaweek, October 21, 1988, p. 22. 
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Beijing) were forced to resign. 39 This led to investigations of the In-
dustry and Commerce Bank in Beijing and revealed links to Party Sec-
retary General Zhao. Former State Councillor Zhang Jingfu and 
former Tianjin vice-mayor Wang Guangyin also were put under 
suspicion. 40 
Not only was it apparent that the left had taken advantage of the 
reformists' nepotism, but it seemed to be much more widespread than 
anyone had guessed. Some said it was epidemic and even Deng Xiaop-
ing could not do much about it.41 
The investigations of corruption at this time also revealed that top 
leaders were involved in "unethical ways" in China's arms manufac-
turing companies. This reportedly included Deng's son-in-law and the 
grandson of the former famous communist military leader, He Long.42 
These links were even thought to have influenced the Chinese govern-
ment to approve military assistance to Iran and Iraq in a major way-
to the tune of $2 billion worth of sales during the period.43 The same 
also was said about the sale of Silkworm missiles to Saudi Arabia. 
Deng and the reformists struck back. Deng publicly accused 
"certain people" of spreading rumors about the involvement of rela-
tives of top leaders in corruption. He even mentioned dissident Fang 
Lizhi by name, stating at one point that what Fang had said in this 
connection was "preposterous" and that he would sue him.44 
After the Party Central Committee plenum meeting in the fall, 
the issue of corruption became much more political, factional fighting 
increased and restrictions of various kinds became more evident. In 
order to stop speculation, the government restricted the opening of 
new businesses, increased various kinds of checking on individuals and 
businesses for tax evasion, cheating and other irregularities.45 Some 
observers stated that "big brother" was back in control of the econ-
omy once again and individual rights and freedoms were suffering as a 
consequence. In September alone, the government appointed 30,000 
new investigators to stop speculators. 46 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
41. /d., p. 23. 
42. Ibid. See also Central Daily News (Taipei), April II, 1988, p. 1. 
43. See International Herald Tribune, July 14, 1988, p. 1. 
44. "A Gadfly Bites," Asiaweek, October 21, 1988, p. 23. 
45. See "Party Meeting Focuses on Economic Order," Beijing Review, October 10-16, 
1988, p. 10. 
46. "Deng's Big Clean-Up," Asiaweek, October 21, 1988, p. 23. See also Jin Qi, "Fac-
tory Directors' Worries," Beijing Review, October 3-9, 1988, p. 7. 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
OTHER RIGHTS PROBLEMS RELATED 
TO THE ECONOMY 
49 
Various other human rights or human rights related problems in 
evidence during the period under study can be related to the economy. 
They can be related to uncontrolled economic growth, unevenness in 
that growth, the reapplication of controls toward the end of the pe-
riod, and the economic relief system itself. 
One thing that was very evident during the period, though it is by 
no means new, was the hostility of the Chinese from one region of the 
country toward people from another. This was especially evident in 
the case of the "Gold Coast" Chinese (those areas along the coast and 
especially in the south that were developing rapidly), being resented by 
inland Chinese. It was also in evidence between northern Chinese and 
southern Chinese, since the south did better in terms of economic 
growth. In addition, there was growing resentment of people with for-
eign connections or those dealing with foreigners. 47 In short, social 
tension and fraction increased. 
One eye-catching example of legal bias was the local courts in 
some areas, which handed down life sentences or even the death pen-
alty for poaching. Local officials complained that sentences in the past 
had been too light.48 It was reflected more generally in Beijing's atti-
tude toward the special economic zones and toward Hong Kong and 
in what appeared to be much harsher punishments for criminals in one 
part of the country as opposed to another and heavier punishments for 
non-locals. 49 
Rationing was seen in China more during the period under study 
and caused problems. It was not introduced nationwide and seemed 
to be practiced unevenly or on a discriminatory basis. 50 The same was 
true of the allocation of housing and the freeing of prices on rents in 
the big cities. Rents in many big cities were to escalate 15 to 20 fold 
with the freeing of prices, but were not allowed to do so evenly. 5 1 In 
other cases, citizens were asked to pay for many things that were for-
merly provided by the government free. Again there were complaints 
of a lack of fairness and the fact that "you had to pay if you didn't 
47. These are common observations made by talking to people in China and by hearing 
comments of both Chinese and visitors to China. 
48. Beijing Review, July 4-10, 1988, p. 12. 
49. See Dai Yannian, "Clean Up Government," Beijing Review, July 4-10, 1988, p. 7. 
50. See Asian Wall Street Journal, December I, 1987, p. I. 
51. See C.P.C., "Behind the Bamboo Curtain," Asian Outlook, May 1988, p. 24, citing 
a report issued by the Economist in April. 
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know someone."52 
Another problem related to the economy that became more evi-
dent during this period was the issue of the environment. Though 
China has had serious ecological problems for some time, it was given 
more publicity lately because it has become worse and because of its 
relationships to political infighting. In early 1988, a semi-official pub-
lication in China stated that arable land was decreasing at the rate of 
five million acres a year because of erosion and pollution. 53 It also 
stated that a "great portion" of protected plant and animal species 
were in danger of becoming extinct. 54 In May, an unprecedented envi-
ronmental report was published which, among other things, declared 
that China was experiencing 1.5 million square kilometers of erosion 
yearly, including 5 billion tons from its two largest rivers. 55 The re-
port put the rate of reforestation in China at 130th in the world-
almost last among nations. 56 Finally, it stated that fluoride deficiency, 
Keshan disease, Kaschin-Beck disease and Schiatomioslis threatened 
half of the rural population in China. 57 
52. See Wen Hui Bao, July 30, 1987, p. I, regarding students being asked to pay and 
allowed to seek jobs freely in exchange for that payment. 
53. Liaowang Weekly (Overseas Edition), February 29, 1988, p. 39. 
54. Ibid. 
55. SeeMing Bao, June 6, 1988, p. 6. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
INTELLECfUALS: STUDENT ACfiVISM AND THE PLIGHT 
OF THE INTELLECfUALS 
INTRODUCfiON 
Following the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign of early 
1987, the human rights condition of intellectuals in China improved. 
But by late 1987 and early 1988, the situation changed; it was a zigzag 
course, with some hesitant relaxation and a good deal of confusion. 
Overall, there was no major improvement in the status of intellectuals 
as the Party and government continued to refuse to give up control 
over academic and cultural matters. 
In 1987-88, amidst ideological confusion caused by economic 
problems, a further erosion of the ideological underpinnings of the sys-
tem inevitably resulted. This caused difficulties for intellectuals who 
were blamed for the appearance of unorthodox ideas. Other issues 
also cropped up to test the limits of the more open policy, such as the 
appearance of "obscene materials" in the mass reading markets and 
controversial movie productions seen as overstepping ideological 
boundaries set by the Party. 
Major events in the period under review include renewed student 
activism following a lull during the winter of 1986-87, tolerance to-
ward some leading intellectuals who were targets of attack during the 
Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign, and threats to take measures 
against what the authorities denounced as pornography and harmful 
audio and visual material, such as films and tapes. 
STUDENTS PROTEST POOR CONDITIONS 
Student activism, which started again in late 1987 in Beijing, 
reached a new high in April 1988 when the National People's Con-
gress and the National People's Political Consultative Conference con-
vened. By dramatizing their concerns for the basic human rights of 
intellectuals through stepped-up protest activities, the students in-
tended to attract the attention of Party and state leaders. Student res-
tiveness also took the form of protest against rising prices and the 
abject living conditions of university faculty, particularly its junior 
members, in the face of spiraling inflation. The protest against rising 
prices was linked to criticism of rampant corruption and special privi-
(51) 
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leges enjoyed by persons in power, which the students charged were at 
the root of general discontent. The students also perceived that educa-
tion was assigned a very low priority in the current reform drive and 
lamented its neglect in strong terms .. 
On April 4, 1988, a poster appeared on the campus of Beijing 
University. Signed by "many junior faculty members and graduate 
students," the poster was prominently displayed on a bulletin board in 
front of the Xinhua Bookstore (run by China's official news agency) on 
campus. It was tom down within hours, but it reappeared the next 
day, this time on the wall of the student dining hall. On the poster, 
the signers declared the nation's education was in a state of "total cri-
sis" and expressed their deep pain and despair. They pointed to the 
current trend toward down-grading education and learning, the severe 
shortage of funds for education, "the decline in the quality of educa-
tion, the poverty in philosophy, the chaos in economics, the 'infantile' 
development in law, the crisis in history and the poor pay scale for 
teachers" as symptoms. 
Responding to a call by the authorities to study harder, the poster 
said students were abandoning learning to go into business "to get 
rich." A shocking fact, the poster warned, was that the "quality of the 
entire Chinese nation continues to decline." "If the ten-year Cultural 
Revolution once nearly destroyed Chinese culture and education, then 
we must say today's wrong policies continue to threaten the very sur-
vival of education," the poster asserted. Putting the responsibility for 
ignoring the rights of the impoverished and much persecuted intellec-
tuals squarely on the shoulders of Party General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang, Premier Li Peng and Wan Li (formerly first vice premier and 
now chairman of the National People's Congress) by name, the signers 
of the poster warned that "without the support of intellectuals, the 
current reform in China is doomed." 1 
On April 6, two days after the appearance of the poster, students 
took to the streets. To dramatize their demands and make a cynical 
retort to the central authorities' call to "help oneself through produc-
tion" (sheng can zi jiu) by offering "paid services" (you sang fu wu), 
some students went to Tiananmen Square to set up shoe-shine stands. 
They sought to bring a message home to the delegates and dignitaries 
attending the sessions of the National People's Congress and the Na-
tional People's Political Consultative Conference at the Great Hall of 
the People. A group of five graduate students in classical Chinese 
I. "Shengshi weiyan (Warnings in times of prosperity)," Cheng Ming, (Hong Kong), 
No. 128, June 1988, p. 9. 
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studies from Beijing University, sporting a sign reading "Beijing Uni-
versity Graduate School Shoe-shining Department," paraded around 
the square and then offered their services to passers-by at 20 fen to 40 
fen (about 6 to 12 cents) per shine. They were soon led away by secur-
ity police for operating a business without a permit. 2 
On April 10, a group of young instructors from Beijing Univer-
sity staged a sit-in in Tiananmen Square with a big sign on their 
parked bicycles nearby urging increased expenditures on education. 
The plea was written in both Chinese and English. Meant for those 
attending the meetings in the Great Hall of the People, the message 
obviously was intended also for foreign journalists covering the impor-
tant meetings. 
Several policemen quickly removed the bicycles for illegal park-
ing. The demonstrating teachers then silently held up the sign with 
their hands, ignoring the plain-clothes security men who were taking 
pictures of them. Two Western newsmen (an American from ABC-
TV and a Canadian) were on the scene to interview one demonstrating 
teacher. Chinese newsmen were conspicuously absent from the 
square, where armed police and plain-clothes men far outnumbered 
demonstrators and onlookers. By 2 p.m., when the demonstrators 
were ready to leave, a bespectacled plain-clothes policeman was heard 
scolding the demonstrators in contempt: "You are only interested in 
making a show to the foreigners. Why don't you beg them for 
money?"3 
On Aprill7, a group often students from Beijing University took 
to the streets, soliciting signatures for "An Open Letter to Deng, 
Zhao, Li and Wan," (Deng Xiaoping, Party General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang, Premier Li Peng and National People's Congress Chairman 
Wan Li). They protested rising prices which they said were causing 
great hardship for the majority of the people. The action apparently 
was organized, for the students took to the streets only after dozens of 
posters had appeared in public places urging people to sign up in a 
"million-signature drive." 
As the students began to attract crowds, the local deputy police 
chief rushed to the scene with more than 30 policemen and chased the 
students away, alleging that the students were holding up traffic. Gov-
ernment authorities apparently feared that the student unrest might 
merge with the widespread discontent beyond the college campus 
2. Lu Yun, "Shoe-shine, Sit-in, on Tiananmen Square," Cheng Ming, (Hong Kong), 
No. 128, June 1988, pp. 12-14. 
3. Id., p. 14. 
54 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
caused by what many termed "uncontrolled inflation" and "rampant 
corruption." While government officials allowed students limited lee-
way to vent their pent-up feelings, any remote sign that the student 
protest might spread brought quick action. Referring to the extent of 
general discontent, a scholar remarked: "If things get out of control, a 
Polish-styled general strike or at least a work slowdown will appear."4 
Another episode occurred on the Beijing University campus a few 
weeks later. On May 4th, the anniversary of the famous May 4th 
Movement of 1919 spearheaded by patriotic students, a day which also 
coincided with the 90th founding anniversary of Beijing University, a 
large celebration was planned. The celebration featured a keynote 
speech by Li Tieyin, recently elected member of the all-powerful Party 
Politburo and head of the State Education Commission. 
While Li was making his speech at the official gathering, Fang 
Lizhi, the outspoken and renowned astrophysicist who lost his job in 
1987 as vice president of the University of Science and Technology 
and was subsequently kicked out of the Party for his open advocacy of 
democracy and human rights, arrived on a bicycle and immediately 
created a commotion. Over half of the students were drawn away by 
Fang from the official function. A rival ceremony quickly got under 
way featuring Fang and his student admirers. 
Fang spoke on democracy and human rights. His 20-minute talk 
was interrupted repeatedly by enthusiastic applause. He called for 
freedom of thought, speech and the press as "the most pressing task" 
and attacked the Party for avoiding genuine democracy by practicing 
the so-called Chinese-styled "democratic centralism." "There is no 
such thing as physics with Chinese characteristics and the same is true 
of modernization," Fang told the cheering crowd. "First we must rec-
ognize the concept of human rights above all. And we must use demo-
cratic means. For human rights, all the people must have freedom of 
thought and freedom of speech."5 He urged the students to persevere 
in their quest for democracy, adding cynically that the present leader-
ship in China "has neither the guts of dictatorship nor the courage for 
democracy. " 6 
4. Luo Bin, "The Rival Shows on Beida Campus and the Gathering Storm," Cheng 
Ming, (Hong Kong), No. 128, June 1988, pp. 6-9. 
5. Edward A. Gargan, "Chinese Dissident Derides a Dogma," New York Times, May 
5, 1988, p. 13. 
6. Luo Bin, supra note 4, p. 7. 
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"TAIWAN STUDY" GROUPS ON CAMPUS 
Since early 1988, students at such prestigious institutions as Wu-
han University in Central China and Zhejiang University in East 
China organized numerous study groups focusing attention on current 
affairs across the Taiwan Strait. Known by such names as the "Tai-
wan Problem Study Group" and the "Status on Both Sides of the Tai-
wan Strait Study Group," these student organizations became very 
popular on campus. Students at Beijing University and the People's 
University in the nation's capital also set up such groups as the "Kuo-
mintang History Study Group" and the "Three People's Principles 
Study Society." Better information about Taiwan's economic develop-
ment and political change, namely democratization, provided the im-
petus for student activism. These developments alarmed top officials 
in Beijing, who characterized the situation as "tendencies of aliena-
tion" and urged the State Education Commission to do something 
about it. The Commission, caught in a dilemma, issued a self-contra-
dictory directive: it urged the university authorities not to interfere 
with these groups if they were engaged in purely scholarly activities; 
on the other hand, it said these groups should be closely watched and 
prevented from "making statements deemed too extreme or 
inflammatory. " 7 
Following Fang Lizhi's appearance at Beijing University in early 
May 1988, students at the University continued their protest, holding 
a series of "teach-ins" on campus. They invited among others, U.S. 
Ambassador Winston Lord and his Chinese-born wife, author Betty 
Bao Lord, to attend one of the sessions. Government and Chinese 
Communist Party authorities were alarmed at the involvement of the 
U.S. envoy with radical Chinese students. An investigation was imme-
diately launched to seek out the organizers of the teach-ins. Security 
officials questioned their motivation in inviting the U.S. ambassador. 
At least two students were later expelled permanently, according to 
sources at the university. 
Quoting an internal directive, sources at the university subse-
quently reported that Li Tieyin, Party Politburo member and head of 
the State Education Commission, accused Fang Lizhi of carrying out 
counterrevolutionary activities among the students. 8 Meanwhile, a 
7. "Beidaihe Summit to Discuss Price and Wage Reform and the Taiwan Question," 
Chung Pao (Centre Daily News) (eastern U.S. edition unless otherwise specified), August 1, 
1988, p. I; Luo Bin, "Message from Beidaihe Meeting," Cheng Ming, (Hong Kong), No. 
130, August 1988, pp. 10-12. 
8. Chung Pao, July 26, 1988, p. I. 
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second invitation to Mrs. Lord to address a student group at a univer-
sity in Shanghai was ordered postponed indefinitely by the police. Stu-
dents at Beijing University charged that the authorities simply did not 
want foreigners to have direct contact with the students during the 
unrest. 9 
Amidst the student unrest, an incident occurred at Beijing Uni-
versity on June 1, 1988 which resulted in the death of a graduate stu-
dent. On the night of June 1, the student, Cai Qingfong, got into an 
argument at an off-campus liquor store with six unemployed youths, 
one of whom pulled a gun and shot Cai to death. The killing touched 
off spontaneous demonstrations by students who linked the lack of se-
curity and increase of crime on and near the campus to ineptitude and 
corruption in government. During a march to Tiananmen Square on 
June 3, the students shouted slogans, including "Justice and Human 
Rights!" 10 
WE PREFER BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY 
During the protest march following Cai Qingfong's death, Beijing 
University campus was plastered with posters denouncing the govern-
ment and corrupt officials. One poster read: "We Prefer Bourgeois 
Democracy to Socialist Democracy. Give Us More Freedom and De-
mocracy. Punish Corrupt Officials!" 11 One student leader asked the 
demonstrators: "Do We Have Democracy?" A roaring answer came 
from the marchers: "No!" 12 
But before the demonstrations could spread, the police rounded 
up all six suspects in the shooting and the court meted out severe pun-
ishments. Charged with murder and hooliganism, two were given the 
death sentence (with one suspended for two years). The rest received 
three to 15 years in prison. Wang Jian, the alleged killer who was 
sentenced to death, was executed on July 21, shortly after his appeal 
had been denied. 13 The severe sentences and swift justice-less than 
two months from committing the crime to execution-though not un-
usual in the PRC, can be seen as an attempt to placate restive students. 
Meanwhile in the United States, a large number of PRC students 
were involved in human rights protests. Alarmed by the dispropor-
tionately large number of Chinese students now studying in the United 
9. Chung Pao, July 25, 1988, p. I. • 
10. Edward A. Gargan, "Beijing Students March in Protest," New York Times, June 4, 
1988, p. 4. 
II. Chung Pao, June 9, 1988, p. I. 
12. Chung Pao, June 8, 1988, p. I. 
13. Chung Pao, July 22, 1988, p. I. 
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States, where presumably they were influenced by "bourgeois liber-
alism," the Chinese government decided in early 1988 to enact a long-
rumored policy. It drastically cut back the number of students al-
lowed to go to the United States and limited their period of stay. 
Starting in 1988, only 600 Chinese students were permitted to go for 
study in the United States annually, compared with 8,000 in each of 
the previous two years. The change of policy caused an uproar among 
Chinese students in the United States, many of whom could not com-
plete their graduate studies within the new time limits. More than 
2,000 students in over 40 U.S. universities signed an open letter urging 
the Chinese government to reconsider the decision. 14 
In an article published in the New York Times, a Chinese student 
called the new limits a violation of human rights. He wrote: "As an 
internal matter, a policy that denies Chinese citizens the opportunity 
to study abroad violates their civil rights, as well as its laws on the 
freedom of travel, which are guaranteed by China's Constitution. It 
also violates internationally accepted standards of civil and human 
rights." 15 He quoted officials in Beijing as denouncing the open letter 
which he signed as "the work of an outlawed counterrevolutionary 
organization." 16 
Why were Chinese students restless? Liu Binyan, the famous dis-
sident writer, asked this question during a long interview. He then 
supplied the answer: "They support the reform, but they feel the pace 
of political reform is too slow." Liu also spoke of the great signifi-
cance in Gorbachev's political reform, not only for the Soviet Union, 
but for all socialist countries. Pointing to the fact that Gorbachev had 
gone much further in political reform than has been attempted in 
China so far, Liu said: "You need to look at Gorbachev's reform to 
understand why Chinese students have taken to the streets." 17 
"If I have a choice, I would rather go to the Soviet Union," Liu 
said, not too long after his arrival in the United States in early 1988 as 
a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University. Liu stated his reason for 
wanting to go to the Soviet Union. "The Soviet Union and China are 
14. Chung Pao, April II, 1988, p. I. Of the 40,000 Chinese students studying abroad, 
some 28,000 were in the United States. Those on government stipends, about a third of the 
total, were controlled by the government and were obligated to return; the remaining self-
supporting students, mostly sponsored by their relatives and friends or on scholarship, 
showed little interest in going home. 
15. "China's Phantom Brain Drain," New York Times, May 5, 1988, p. A31. 
16. Ibid. 
17. United Journal, (New York), May 4, 1988, p. 18. For the full text of Liu's ex-
tended interview with Lee Yee, editor-in-chief of The Nineties, see Lee Yee, "A Second 
Interview with Liu Binyan," The Nineties, No. 198, May, 1988, pp. 16-30. 
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so similar in so many respects," Liu said, referring clearly to the com-
mon socialist system. "If I can write on the Soviet Union, then my 
writing will have a direct impact on China." With a heavy heart, Liu 
spoke of the solemn responsibility of a writer, and particularly a Chi-
nese writer. "I am not opposed to writers pursuing lofty artistic 
goals," he said, "but China in the final analysis is the China a Chinese 
writer must face, a country where tens of millions still go hungry and 
where human rights are all too often trampled upon. I believe a writer 
cannot in good conscience avoid facing these problems." 18 
Contrary to what many Western specialists say, most Chinese in-
tellectuals are of the opinion that Gorbachev is far ahead of Deng in 
political reform. 19 They also attach great importance to its future. 
Liu Binyan put it succinctly when he said that probably no nation 
outside of Eastern Europe was more concerned than China about the 
success of Gorbachev's reforms. Just as China's economic reforms 
have inspired Soviet reformers, Liu said, "so the fate of Gorbachev's 
political reforms, or glasnost, will have considerable influence in 
China, which trails far behind the Soviet Union in this respect." Liu 
noted that, unlike Chinese reformers, Gorbachev made political re-
form a priority. Speaking as a journalist whose writing had gotten him 
in trouble with the authorities many times, Liu pointed out that 
changes in the Soviet press have been especially envied in China. "No 
mainland Chinese newspaper has been allowed to match the way the 
Soviet media boldly expose political mistakes, stimulate discussion of 
political questions and explicitly challenge conservative views." 
Refuting the view that the Chinese are less interested in social 
and political issues, Liu recalled that from 1978 to 1980, when the 
People's Daily was "unusually frank and courageous,"-a trend he had 
helped foster with his expose writings-its circulation rose to seven 
million but later dropped by half when the brief "Beijing Spring" was 
18. Lee Yee, "A Second Interview with Liu Binyan," supra, p. 30. Liu was expelled 
from the Party during the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign in 1987. Liu's vocal 
criticism of the authorities was silenced and his activities were curtailed for some time, but 
he suffered no physical persecution this time, apparently because of the notoriety he had 
achieved through his expose writings and the international acclaim he had received for his 
courage and uprightness. Bowing to popular pressure and eager to cultivate a liberal and 
open image abroad, the government allowed him to leave the country, accepting the invita-
tion from Harvard which had been held up for some time. 
19. Merle Goldman and Marshall Goldman, "Going Back to China and the Soviet 
Union," New York Times, July 16, 1988, p. 27. In this essay, the Goldmans stated: "In the 
Soviet Union, there is dismay that political changes have been accompanied by almost no 
tangible economic improvements. . . . By contrast, in China there has been almost too 
much improvement." 
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Liu, who argued in a speech in 1984 that the coverup of Chinese 
political and social problems drove the people from the Communist 
Party and increased their indifference, said in the speech that "Our 
level of democracy will be determined by our degree of openness; be-
cause democracy, to a large extent, is the right to choose." Liu de-
clared that his term "openness" meant quite the same as glasnost 
advocated by Gorbachev in 1985. "Yet China still has no glasnost." 
Pointing to the "great popular yearning" for change that fueled eco-
nomic reform in China, Liu said the Chinese people "are now wishing 
Gorbachev success in the political realm," because that could "provide 
the push they need to bring political reform to China. " 21 
THE SOVIET UNION IS AHEAD IN GLASNOST 
Because of the perceived differences in political reform between 
the two countries, many Chinese intellectuals, like Liu Binyan, have 
intently followed the course of Gorbachev's glasnost in the Soviet 
Union, from the bold challenge to Lenin's and Stalin's legacies to the 
sharply-worded demand for Andrei Gromyko's resignation. As one 
professor of English in Beijing remarked in the summer of 1988: 
"They are ahead of us in glasnost, that's for sure. What is happening 
there is real. A real discussion of important issues. We don't have any 
of that. Maybe someday, but not now.'m 
Similar views were expressed by a junior faculty member in the 
history department of Yunnan University, several thousand miles 
away in southwestern China. Asserting that Gorbachev's political re-
form was unprecedented in any socialist country in terms of its 
breadth and depth, he said that even at this early stage it was already 
inspirational for other socialist countries, including China. 23 
The success of Gorbachev's political reform in the Soviet Union, 
already further along than any post-Mao attempts at political reform 
by Deng Xiaoping in China, would send a signal throughout the trou-
bled socialist world that political reform is possible and desirable as 
economic reform is inevitable and imperative. These Chinese intellec-
tuals realize that without political reform, further economic reform 
20. Liu Binyan, "China's Stake in Glasnost," New York Times, June 19, 1988, Section 
4, p. 26. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Edward A. Gargan, "China Nods; Sagely at Soviet Changes," New York Times, 
July 4, 1988, p. 3. 
23. Personal interview, April 29, 1988, while this writer spent his sabbatical doing re-
search at Yunnan University as a visiting scholar. 
60 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
will be limited severely. Worse still, whatever measure of economic 
reform was already achieved ultimately would serve only to strengthen 
the economic base of the existing system, a system that is fundamen-
tally antithetical to the enjoyment of human rights. It is in this sense 
that those who live under the system conclude from their personal 
experiences that the absence of genuine political reform constitutes a 
continuing violation of basic human rights, a violation that no mea-
sure of improvement of economic conditions can erase. 
In an editorial, the New York Times noted that amidst all the 
superficial change a tourist could observe in China, there was an ab-
sence of the kind of political and cultural relaxation that glasnost 
brought to the Soviet Union. "There is little in China to compare to 
Soviet soul-searching over Stalin's excesses, to the thousands of in-
dependent groups springing up or to the effort to stir the masses into 
activism." The editorial writer quoted one Chinese as saying that 
"many fellow intellectuals envy the Soviet intelligentsia and find 
Mikhail Gorbachev remarkably courageous. The Chinese fear of 
chaos, he thinks, is too great for such reform. " 24 
Intellectuals, particularly those who were "reborn" after their 
outspoken criticism of the Party got them in trouble in the past, 
tended to speak with circumspection. Whether on officially sanctioned 
trips abroad or publishing essays at home discussing sensitive topics 
such as Marxist ideology or reform, they try to maintain their image 
as daring critics. But all the while they are quick to proclaim their 
loyalty to the Party or to Marxism. Su Shaozhi, who lost his job in 
1987 as head of the Institute on Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought at the National Academy of Social Sciences, criticized 
Marx's outmoded views and those of various interpreters of Marxism, 
from Stalin to Mao, in a recent long article discussing socialism. He 
expounded on his theory of the "primary stage of socialism" by the 
Chinese Communist Party, which was adopted as the official ideologi-
cal position at its 13th Congress in November 1987. He approvingly 
quoted former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, who in an inter-
view with Washington Post publisher Catherine Graham in September 
1986, openly admitted young people's lack of interest in Marxism as a 
universal phenomenon because "we socialists didn't do a very good 
job ... particularly concerning democracy and human rights."25 How-
ever, Su was quick to say that there was no reason for despair. Reiter-
24. "Chinese Reformers, Soviet Upstarts," New York Times, April 24, 1988, Section 4, 
p. 24. 
25. Su Shaozhi, "Socialism Revisited," Chung Pao, March 1, 1988, p. 7. 
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ating his conviction in the superiority of socialism, he urged greater 
efforts to find out the reasons "why the superiority of socialism was 
not fully developed."26 
Yan Jiaqi, director of the Institute of Political Science of the same 
academy, is another academic critic of the system in China. Despite 
his anti-government protest, he was allowed to keep his job and was 
even sent to the United States in January 1988 for a 40-day tour of 
major universities and meetings in Washington. During the tour, Yan 
noticeably toned down the harshness of his criticism. He told an inter-
viewer on the eve of his departure from the United States that he was 
confident of the future of democracy in China. Stressing that "China 
must have democracy if it is to have progress," Yan said the problem 
was a complex one, but "if we proceed step by step, there will be 
hope." He compared the Chinese system under the present Constitu-
tion with the U.S. system with particular reference to built-in checks 
and balances and concluded, a bit gratuitously, that "in certain re-
spects, the Chinese system has stronger checks and balances. "27 
Liu Binyan, the famous writer-reporter who was expelled from 
the Party in 1987 for his outspoken criticism of government officials, 
was no exception to the restraint shown by critics. He expressed simi-
lar optimism for the future of reform in China in a speech at Columbia 
University in April 1988. But when asked if he was blindly loyal to 
the Party, he demurred, proclaiming that despite his expulsion from 
the Party, he remained a loyal critic and had no intention of turning 
against the Party.28 On another occasion, Liu took pains to make 
clear that he did not oppose socialism. "I am not a dissident in the 
Solzhenitsyn sense," he said referring to the exiled Soviet writer who 
opposes socialism altogether. Calling himself a loyal dissenter from 
within the Party, Liu said: "I favor reforms, but I just don't feel that 
the current leadership is pushing them vigorously enough."29 
INTELLECfUALS CO-OPTED 
Why did these intellectuals behave this way? Several explana-
tions are possible. Some could be true believers, despite their past 
pain. Ideological conviction, when combined with nationalism, can 
give a person great inner strength. Indeed, with the possible exception 
26. Ibid. 
27. Chen Wanying, "Strong Voice for China's Democratic Reform," Chung Pao, 
March 4, 1988, p. 3. 
28. Chung Pao, April 30, 1988, p. 2. 
29. Richard Bernstein, "Chinese Journalist Pushes His Ideas on 'Openness,' " New 
York Times, May 30, 1988, p. 3. 
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of Fang Lizhi, none of the above-mentioned intellectuals has re-
nounced socialism openly. Some could have been co-opted by the 
Party, which they might feel not only had shown leniency toward 
them by sparing them more severe punishment, but actually had even 
granted them coveted favors, such as promotions and travel abroad. 
Thus, they might have had second thoughts about their previous 
views. Last but not least, many simply may have become smarter and 
learned to stay within the bounds this time around, fearing future per-
secution. Yin Roucheng put it best when the formerly persecuted ac-
tor-turned Vice minister for cultural affairs commented on the hesitant 
way many in the arts and theater approached Western works. "The 
biggest obstacle is fear," he said bluntly, referring to the fear of perse-
cution by the authorities. 30 
One of the few intellectuals who courageously fought off the pres-
sure from the authorities and continue to speak his conscience is Fang 
Lizhi. Demoted to the position of a research fellow at the Beijing Me-
teorological Observatory after his expulsion from the Party in 1987, 
but still allowed some limited activities including occasional trips 
abroad, Fang continued to fight for the cause of democracy and 
human rights. However, he was denied effective forums from which to 
express his views. 
It is particularly interesting to see the contrast between the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China, at a time when both coun-
tries are in the throes of reform. Gorbachev is bold enough to allow 
Soviet human rights champion/nuclear scientist Andrei Sakharov to 
visit the United States; the Chinese government cancelled Chinese 
human rights champion/astrophysicist Fang Lizhi's visit to the 
United States.31 Interviewed in Beijing at his home on October 17, 
1988, Fang confirmed that the Chinese Academy of Science had can-
celled his trip to the United States (originally scheduled for December) 
to attend a series of scientific conferences in Texas, Colorado and Cali-
fornia. The cancellation was the result of the statements he allegedly 
had made during his earlier trip to Australia and his unauthorized 
stopover in Hong Kong. While in Australia, Fang quoted a widely 
circulated rumor in China that many top Party and government offi-
cials and their children maintained bank accounts in foreign countries. 
Deng Xiaoping reportedly was incensed about Fang's statement. Ac-
cusing Fang of "slandering high government officials abroad," Deng 
30. "Cultural Interflow Is Irresistible Historical Trend," Chung Pao, November 24, 
1987, p. 9. 
31. "Blunt Talk Costs Fang Lizhi U.S. Trip," Chung Pao, October 19, 1988, p. I. 
STUDENT ACTIVISM 63 
suggested that Fang be prosecuted for "libeling China's leaders."32 
Fang and Sakharov are so alike that in fact Fang is widely known 
as "China's Sakharov" to his countrymen. Sakharov's views were 
prominently reported in the United States, including his warnings 
about the flaws in Gorbachev's Constitutional reforms. 33 His message 
has reached a global audience through the free press in the United 
States. Fang Lizhi was confined in China, where the leaders did not 
dare to let his message be heard in the outside world. 
"SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS" 
Intellectuals in China have yet to climb up from the bottom of the 
social scale to which they had been condemned in the heyday of the 
Cultural Revolution some 20 years ago. Contributing to the continued 
low social status of intellectuals under Deng Xiaoping's get-rich pol-
icy, is their pitifully low wages. Long treated as second-class citizens 
and the targets of persecution in many political campaigns, intellectu-
als-the educated elite-decimated and mostly frightened into silence, 
now suffer the added woes of economic deprivation. This is particu-
larly true of those in the teaching profession. The economic reforms 
so far have only benefited those who work with their hands. It has left 
out those who work with their brains. As farmers, factory workers 
and particularly the new private urban entrepreneurs saw their income 
rise, wage-earners not in production and commerce found it increas-
ingly difficult to cope with inflation. Teachers were the hardest hit, 
with their meager salaries lagging farther and farther behind in the 
face of rising prices. In real terms, the wages of both university profes-
sors and primary school teachers today are less than one-tenth what 
they had been in old China before the anti-Japanese war, according to 
Qian Jiaju, a well-known economist.34 In 1987, China's annual per 
capita spending on education was only $5.50, the third lowest among 
149 nations in the world.35 
The long neglect of teachers, together with the further lowering of 
their economic status, has given rise to what many observers call a 
new belief that "the pursuit of knowledge is useless," a slogan made 
32. Ibid. 
33. Bill Keller, "Sakharov Warns of Perils in New Soviet Setup," New York Times, 
November 2, 1988, p. A1; Celestine Bohlen, "Sakharov Assails Threats to Perestroika," 
New York Times, November 8, 1988, p. A3. 
34. Edward A. Gargan, "Words the Chinese Were Waiting to Hear," New York Times, 
May 8, 1988, Section 4, p. 2. 
35. Cheng Yan, "College Faculty under Twin Pressure: Career and Decent Living," 
Chung Pao, July 19, 1988, p. 7. 
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famous during the anti-intellectual heyday of the Cultural Revolution. 
Seeing that less-educated taxi drivers and private entrepreneurs, many 
of them formerly unemployed youths from Cultural Revolution days 
or high school dropouts, were making many times more money than 
professors and college graduates, students began to question the use-
fulness of college education. At the prestigious university in Shanghai, 
there used to be 34 applicants vying for every place in its Ph.D. pro-
grams. However, in 1988, the university failed to fill its quota of 88 
places in those programs and several candidates in the graduate pro-
grams actually dropped out, including a chemistry major, who left the 
school to build a $100,000 business. No wonder! The starting salary 
of those with graduate degrees is on average less than $30 a month. 
And, according to the dean of the university graduate school, "the 
higher one's degree, the harder it is to find a job."36 
The new emphasis on money has produced a change of attitudes 
and values in the younger generation. A nationwide poll of over 
11,000 university students in 47 universities revealed that over 70 per 
cent agreed with the motto "I for everybody and everybody for me." 
Less than 16 per cent held on to "selfless dedication." Only 3 per cent 
stated they believed in "selfishness as the universal truth." A 21-year-
old business major said, compared with his father's generation, "my 
generation of college students are more selfish. We want to see tangi-
ble personal rewards for our service to society.'m 
In forsaking the ivory tower for the lures of the marketplace, not 
everybody would succeed in new ventures and many, in fact, would 
end up in dire straits. The student protests in Hainan in the summer 
of 1988 are a case in point. Attracted by the prospect of jobs and 
opportunities in the southernmost island, which had just been elevated 
administratively to a province and marked as a showcase for quick 
economic development as part of Deng Xiaoping's reform efforts, tens 
of thousands of college graduates swarmed into Hainan hoping to 
make a fortune there. Of the 26,000 who went there, only a few thou-
sand actually found jobs; the great majority, disappointed, headed 
home. More than a thousand college graduates, stranded there and 
out of money, became street peddlers who hawked their wares during 
the day and slept in the streets at night. Many were chased away or 
beaten by the police. In their demonstration in front of the municipal 
building in Haikou, the capital city of Hainan, hundred of students 
36. Chung Pao, May 20, 1988, p. 9. 
37. "Traditional Views Changing under Western Impact," Chung Pao, June 15, 1988, 
p. 9. 
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presented their plights as a case of human rights. They held up signs 
proclaiming that "We are human beings. We refuse to be treated as 
dogs and pigs. "38 
38. "Stranded College Students in Hainan Demonstrate against Police Brutality," 
Chung Pao, July 19, 1988, p. 1. 
CHAPTER VI 
INTELLECTUALS: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND PUBLISHING 
INTRODUCTION 
In the period under review, there were no major changes or signs 
of improvement with respect to freedom of the press and those policies 
applying to arts and literature. The pattern of alternating between 
tightening and limited relaxation continued through most of 1987 and 
1988. However, during the second half of 1988, economic problems 
became more serious and the hard-line Marxists gained political influ-
ence. As a result, the beleaguered reformist faction of Zhao Ziyang 
was threatened and a trend toward tightening in the ideological area 
became discernible. 
An article of unusual candor in the magazine Xinwen Zhanxian 
(News Front) stated in March 1988 that, in the past, newspapers were 
used as an instrument for political struggle. Newspapers, the maga-
zine said, were a vehicle for propagating official instructions, hence 
their function was to be "an extension of the Party and government." 
Calling for more openness without departing from the fundamental 
notion that news should be managed, the article asserted that "propa-
ganda is one of the basic functions of a newspaper." Improving news 
propaganda, therefore, meant better transmission of facts "in order to 
achieve propaganda results." The article went on to discuss the pit-
falls of a controlled press, something that is very familiar to the aver-
age newspaper reader in China: "Excessive strengthening of the 
propaganda function of news reports usually results in getting farther 
and farther away from the factual content of the news. It leads to 
empty didacticism and the shouting of slogans. It arouses hostile reac-
tions in the reader. People may find it intolerable to read such 
newspapers." 1 
Official interference in news reporting in other ways remained a 
fact of life despite the current reform. In the wake of worker restive-
ness, Chinese journalists remarked that they were instructed by the 
authorities to play down news of strikes in Eastern Europe related to 
I. Xinwen Zhanxian (News Front), (Beijing), No. 3, 1988, pp. 9-10, cited in Inside 
Mainland China, (Taipei), July 1988, p. 25. 
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economic reform policies there, and to ignore incidents of unrest in 
China. 2 
FREEDOM OF PRESS STRESSED 
No one is in a more authoritative position to comment on the 
state of press freedom than Liu Binyan, the best known investigative 
reporter in China. Liu was expelled from the Party for writing too 
much and digging too deeply. In a speech at Columbia University in 
May 1988, Liu cited freedom of the press and the rule of law as the 
two most pressing problems facing China today. The two problems 
have reached such serious proportions that, left unsolved, "the ulti-
mate victims will be the Communists themselves," he warned. Citing 
a recent statistic, he asked rhetorically: why each day more than 60 
million Chinese were listening to Voice of America broadcasts? "Be-
cause people simply don't like to read the official newspapers and this 
will set the Chinese Communists farther and farther from the 
people."3 
Liu cited the case of the once authoritative theoretical journal of 
the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Hongqi (Red Flag), 
as an example. "If an object is raised too high, it is bound to tumble 
down hard," Liu said, referring to the journal's former status (the 
once powerful Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece) and its demise 
in mid-1988. Heavy with ideological jargon, the journal, according to 
a survey conducted by the Post and Telecommunications Ministry, 
had a nationwide retail circulation of only one individual paid sub-
scriber; all other subscribers were government offices, libraries or gra-
tis subscriptions. Once, a Beijing resident tried all the newsstands in 
town but could not find a copy of it. The people who conducted the 
survey later found out the reason: the retail outlets simply stopped 
carrying the journal because nobody wanted to buy it. "The only 
thing one can say about Hongqi is that it is the best preserved journal 
in any library," Liu said cynically.4 
Referring to the official Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), whose 
circulation Liu helped to push with his expose articles in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, before being forced out as an investigative reporter, 
Liu said bluntly: "Where there is good reporting, the circulation is 
high; when the Party is happy with the newspaper, the circulation is 
2. Edward A. Gargan, "Chinese Leaders Cite Unrest and Link it to Restructuring," 
New York Times, July 7, 1988, p. 2. 
3. Chung Pao, (Centre Daily News), eastern U.S. edition, May 3, 1988, p. 2. 
4. Ibid. 
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low."5 But his formula for change got him in trouble. 
In a speech at the University of California at Davis in May 1988, 
Liu, who was purged rather than imprisoned and was used by the re-
formists, spoke of the problems caused by lack of freedom of the press. 
He asked rhetorically: "Haven't we seen enough undemocratic social-
ist systems? Haven't we seen enough unchecked Party leadership? 
Haven't we seen enough unlimited dictatorship of the proletariat?" 
Answering his own questions, Liu said that the four problems he 
raised all had to do with the lack of freedom of the press and freedom 
of speech. "In past decades, the least progress was made in these ar-
eas. Indeed in the 1980s, we witnessed continuous retrogression in 
freedom of the press and freedom of speech in China," Liu said. He 
concluded: "The Chinese Communist Party is most afraid of freedom 
of the press. " 6 
Party newspapers, which as a rule fare poorly in retail circulation, 
have been doing worse in recent years as a result of reform. The over 
10 million residents in the city of Beijing, according to a report from 
the capital city by Agence France-Presse in 1988, have purchased only 
some 800 copies of People's Daily a day. The People's Daily boasted an 
official circulation of 4 million nationwide, but it was distributed to 
offices and factories throughout the country on a mandatory basis. 
"People are not interested in official newspapers, and many do not 
believe news carried in these newspapers," the AFP dispatch said. 
Other official newspapers did even worse at Beijing's retail outlets: the 
China Youth Daily sold about 200 copies a day, the Workers' Daily 
and Economic Daily only 20 to 30 a day. In a survey conducted by the 
English-language China Daily, it was reported that the most widely 
read news item was the weather report. 7 
In another speech, Liu Binyan urged a "truly free" newspaper in 
China to allow the people to express themselves. Referring to the cri-
sis of confidence as the most serious problem affecting the current re-
form, Liu said the people were apathetic not only because they 
realized that public opinion had no role to play, but indeed because 
they remembered all too well that speaking one's mind would get one 
in trouble. Urging greater freedom of the press, Liu said: "If the time 
is not yet ripe to have a truly free newspaper, at least we should start 
5. Richard Bernstein, "Chinese Journalist Pushes His Ideas on 'Openness,' " New 
York Times, May 30, 1988, p. 3. 
6. "Liu Assails Press Control in Mainland China," Chung Pao, May 21, 1988, p. 2. 
7. "Poor Newsstand Sales of People's Daily: Only 800 a Day," Chung Pao, July 30, 
1988, p. 2. 
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by improving the present Party newspapers."8 
Although spared severe persecution and allowed to travel to the 
United States, Liu Binyan paid an additional price little known to out-
siders, aside from his widely published expulsion from the Party. 
Three of his most recent books were held back from publication, and a 
fourth book, a collection of his latest expose articles, titled "To Tell 
You a Secret," which was published just before his expulsion from the 
Party, was banned. The Party committee at the National Writers' As-
sociation decided to withhold the news that one of the expose stories 
was chosen as one of the 20 best-liked stories in a nationwide reader 
survey conducted by the People's Literature.9 
As a political scientist, Yan Jiaqi, director of the Institute of 
Political Science at the National Academy of Social Sciences, spoke of 
the importance of freedom of the press as a prerequisite to democracy 
in China. He called Chinese politics "briefing politics," meaning pol-
icy makers at the top often made unrealistic policy decisions based on 
the briefings of a small staff with little knowledge of the true senti-
ments of the people, and without public accountability. This kind of 
"briefing politics without due process," characterized by the concen-
tration of power in the hands of a few and the exclusion of the vast 
majority from the political processes, according to Yan, could be 
changed only through the unfettered flow of information as a first step 
toward public participation and accountability. 10 
In fact, a new press law has remained at the "study" stage for 
years. Hu Jiwei, director of the Office for the Study of Press Law 
under the National People's Congress, spoke of the difficulties encoun-
tered in the drafting of the press law in April 1988. People were di-
vided on the purpose of the press law, he said. There were two schools 
of thought on this: some felt that freedom of the press was insufficient 
in China and a press law was needed to spell out the details of consti-
tutional guarantees; others felt a law was needed to check the abuses 
that already existed in abundance in China. Hu disagreed with the 
latter view, but conceded that drafting of the press law in the past two 
years had run repeatedly into obstacles mainly because of the diver-
gent views at the policy-making level. 11 
8. "Weak Public Opinion Breeds Apathy toward Reform," Chung Pao, July 26, 1988, 
p. 3. 
9. Chung Pao, November 12, 1987, p. 9. 
10. Yan Jiaqi, "Freedom of the Press Antidote to Political Corruption," Chung Pao, 
July 21, 1988, p. l. 
11. Chung Pao, April 6, 1988, p. 9. 
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POLITICS IN COMMAND 
Freedom of speech in literature and the arts increased during the 
period under review, although from a very low base. However, the 
trend was a haphazard one, and, as in other realms, political consider-
ations reigned supreme. A good example was the suppression of a 
television series on the Kong clan, the offspring of Confucius. The 
series was based on the memoirs of Kong Demao, a 77th generation 
female lineal descendant of Confucius. It detailed the intimate story of 
the author's father's taking of a concubine to produce a male heir to 
continue the family name of the sage. 
The series was completed in July 1985 at a cost of over a million 
yuan-considered a costly production at the time. In the next two 
years, the film went through numerous checks and reviews and repeat-
edly was held up for political reasons. It finally was cleared by the 
Ministry of Broadcasting, Television and Motion Pictures in Novem-
ber 1987. It thus was ready for release for both domestic and interna-
tional showing at that time. However, in March 1988, the Ministry 
suddenly reversed its earlier decision and ordered the film held again, 
reportedly on the direct orders of Hu Qili, the Party Politburo and 
Central Secretariat member in charge of ideological matters. The rea-
son for the action was that release of the film might embarrass Kong 
Decheng, the author's half brother whose biological mother was the 
concubine. Kong Decheng is now President of the Examination Yuan 
in the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan where Confu-
cius is revered. At a time when and Taiwan was being wooed, release 
of the film was deemed unwise and consequently was postponed 
indefinitely. 12 
Freedom of speech in the media also suffered from the corruptive 
influence of money, thanks to the get-rich atmosphere in China evoked 
by the economic reform. It was rumored widely that, in keeping with 
the spirit of current economic reform, the media, state-owned in 
China, had been told that state subsidies would be phased out and that 
the media would be on their own financially. 13 In other words, while 
remaining the mouthpiece of the Party and government, the media 
would now be responsible for their own profit and loss. This set off a 
wild scramble for funds. The scramble obviously further degraded the 
media and hurt the cause of freedom of speech. 
In fact, the media have become so corrupted by money that, ac-
cording to many critics, what little freedom of the press there was in 
12. Chung Pao, July 23 and July 24, 1988, p. 9. 
13. Chung Pao, August 22, 1988, p. 9. 
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the past has been turned into a license openly sold for a fee. Specifi-
cally, three types of corruption have been mentioned widely: the sell-
ing of press cards; payoffs by factories to reporters, who in turn would 
write glowing stories about them; and, bribery or paying for news cov-
erage. Newspapers openly have sold positions of special correspon-
dents, reporters and stringers on a descending scale of fees. In some 
cases, they have promised the immediate issuance of a press card upon 
receipt of a set fee. A public security bureau reported in July 1988 
that three press cards were found on a criminal. 14 Cases of buying 
good publicity or press coverage also can be documented easily. 
Because of the limited time devoted to news coverage and the size 
of the audience, television has become the most corrupted media. 
Buying news coverage has become commonplace. The Central Televi-
sion Station in Beijing is a good example. In February 1988, Zhang-
guo Laonian (China's Senior Citizens) magazine had to give everyone 
in the station's news department a wrist watch in order to get an 
award ceremony covered on the evening news. In March of the same 
year, the magazine Yanhuang Zisun (Descendents of Yan and Huang 
Emperors) requested television coverage of its inauguration ceremony 
and was turned down, despite the fact that the new magazine boasted 
of Deng Xiaoping's calligraphy on its cover and listed Bo Yibo, vice 
chairman of the Party Central Advisory Committee, among the guests 
at the ceremony. The coverage was obtained after a reporter and a go-
between were paid 150 yuan. Without the bribe, a significant event 
would have gone unreported. In April 1988, nine organizations jointly 
held a "Seminar on Cultural Development" in Beijing and the news 
was ignored by the television station, although an invitation (without 
accompanying gratuity) was sent well in advance. 15 
During 1987 and 1988, harsh measures were ordered against the 
printing and distribution of what the government regarded as "porno-
graphic" materials. Such publications have been visibly on the in-
crease in recent years, particularly in major coastal cities. With the 
relaxation of controls under the Dengist reform, a wave of so-called 
"yellow publications" -cheap publications on sex and violence put out 
by enterprising merchants for quick profits-swept the land. In Bei-
jing, along the main thoroughfare of Changan Street, more than 65 
percent of the books sold at bookstands run by private entrepreneurs 
were on sex. And there were over 700 such bookstands in Beijing, 
according to Liu Yandong, a member of the Standing Committee of 
14. Chung Pao, July 21, 1988, p. 9. 
15. Ibid. 
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the National People's Congress (who cited a survey by the Communist 
Youth League). The same survey identified over 70 titles of what it 
called obscene publications totalling over 7 million copies put out by 
35 publishers, catering mainly to young readers. Liu said that these 
publications should be banned in order to save the nation's youth from 
"spiritual demoralization." 16 
Unlike the never-ending controversy over the relationship be-
tween sex and crime in the West, Chinese authorities have long be-
lieved in that relationship. Reflecting the official view stressing a 
direct link between sex and violence in early 1988, Song Muwen, dep-
uty director of the Bureau of Press and Publications, spoke about a 
study conducted at a juvenile reform center in Anhui province. A 
sampling of 30 sex offenders there showed, he said, that all had been 
exposed to obscene reading materials. It is these obscene materials 
that had made the young people "obsessed with unhealthy thoughts 
about the opposite sex, sink low in spirits, lose self-control, absent 
themselves from school and work, and finally commit crimes," Song 
said. 17 Higher authorities in the Chinese government and the Chinese 
Communist Party supported his view. 
Chinese officials have insisted routinely that "obscene publica-
tion," a loosely defined term, provokes criminality. During 1988, this 
view was propagated more widely. For example, a survey of young 
hoodlums, reported by Xinhua, the official Chinese press agency, 
found that most had been exposed to obscene works. 18 Du Daozheng, 
director of the Bureau of Press and Publications, promised seizure of 
obscene publications and severe punishment for the publishers. He 
called such publications "opium, harmful to the mind and body of the 
young." Citing the "Directive on Strictly Banning Obscene Materi-
als" issued by the State Council in 1985 and appropriate provisions 
(Article 170) of the Penal Code, he vowed to crack down on the waves 
of "pornographic publications" and urged mass campaigns, involving 
the media, to combat the trend. 19 In July 1988, the bureau issued two 
directives, stiffening the punishment for those publishing, printing, 
selling, renting, or storing "pornographic materials" with jail 
sentences of up to three years. It also banned publications which, 
though not deemed obscene, were preoccupied with sex, and ordered 
16. Chung Pao, July 2, 1988, p. 3. 
17. Chung Pao, May 4, 1988, p. 9. 
18. Edward A. Gargan, "Public Flirtation with Private Desire," New York Times, June 
4, 1988, p. 4. 
19. "Authorities to Stem 'Yellow Tide,'" Chung Pao, May 4, 1988, p. 9. 
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prior screening of material affecting the young before publication. 20 
DENG THREATENS TO EXECUTE "PORNOGRAPHY" 
PUBLISHER 
New directives affected not only books by Chinese authors, but 
also translated works by Western authors. Two, in particular, were 
the object of attention: Irving Wallace's sexually explicit novel Fan 
Club and British writer Jackie Collins' Lovers and Gamblers. The two 
books caused the ire of no less than Deng Xiaoping, who in a directive 
to the Bureau of Press and Publications reportedly said: "We should 
put some publishers on trial and execute them. " 21 
Following Deng's alleged outburst, Sun Yuanzhong, deputy di-
rector and deputy editor-in-chief of Yanbian People's Publishing 
House in Jilin Province, which published the Chinese translation of 
Wallace's book, and Cui Xingshou, head of the literature and art edi-
torial department at the publishing house, were fired. 
Meanwhile in New York, an enraged Wallace commented on the 
ban of his book in China: "I think this is the most vile thing I've ever 
heard. George Bernard Shaw once said the ultimate in censorship is 
assassination. This is the ultimate. They have done it. They have got 
to be stopped. I've contacted the Authors Guild and I hope we can do 
something." Wallace pointed out that his Fan Club, published in 16 
countries and by five book clubs around the world, had never been 
banned anywhere else.22 Earlier, the Bureau of Press and Publications 
announced that five major publishing houses in China, including the 
one that published the Chinese translation of Wallace's book, had been 
fined heavily during the fracas. 23 
In a related area, a number of beauty contests were cancelled in 
the spring of 1988. Contests were stopped in both Beijing and Shang-
hai. In addition to showing where real power lies, despite frequent 
talk about rule by law, these incidents were revealing in that they indi-
cated not so much why, but how, the contests were scrapped. While 
there could be many "legitimate" reasons for banning the pageants, 
organizers were not cited for violating any specific rules when the con-
tests were banned from television. The reason given by the embar-
rassed Beijing pageant organizer for taking the show off the air 
20. "Tough Measures Ordered by Publications Bureau," Chung Pao, July 9, 1988, p. 9. 
21. "Deng Xiaoping Angry Over 'Yellow Literature' Publishers," Chung Pao, August 
24, 1988, p. I. 
22. "Wallace Book Too Spicy for China," New York Post, August 31, 1988, p. 6. 
23. "Beijing Press Bureau Sweeping 'Yellow Literature,'" Chung Pao, August 12, 
1988, p. 9. 
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sounded noble: "China is not rich. Some people do not eat. Some 
people say how can you hold a beauty contest if some people can not 
eat or dress properly?"24 
The Shanghai pageant was not just taken off the air; it was perma-
nently cancelled. The Communist Party Secretary in Shanghai, Jiang 
Zemin, citing the city's economic problems, had this to say: "Condi-
tions are not yet ripe" for a beauty pageant. Since no reason was given 
for banning the show, rumors became rampant. Some said the Party 
Central Committee frowned upon the idea as bourgeois and thus or-
dered the show stopped. Others said Hu Qili, the powerful member of 
the Standing Committee of the Party's Politburo in charge of ideologi-
cal matters, personally ordered the show banned. 
Zhu Hansheng, director of China Television Artists Association 
and an organizer of the pageant, insisted that there had been no ex-
plicit instructions from the top. Unaware that he was offering the best 
off-hand proof that China was ruled by the whims of the leaders rather 
than by law, Zhu told a Western reporter: "If Hu Qili had said stop, 
we would have had to stop immediately and I wouldn't have agreed to 
see you." He was seconded by his co-worker, who added: "We have 
not received any directive directly from the authorities, but we can feel 
the atmosphere .... " The New York Times commented: "'Feeling 
the atmosphere' is a talent most Chinese have cultivated with care, for 
a loss of touch usually means trouble from above."25 This conditioned 
mentality of learning to live with the "myth of commanded assump-
tions" contrasts sharply with the feelings of some daring human rights 
activists, artists and others. One, 35-year-old film director Chen 
Kaige, said in this regard: "Freedom is something that is my own, not 
something the government can give me."26 
For many intellectuals, particularly the young and the artistically 
inclined, living in an ideological straitjacket cannot be accepted as a 
fact of life. The Dengist policy of opening to the West had provided 
them with a way out: leaving the country. Brain drain, long a prob-
lem of the Third World, has now begun to beset China, but for a dif-
ferent reason. The situation at the Central Academy of Opera 
provided a case in point. A veteran musician at the Academy recently 
said that so many young musicians had left the country that the loss at 
the Academy had reached crisis proportions. The Academy's orches-
tra lost more than a third of its members; four of the five performers 
24. Edward A. Gargan, "Out She Goes, Again, Miss Ideological Impurity," New York 
Times, May 25, 1988, p. A4. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Flora Lewis, "The Pain of Change," New York Times, May 11, 1988, p. A27. 
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capable of singing the leading role in Carmen had left the country, 
according to Zheng Xiaoying, the veteran musician at the Academy. 
Why were young and talented artists reluctant to return to 
China? Zheng told the China Youth Ddily bluntly: "Because there is 
too much politics-and there are too few opportunities-in China."27 
Commenting on "How to stop China's Brain Drain," the New York 
Times listed the reasons editorially: "Professors find courses and 
course content dictated by Communist Party officials. Scientists find 
little freedom of intellectual inquiry. Social scientists find their work 
censored .... It is the leaders' own contradictory goals that are really 
to blame. They insist on maintaining Communist Party power and 
control even as they seek economic change. Economic vitality cannot 
long survive in a political and cultural straitjacket. " 28 
TV SERIES "INSULTING TO MOTHERLAND" 
The plight of intellectuals was accentuated in a widely acclaimed, 
but later banned, six-part television series, He Shang (River Elegy), in 
the summer of 1988. Using the Yellow river symbolically, the televi-
sion series lamented the fate of the motherland--or more precisely the 
collective fate of its people-which was ravaged in recent memory just 
as it had been for countless times devastated by Yell ow River floods. 
The series struck such a responsive chord among millions of viewers 
that it was rebroadcast twice by the Central Television Station on its 
nationwide network. The alleged negative message of the film eventu-
ally aroused so much concern for Party leaders that government au-
thorities took it off the air. Video tapes of the program also were 
banned both domestically and for export. 29 
One Chinese leader who reportedly was enraged by this program 
was Vice President Wang Zhen, a veteran general close to Deng 
Xiaoping. In a speech on September 27, 1988, in the Ningxia Autono-
mous Region in northwest China, Wang condemned the television se-
ries, denouncing it as anti-socialist and anti-Party, "reflecting nothing 
right about our great nation." "The way I see it," roared the diehard 
Marxist and veteran soldier of the Long March at a meeting of local 
Party leaders, "this program attacks our great Yellow River, our 
Great Wall, and above all, the great Chinese people."30 Many saw 
Wang's attack as aimed at those who challenged Marxist doctrines 
27. Chung Pao, November 25, 1988, p. 9. 
28. "How not to Stop China's Brain Drain," New York Times, April 13, 1988, p. 26. 
29. "'River Elegy' Angers Hardliners, Ordered Banned," Chung Pao, October 12, 
1988, p. 3. 
30. Ibid. 
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and departed from Party-prescribed themes in arts and literature. 
Within days of Wang's angry outbursts, the program was banned. 
What provoked Wang's violent attack on the television program 
was apparently its daring plea for the case of Chinese intellectuals. 
The film was made by a group of young intellectuals mostly in their 
30s; two consultants in the making of the film were well-known profes-
sors. Their fate, the cancelling of the program revealed, said much 
about the system under which intellectuals were living. Aiming his 
figurative gun directly at many intellectuals who were associated with 
the film, Wang said with contempt characteristic of leaders of his gen-
eration with similar background: "I have fought all my life to reach 
where I am as a national leader, and now I have to listen to this bunch 
of all-knowing professors and graduate students!" "I have never been 
this angry before," the Long March veteran fumed, and added a warn-
ing: "Intellectuals are dangerous." 
0 Wang Zhen's outbursts created widespread apprehension among 
writers and artists, many of whom had been targets of attack in the 
Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization campaign in 1986-1987. They feared 
that Wang's warning might be the first salvo of a new campaign 
against intellectuals, designed to stop them from challenging Marxist 
dogma and the Party, particularly at a time when Deng's economic 
reforms were in trouble, giving hardline orthodox Marxists a needed 
opening to stage a comeback.31 
At a more fundamental level, the television program linked the 
plight of intellectuals in contemporary China with the future of the 
nation. "Although 20th century Chinese intellectuals are now rid of 
the misfortune of being categorized as the 'stinking ninth elements,' 
their social status has only been marginally raised," the program's au-
thors warned, referring to the worst days of the Cultural Revolution 
when intellectuals ranked at the bottom of nine classes of "enemies of 
the people." "Economic and psychological pressures still affect them. 
There are constant reports of their premature deaths." Pleading for 
more freedom and respect for the nation's precious intellectuals, the 
program said: "What is more horrifying is that a country where Con-
fucius was most respected is now treating its teachers so badly. The 
old generation is dying and the younger generation is unwilling to fol-
low in its footsteps. Intellectuals are desperately in need of cleaner air 
and more freedom." 32 
31. "'River Elegy' Banned after Criticism by Wang Zhen," China Spring, December 
1988, p. 77. 
32. Edward A. Gargan, "From China, Remembrances of Great Minds Lost," New 
York Times, October 30, 1988, Section I, p. 12. 
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At the same time, another popular television program, "Today in 
History," also was cancelled. Like Walter Cronkite's "Twentieth Cen-
tury" radio program on important events in the 20th century, "Today 
in History" featured short flashbacks of important events in China's 
recent past. In selecting materials, the television station often encoun-
tered official interference. For example, on August 28, 1988, it aired 
the tragic 1980 accident at the Bohai No. 2 offshore oil drilling plat-
form, which occurred because of negligence and resulted in the death 
of scores of crew members and the complete destruction of the plat-
form. The Minister of the Petroleum Industry and other senior offi-
cials lost their jobs in the wake of the accident, which has since 
become a sensitive subject seldom mentioned publicly. 
Some high officials still in power were offended by the airing of 
the details about this accident. The reporting of other major events 
also was banned from the air: Mao's review of the first Red Guards on 
August 8, 1966, which heralded the violent Cultural Revolution; the 
plane crash that allegedly killed former Defense Minister Lin Biao on 
September 13, 1971, as he tried to flee to the Soviet Union after an 
abortive plot to kill Mao; the overthrow of the "Gang of Four" in 
October 1976 soon after Mao's death. Apparently, the present leader-
ship in China did not feel that the public should be reminded of these 
events. 
The eventual cancellation of this popular television program, 
along with the ban of "River Elegy," were seen as signs of a tightening 
trend in the ideological arena, casting a shadow on the long-heralded 
Fifth National Congress of Artists and Writers in November. 33 Com-
menting on the ban of the two television programs, a Chinese-lan-
guage newspaper in the United States, known for its leftist sympathies, 
was provoked enough to question whether the "spirits of cultural des-
potism" again were stalking the land. 34 
33. " 'Today in History' Cancelled after Demise of 'River Elegy,' " Chung Pao, Octo-
ber 28, 1988, p. 9. 
34. "Spirits of Cultural Despotism Again Stalking Mainland China?" Chung Pao, Oc-
tober 29, 1988, p. 2. 
CHAPTER VII 
MASS EXECUTIONS; SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite mounting international criticism, mass executions contin-
ued in China during 1987-88. The reason was that crime associated 
with economic reforms and the opening to the West, had increased in 
recent years and efforts by Party and government authorities to cope 
generally failed. As a result, punishments have become harsher and 
have been administered more inconsistently, and often for purely 
political reasons. During the period under study, the list of capital 
crimes was expanded to include less serious cases. Finally, according 
to official statistics released by the Supreme Procuratorate Office, cases 
of police violations of basic human and civil rights rose significantly. 1 
The increase in executions in China followed a trend started in 
1983. Deng Xiaoping vowed to crack down on crime in August 1983 
after an attempt on his life. Large numbers of executions have been 
reported since. According to the London-based human rights organi-
zation Amnesty International, a conservative estimate puts the total 
number of executions in the three to four years following Deng's an-
nouncement at between 5,000 and 30,000. 2 Executions often followed 
mass meetings at sports stadiums attended by large crowds of people, 
at which the sentences of the condemned, bound and held at gunpoint 
by uniformed police, were announced. After the mass meetings, the 
prisoners were often paraded through the main streets in ftatback 
trucks before being taken to the execution ground to be shot. After 
the execution, court posters in bold characters were displayed promi-
nently in public places, announcing the cases and detailing the crimes 
of the condemned. On top of the name of each condemned, a big red 
check mark was placed, signifying that the death sentence had been 
carried out. This continued during 1987-88. 
More attention focused on human rights victims in China during 
1987-88 as a result of the country's policy of opening to the outside 
l. "75,000 Cases of Police Violation of Human Rights in 1987," Chung Pao (Center 
Daily), eastern U.S. edition, August I, 1988, p. l. According to the Supreme Procuratorate 
Office, 30,000 of the 75,000 cases involved illegal detention beyond the legal limit of 15 
days, and 600 cases were arrests without a warrant. 
2. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), (Taipei), September 20, 1987, p. 6. 
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world and increasing trade and foreign investment opportunities in 
China. The government and the Chinese Communist Party continued 
to display a callous attitude toward dissidents imprisoned in China 
and adopted the attitude that foreign countries really did not care 
about human rights abuses in China. However, there was some evi-
dence of changing policies, although the evidence was of changes in 
different directions-toward both a less harsh policy and a tough pol-
icy against known human rights victims. 
PARADE BEFORE EXECUTION 
During 1988, the practice of holding mass meetings and public 
parades before or after executions was criticized strongly by Amnesty 
International. Amnesty pointed out that this was a violation of 
human dignity and contradictory to a 1979 Chinese law forbidding 
condemned prisoners' "exposure to the public."3 However, its criti-
cism had little effect. Chinese authorities publicly stated that such 
public display and the humiliation of the condemned would enhance 
the effectiveness of capital punishment in checking serious crimes. 
The Chinese leadership also held to the view that executions had an 
educational or fear instilling effect. In fact, to spread the message as 
widely as possible, television stations broadcast to millions of viewers 
scenes of rides to the execution ground and mass meetings. Televised 
pre-execution programs were seen in Beijing and Shanghai as well as 
in other Chinese cities. 4 
During 1988, in line with the Party decision to dispense swift jus-
tice, laws were amended to make it easier for the courts to condemn 
criminals. One important change: the requirement for the Supreme 
Court to confirm death sentences was eliminated, making it possible 
for lower courts to order immediate execution after trial, sometimes 
within hours of a verdict. According to a New York Times report 
from Beijing, the list of capital offenses was extended to more than 40, 
including a mixed bag of offenses such as organized jailbreaks, "mo-
lesting" women, procuring, smuggling gold or antiques, "very grave" 
cases of embezzlement and "passing on methods of committing 
crimes."5 In practice, however, most executions were for crimes of 
murder, rape or robbery with violence-accounting for more than 70 
3. John F. Burns, "When Peking Fights Crime, News is on the Wall," New York 
Times, January 28, 1986, p. A2. 
4. Ibid.; John F. Burns, "Peking Focuses on Execution of 3 Aides' Sons," New York 
Times, February 25, 1986, p. All. 
5. See Chapter 4, supra, on Economic Change and Human Rights. 
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to 85 people shot in Beijing during an 18-month period. 6 This sug-
gests that the government sought to expand the use of the death pen-
alty to intimidate lesser offenders, but had only started. 
A study of the data on executions during this period also suggests 
the decision to impose the death penalty had less to do with the sever-
ity of the crime than with the need to placate public opinion or to find 
a scapegoat. In one case, 18 criminals were executed after a mass rally 
at the city's Workers' Stadium in Beijing. One of the condemned, a 
31-year-old peasant named Wang Yulong, was described in the poster 
as a "hardened thief," a third-time offender who stole $3,130 worth of 
generators, electric motors, television sets and pigs. 7 In another 
widely publicized case that was televised in Shanghai, three con-
demned rapists were executed-all sons of high local Party officials. 8 
Government authorities apparently wanted to show that the powerful 
and privileged were not immune from punishment. In another case 
involving student demonstrations in the wake of the death of a Beijing 
student in a brawl with unemployed youths at an off-campus liquor 
store, the man who shot the student was apprehended and executed 
with considerable fanfare after a quick trial.9 The whole process took 
just days. 
To support the drive for unification with Taiwan and to promote 
tourism, visitors from Taiwan and Overseas Chinese from Hong Kong 
assumed political and economic significance. Offenders who preyed 
on people from Taiwan making sentimental visits to their native places 
and Overseas Chinese tourists from Hong Kong and other places were 
dealt with quickly and harshly. 10 
Severe punishment did not, however, slow the rate of increase in 
serious crimes. According to a report by the Ministry of Public Secur-
ity, grave offenses showed a faster increase in 1988 than in any recent 
year. During the first half of 1988, according to this report, serious 
crimes in China increased 34.8 percent over the same period in 1987, 
with stealing of public properties, murder, robbery and arson account-
ing for the major portion of the increase. In many murder and arson 
cases, said the report, money was an important reason behind the 
commission of the crime. Minister of Public Security, Wang Fang, 
declared that gambling, prostitution, drug trafficking and the spread of 
pornographic materials, all associated with the opening to the West, 
6. John F. Bums, supra note 3. 
7. Ibid. 
8. John F. Bums, supra note 4. 
9. See note 20 infra. 
10. See notes 28, 29, 31 and 32 infra. 
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were undermining good social order and making Chinese society 
prone to serious crimes. However, he conceded that these were "una-
voidable problems accompanying the reform." The Public Security 
Minister urged greater vigilance against crime, which he warned 
would get worse in the days to come. In this context, he called for 
severe punishment of criminals. 11 In his report to the National Peo-
ple's Congress on the status of national law enforcement in August 
1988, Minister Wang described the situation as "grave" and put the 
blame on economic reform and the opening to the West. 
Following is a list of death sentences during the period under re-
view that have come to our attention from various sources, mostly 
reported in the press. With rare exceptions, death sentences were fol-
lowed immediately by the execution of the condemned by shooting in 
the head at close range. Given the size of China and the general prac-
tice of omitting bad news, it should be assumed that not all cases (in 
fact very few) became known and only those considered news "fit to 
print" would be reported in the Chinese media. Therefore, the cases 
described below in all probability represent only a small fraction of 
what actually occurred. They should not be viewed quantitatively; 
rather, they should be viewed as examples showing the nature of swift 
"justice" now dispensed in China and human rights issues created by 
the get-tough policies under Deng's modernization drive. The reader 
also is advised to note that most of those executed were not done so 
after "due process," and a large percentage were given the death pen-
alty for crimes not considered capital in other countries. The use of 
capital punishment for other than legal reasons was widespread. 
EXECUTIONS CARRIED OUT 
On September 12, 1987, Chu Hon-shing, a 31-year-old man from 
Hong Kong, was executed in Shenzhen for rape and attempted mur-
der. Chu was found guilty of raping and trying to kill a 20-year-old 
female taxi driver in Shenzhen three months earlier. His death sen-
tence was announced by the People's Court of Guangdong province at 
the Shenzhen Stadium before a crowd of more than 20,000. Speaking 
before the announcement of Chu's sentence, Li Guangzhen, vice 
mayor of Shenzhen, told the crowd that severe penalties were neces-
sary to curb rising crimes in the new economic zone across the border 
II. "Crime on the Rise, Warns Security Minister," Chung Pao, September 2, 1988, p. 
9. 
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from Hong Kong. Chu was shot immediately after the mass rally. 12 
Congressman Tom Lantos (Dem.-Calif.) reported on September 
30, 1987, that the Chinese government had executed at least two 
Tibetans as a political message. In fact, Lantos said that the public 
executions of the two men were in reprisal for the speeches given by 
the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, during his visit to 
the United States that year. Lantos cited a report of the executions in 
a translation of Radio Lhasa made by Tibetan exiles in India, who 
monitored the state-controlled broadcast. The transcript of the broad-
cast was provided by a Tibetan exile group based in New York. 13 
A Reuters dispatch from Beijing on November 11, 1987, reported 
that in the week following the conclusion of the 13th Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party, a wave of public executions occurred. 
Those shot included condemned robbers, pimps and Party officials 
convicted of embezzlement of public funds. The Party Congress was 
widely known to have adopted a hard line on crime. The official news-
paper, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), reported on November 17-
also just after the Party Congress-that a couple from Anheng 
County, convicted of embezzling $120,000, had been executed. 
Yangcheng Wanbao (Canton Evening News) reported the execu-
tion on November 16, 1987 of a pimp who ran a brothel with ten 
prostitutes. On the same day, the paper said, a native of Shanghai 
convicted of armed robbery and murder was executed. Also, the 
Zhongguo Fazhibao (China Legal News) reported the execution of 
seven people who had robbed long-distance buses in Guangdong and' 
Fujian provinces in south China. 14 One robbery took place in the 
early hours of September 21, 1987 on a Shenzhen-Shantou (Swatow) 
bus, when 21 passengers, including many from Hong Kong, were ter-
rorized and robbed of their cash and jewelry. The suspects were ap-
prehended quickly and tried. They were executed on November 13, 
within less than seven weeks of the robbery. 15 
An Associated Press dispatch from Beijing on November 11, 
1987, reported the execution of Jiang Zhengguo, the 35-year-old finan-
cial director of a fertilizer factory in Jiangsu province, for embezzling 
approximately $351,000. The execution was part of a crackdown on 
what was described as "economic crime rampant in the wake of the 
12. "Hong Kong Man Executed in Shenzhen for Rape," Sunday Standard (Hong 
Kong), September 13, 1987, p. 1. 
13. "Executions Are Claimed," New York Times, October I, 1987, p. AS. 
14. "Execution of Embezzlers and Robbers by Chinese Communists Reported," 
Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), (Taipei), November 20, 1987, p. 6. 
15. Chung Pao, November 16, 1987, p. 9. 
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economic reform." Jiang's execution was the tenth reported in a 
month and the third of a convicted embezzler. He was put to death a 
day after his death sentence was passed down, according to Gongren 
Ribao (Worker's Daily). 16 
On December 3, 1987, two Guangdong officials were sentenced to 
death for profiteering from sales of foreign exchange and the import of 
motor vehicles. Ke Liji, an official of the Maoming branch of the 
China Travel Service, and Chen Xuewen, former secretary of the 
Maoming City Communist League, were given the death penalty by 
the Maoming City People's Court for colluding in illegal sales of more 
than $900,000 and imported cars belonging to Ke's unit. 17 
On December 11, 1987, a bus conductor in Shanghai was exe-
cuted for robbing a bank and killing a cashier. Yu Shuangge, the 24-
year-old bus conductor, robbed the Shanghai branch of the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China on November 16 and killed a woman 
cashier, using a police pistol he had stolen. He fled the scene and was 
arrested a week later in another city. The Shanghai Intermediate Peo-
ple's Court sentenced him to death on December 4. 18 
On December 15, 1987, the Intermediate Court of the Shanghai 
Railway Transport office sentenced Ma Yuanjun to death for rape and 
attempted murder. Ma, whose crime was announced at a public trial, 
was convicted of rape and attempted murder of a fellow passenger on 
August 2. 19 
On December 16, 1987, the Nanjing Municipal Intermediate Peo-
ple's Court held an open trial in the Zhongshan East Road Stadium 
and sentenced four prisoners to death for murder. 20 No further details 
were provided. 
Ma Qingjun, a 22-year-old bicycle repairman, was sentenced to 
death by the Beijing Municipal Intermediate People's Court on De-
cember 23, 1987, for killing a student at the University of Foreign 
Relations and Trade in Beijing. The student's death occurred at the 
University campus store on December 5 when Ma got into an argu-
16. "China Executes Embezzler in Crackdown on Crime," Times Tribune (Oakland, 
CA) November 23, 1987, p. A6. 
17. Xinhua New Agency, December 5, 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
China (FBIS-CHI)-87-234, December 7, 1987, p. 40. 
18. Xinhua News Agency, December 11, 1987, in FBIS-CHI-87-240, December 15, 
1987, p. 27. 
19. Hefei, Anhui Provincial Service in Mandarin, December 15, 1987, in FBIS-CHI-
87-242, December 17, 1987, p. 32. 
20. Nanjing, Jiangsu Provincial Service in Mandarin, December 14, 1987, in FBIS-
CHI-87-241, December 14, 1987, p. 20. 
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ment with Zang Wei, a second·year student at the University. Ma 
stabbed Zang to death and fled. He was arrested the next morning, 
and the death sentence was handed down just over two weeks later. 21 
On December 29, 1987, the official Xinhua (New China) News Agency 
reported Ma's execution, following student demonstrations demanding 
better security on campus. 22 
Commenting on this case of swift justice, the Chicago Tribune in 
a dispatch from Beijing pointed out the arbitrary nature of China's 
judicial system. The dispatch recalled that the stabbing took place on 
December 5, the conviction was handed down on December 23 after a 
one·day trial, and the execution was carried out on December 28, all 
within three weeks. "The authorities were apparently stunned by the 
student demonstrations and decided to execute Ma in order to placate 
the public," the paper said. Only weeks before this execution, the Bei· 
jing Appeals Court Chief Judge, Li Yutin, stated that serious cases 
such as murder normally should require six weeks to investigate and 
another six weeks of trial, with the defendant allowed ten days for 
appeal. 23 
On January 4, 1998, an Associated Press dispatch from Beijing 
reported the execution of 17 people in the northern Chinese city of 
Shenyang, capital of Liaoning province. The 17 were tried and con· 
victed of crimes, reportedly including murder, rape and robbery, at a 
mass rally held on Christmas Day. After their conviction, the con· 
demned were taken immediately to the execution ground and shot, 
according to a provincial radio report monitored by the BBC. The 
rally, announced publicly in advance, was held at the Shenyang Sports 
Stadium, at which thousands of onlookers were gathered to witness 
the trial and sentencing. 24 It gave the appearance of both entertain· 
ment and an effort by the Chinese Communist Party to intimidate the 
population. 
On January 5, 1988, Zhongguo Fazhibao (China Legal News) re· 
ported the execution of a Communist Party cadre for raping 14 young 
women. Ni Shijie, Party secretary of a mine in Shandong Province, 
21. Hong Kong, Zhongguo Xinwen She in Chinese, December 23, 1987, in FBIS-CHI-
87-246, December 23, 1987, p. 15. 
22. "China Executes Man for Slaying Student," San Francisco Chronicle, December 
30, 1987, p. Al4. 
23. "Swift Justice Betrays Arbitrary Chinese Judicial System," Chung Pao, January 6, 
1988, p. 2. The article referred to a mix of "social order" and economic charges, which 
confuses the issue. See also Chapter 4 on Economic Change and Human Rights. 
24. "17 Executed in China after Trial at a Rally," New York Times, January 5, 1988, p. 
A12. 
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was arrested in March 1987 for crimes committed since 1977; most of 
his victims were teenage mine workers. 25 
On January 30, 1988, a former Communist Youth League official 
was executed in Wuhan for corruption. Qi Tongen, 38, was convicted 
of embezzling public funds, including League membership dues, when 
he was deputy chief of the organization department of the League's 
Hubei Provincial Committee. His execution was ordered by the Hubei 
Provincial Higher People's Court.26 
On May 14, 1988, Xinhua reported the execution of a 29-year-old 
unemployed man for stealing 111 bicycles. Xiao Guiqi, the thief, was 
executed in the coastal city of Shantou (Swatow) in Guangdong prov-
ince after the Shantou Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to 
death for masterminding a two-year-long wave of bicycle thefts from 
March 1984 to May 1986. He was executed immediately after his 
death sentence on May 13, 1988, with no chance for appeal. 27 
On May 25, 1988, a 30-year-old temporary worker in Shantou, 
Guangdong province, was executed for repeatedly robbing Overseas 
Chinese visitors. Zhang Shaobo, who was sentenced to death by the 
Shantou Intermediate People's Court, was shot immediately after his 
appeal to the Guangdong High People's Court had been denied. 
Zhang was arrested after he robbed Overseas Chinese from the United 
States of several thousand U.S. and Hong Kong dollars. He slipped 
into the tourist hotel where the visitors stayed, posing as a travel 
agency employee with a fake identification card. Threatening the visi-
tors with a toy pistol, he tied them up with ropes, searched the room 
and then fled with the money. Between September 1986 and August 
1987, according to court documents, Zhang had committed three rob-
beries, his victims including Chinese from Thailand, Australia and 
Hong Kong. His execution came three months after the last 
robbery. 28 
On July 29, 1988, three condemned robbers were executed in 
Guangzhou, Guangdong province. The three, Zhang Xiangyang, Jin 
Chengji and Zhang Y aosheng, were all from north China. They had 
come to the south to prey on overseas Chinese tourists. They repeat-
25. Hong Kong, Agence-France Presse, "Student Demonstrations," January 5, 1988, 
in FBIS-CHI-88-002, January 5, 1988, p. 19. 
26. Beijing, Xinhua News Agency, January 30, 1988, in FBIS-CHI-88-020, February 1, 
1988, p. 9. 
27. "China Executes Man who Stole Ill Bicycles," New Haven Register, May 14, 
1988, p. 8. 
28. "Swatow Man Shot for Robbing Overseas Chinese," Chung Pao, May 27, 1988, p. 
9. 
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edly robbed passengers on buses and guests in tourist hotels. All three 
previously had served terms in labor camps for similar offenses, court 
documents said. 29 
On August 24, 1988, four armed robbers were executed following 
a mass rally, two weeks after they had held up an electrical appliance 
store in Guangzhou, killing three store employees. The four were Li 
Jiangqiang, Deng Yongqi, Ou Zhiqiang and Xie Junjie. Sentenced to 
death on August 19 by the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court, 
they appealed to the Guangdong Provincial High People's Court, 
which upheld the verdicts of the lower court. On the morning of Au-
gust 24, a mass rally was held in the city to announce the death 
sentences. The four were then taken to the execution ground and 
shot.30 
On September 20, 1988, 13 armed robbers were executed in 
Guangzhou following a series of mass rallies at which their sentences 
were announced. The 13 were among 88 convicted criminals who 
were paraded in public in a demeaning way. The others received life 
or long jail terms. Those cond~mned to death were executed immedi-
ately after the rallies. Among those shot was one Li Zhaoheng, who 
was convicted only of robbing a Japanese tourist of his camera and 
cash. However, according to the official Xinhua News Agency, he was 
also guilty of masterminding several other robberies of tourists from 
Hong Kong. 31 
On November 8, 1988, Peng Shaohua was executed after a mass 
rally in Dayu County, Jiangxi province, for murdering a tourist from 
Taiwan. After killing Huang Xueyang, a 68-year-old retired soldier 
from Taiwan who was visiting his hometown in China, Peng took his 
money and fled to the North China province of Liaoning. He was 
later captured and returned to Jiangxi, where he was sentenced to 
death by the Ganzhou Intermediate People's Court on July 23. The 
execution came immediately, within days after his appeal was rejected 
by the Jiangxi Provincial High People's Court. 32 
NOTED POLITICAL PRISONERS 
Several prominent political prisoners continued to serve jail 
29. "Three Executed in Guangzhou for Repeated Robberies," Chung Pao, August I, 
1988, p. 9. 
30. "Guangzhou Executes Four for Armed Robbery," Chung Pao, August 27, 1988, p. 
9. 
31. "Executions Announced at Guangzhou Rallies," Chung Pao, September 24, 1988, 
p. 9. 
32. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), overseas edition, November 17, 1988, p. 5. 
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sentences during the period under review. Wei Jingsheng, China's 
most famous political dissident of the late 1970s, was last reported 
either still in a labor camp in remote Qinghai province-his health still 
deteriorating-or in solitary confinement in a Beijing jail. Wei was 
arrested in the spring of 1979 and in November of that year was sen-
tenced to 15 years for "counterrevolutionary acts" and for revealing 
state secrets (which he had not had access to), after a secret trial. Wei, 
the son of a Communist Party official, was active during the short-
lived Democracy Wall period in 1978-1979 when he wrote many es-
says calling for the "fifth modernization"-democracy-in addition to 
the official Four Modernizations of agriculture, industry, defense and 
science and technology. 
He apparently incurred the wrath of Deng Xiaoping when he 
compared Deng to Mao Zedong in one of his essays, saying both were 
dictators. Wei spent the first few years of his imprisonment in solitary 
confinement, during which his health, both physical and mental, began 
to fail quickly. According to Amnesty International, Wei was twice 
hospitalized for psychiatric treatment while in a Beijing jail before he 
was transferred to a labor camp in Qinghai in 1984. Despite mounting 
international pressure and appeals for his early release, and the irony 
of the fact that Beijing officially has supported since then many of the 
things Wei had stood for about political reform, Wei continued to be a 
victim. 
Late in 1987, Wei's death was reported in the West. Amnesty 
International immediately sent a letter to the Chinese government for 
verification. 33 Beijing denied the report, but stuck to its policy of not 
providing any specific information about Wei. Wang Mingdi, deputy 
director of the Labor Reform Bureau of the Justice Department, de-
clared in Beijing that the news of Wei's death was "absolutely untrue." 
However, he would not reveal Wei's whereabouts. A spokesman of 
the Justice Department, Wang Lixiang, reiterated the policy of refus-
ing to discuss where Wei was, and said only that Wei "is still alive."34 
On January 19, 1988, Chinese Premier Li Peng told visiting Norwe-
gian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland that Wei was still 
alive. 35 
More information became available concerning Wei's crimes dur-
33. "Famous Chinese Dissident Reportedly Died in Prison," San Francisco Chronicle, 
November 14, 1987, p. 1; Fox Butterfield, "Chinese Dissident said to Die in Jail," New 
York Times, November 14, 1988, p. 5. 
34. "Death of Wei Jingsheng in Jail Rumored," Chung Pao, November 16, 1987, p. 1. 
35. "Li Peng Tells Norway Prime Minister Wei Jingsheng Still Alive," Chung Pao, 
January 21, 1988, p. 2. 
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ing the period under study, specifically the charge of disclosing mili-
tary secrets to a foreign journalist. 36 The People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) General Staff Office (in a written statement before the convic-
tion) revealed that the information Wei furnished to the journalist was 
not a military secret. This statement, in fact, was obtained by Wei's 
father, who was a ranking officer in the PLA. The elder Wei went to 
the General Staff Office and asked for the complete written statement 
in an effort to clear his son. However, the statement, reportedly still in 
Wei Jingsheng's dossier, was not provided and the conviction stood. 
All of this confirms that the real reason for Wei's arrest was his polit-
ical activity, primarily his call for a fifth modernization: democracy. 37 
Andrew Nathan, professor of political science at Columbia Uni-
versity and a keen observer of the democracy movement in China, has 
labelled Wei one of the "unknown number of prisoners of conscience 
in Chinese jails." Wei paid with a 125-year sentence for "having said 
too early what every one is allowed to say now," Professor Nathan 
·said in June 1988. "The government refuses to release him in order to 
save face for those who ordered his imprisonment and to remind eve-
ryone else not to get out of step with the official process of 
liberalization. " 38 
In late 1987, a Reuters dispatch from Beijing, quoting informed 
sources, reported the release of Lu Lin, a dissident active during the 
Democracy Wall days in 1979, after serving a six-year jail sentence. 
Lu was formerly deputy editor-in-chief of Tan Suo (Exploration), an 
underground magazine in which Wei Jingsheng published many of his 
articles calling for democracy in China. Still under police surveillance, 
Lu was released in August 1987 from Beijing No. 1 Prison, where Wei 
Jingsheng reportedly was kept in solitary confinement. But Lu never 
met Wei while in jail. Other dissident sources reported that Wei was 
making socks in solitary confinement. Wei was last known to be in a 
labor camp in remote Qinghai province. Whether he had been trans-
ferred back to the Beijing prison cannot be verified. 39 
During the period under review, at least two other leaders of the 
36. For more information on Wei Jingsheng, see Ta-ling Lee and John F. Copper, Re-
form in Reverse: Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, 1986-1987 (Baltimore, 
Md.: University of Maryland School of Law, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Con-
temporary Asian Studies, No. 6, 1987). 
37. "The Statement in Wei Jingsheng's Dossier," China Spring, December 1988, p. 30. 
38. "Chinese Jails Still Hold Prisoners of Conscience," Letter to the Editor, New York 
Times, June 17, 1988, p. A34. 
39. "Democracy Wall Dissident Lu Lin Released," Chung Pao, November 17, 1987, p. 
I. 
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"Beijing Spring" were known to be serving jail terms. Both were ac-
tive during the days of Democracy Wall in 1978-1979. Xu Wenli, 45, 
was arrested in 1981 and sentenced to 15 years on "counterrevolution-
ary" charges. Serving his sentence at Beijing No. 1 Prison, Xu was 
reported to be in poor health because of malnutrition. It also was said 
that he had lost all his teeth. According to several sources, he was 
treated particularly harshly because his memoirs, written in prison, 
were smuggled out of China and published in Hong Kong and the 
United States. In his memoirs, Xu provided details of his imprison-
ment, including graphic descriptions of more than 200 interrogation 
sessions during his long pretrial detention. The publication of his 
memoirs in late 1985 apparently angered the authorities. In the past 
three years, he was allowed only one visit by his wife.40 
Another leader of the "Beijing Spring," Liu Qing, was last re-
ported to be at a labor camp in an undisclosed location more than 
three years ago. Arrested in 1980, Liu, now 41, was first sentenced to 
three years at hard labor. However, his sentence later was extended 
by seven more years because of the unauthorized publication of his 
manuscript abroad. In the manuscript, Liu detailed his arrest and im-
prisonment and wrote critically about China's judicial system. The 
manuscript was completed in jail and smuggled out by Liu's younger 
brother, Liu Nianchun, during a visit. The younger Liu allegedly 
handed the manuscript over to a Western journalist who brought it 
out of China and arranged for its publication. For his role in furnish-
ing the manuscript to a foreigner, the younger Liu was later arrested 
and sentenced to three years of hard labor. At the time of his arrest, 
he said he did not know the whereabouts of his brother.41 
In late 1988, marking the lOth anniversary of the Democracy 
Wall Movement, Ren Wanding, a former movement leader, called for 
the release of political prisoners and appealed to foreign countries to 
make aid and investment in China conditional on social and demo-
cratic reforms. Ren released a four-page letter addressed to the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty Interna-
tional and the Hong Kong Commission on Human Rights, asking for 
inquiries into the condition of Democracy Wall activists and student 
leaders still in prison. Ren was a former Red Guard and co-founder of 
the Chinese Human Rights Alliance. He was imprisoned from 1979 to 
1983. In an interview with the Hong Kong magazine Far Eastern Eco-
40. "Imprisoned Leader of 'Beijing Spring' in Poor Health," Chung Pao, May 21, 1988, 
p. 2. 
41. Ibid. 
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nomic Review, Ren said "the promise of democracy remains unful-
filled" and argued that the country's modernization "cannot be 
realized without the total elimination of the present autocratic sys-
tem."42 In addition to Wei Jingsheng, Xu Wenli and Liu Qing, the 
Far Eastern Economic Review listed the following activists still in 
prison: 
Wang Xizhe: in 1973, Wang, one of the leading theorists of the 
democracy movement, had been one of the three Canton Red Guards 
who wrote a lengthy wall poster attacking the Cultural Revolution. 
Wang was jailed from 1975 to 1979. He was arrested again in April 
1981, and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment for "counterrevolution-
ary incitement." Nothing is known of his current situation. 
He Qiu: Editor of the pro-democracy People's Road, he was ar-
rested in 1980 after participating in organizing a "national committee 
to save Liu Qing." 
Yang Jing: A member of the April 5th Forum, an influential un-
official magazine during the Democracy Wall period, Yang was ar-
rested in 1980 during Deng's crackdown on the democracy movement. 
He was sentenced to 10 years on charges relating to his political 
activities. 
Chen Erjin: A former coal mine statistician from Yunnan prov-
ince, Chen was the author of a book-length essay in support of multi-
party democracy, arguing that a privileged class enjoying a bureau-
cratic monopoly of economic and coercive power blocked China's pro-
gress to communism. Chen was arrested in April 1981 on political 
charges.43 
THE YANG WEI CASE 
The imprisonment of political dissident Yang Wei on "counter-
revolutionary" charges continued to draw international attention dur-
ing the period under review.44 Yang, who returned in 1986 for a visit 
to China from the United States after completing his M.A. in microbi-
ology at the University of Arizona, was arrested in Shanghai for tak-
ing part in student demonstrations for democracy. He was detained 
for 11 months without formal charges or trial. On December 21, 
1987, after a one-day trial, Yang was convicted of conducting "dema-
42. Robert Delfs, "Democracy Wall Remembered," Far Eastern Economic Review, De-
cember 15, 1988, p. 38. 
43. /d., p. 39. 
44. Yang was released from jail on January 9, 1989 after serving a two-year term. See 
Nicholas D. Kristof, "Chinese Dissident Freed from Jail, But Restricted," New York 
Times, January 10, 1989, p. A7. 
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gogical propaganda for counterrevolutionary ends" and sentenced to 
two years in prison. Foreign journalists and observers were barred 
from observing the trial. 45 
During the student demonstrations, Yang, according to the pros-
ecution, pasted up "reactionary posters" and "incited the students to 
make trouble," both "counterrevolutionary acts" carrying stiff penal-
ties. According to Yang's wife Che Shaoli, a student at Baylor College 
of Medicine in Houston, Texas, Yang was arrested on January 11, 
1987 at his parents' home in Shanghai. The police had neither a 
search nor an arrest warrant, Ms. Che said, even though they rifled the 
house and confiscated Mr. Yang's diary and some leaflets when they 
took him into custody. After, Yang's whereabouts were unknown and 
his family members were not allowed to visit him.46 
Yang also was accused of membership in the Chinese Alliance for 
Democracy, a pro-democracy dissident group based in New York. On 
the day of Yang's conviction, the official Renmin Ribao (People's 
Daily) called the group a "reactionary organization which is hostile to, 
and seeks to undermine, our country's socialist system and overthrow 
the people's government."47 The alliance, formed in 1983 by Wang 
Bingzhang, a former medical student from China, publishes the jour-
nal China Spring, which advocates democracy and human rights and 
is widely circulated among Chinese students in the United States. 
Renmin Ribao also condemned the China Spring for "attacking the 
Chinese Communist Party, slandering the socialist system and advo-
cating that China take the capitalist road." Chinese security officials 
warned that Chinese students who had joined the group while abroad 
would be investigated after returning to China and "will have to take 
responsibility for their crimes. " 48 
On December 18, 1987, Chinese students at 40 U.S. colleges and 
universities signed a petition, which they sent to Chinese Communist 
Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, urging Yang's release. Prose-
cuting Yang for joining an organization and expressing ideas, the peti-
tion said, was a violation of China's Constitution. "The Human rights 
situation in China is a major concern of many Chinese students and 
scholar abroad and has drawn a lot of attention of the international 
45. Edward A. Gargan, "Shanghai Court Convicts Student," New York Times, Decem-
ber 23, 1987, p. A9. 
46. Edward A. Gargan, "Chinese Student is on Trial; Joined Shanghai Protests," New 
York Times, December 22, 1987, p. AS. 
47. Edward A. Gargan, "China Expels Member of 'Reactionary' Group," New York 
Times, December 24, 1987, p. A9. 
48. Ibid. 
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community," it went on to state. It also asserted Mr. Yang's case was 
entirely political and belied Zhao's assertion that there were no polit-
ical prisoners in China. 49 
Yang's case attracted considerable attention in the United States 
because, at the time of his arrest in Shanghai, Yang was still enrolled 
at the University of Arizona. In December 1987, Congress approved 
an amendment to a State Department authorization bill calling for 
Mr. Yang's release, saying that he had broken no American or Chi-
nese law. 50 Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona later wrote to Deng 
Xiaoping on Yang's behalf. Secretary of State George Shultz also 
raised the issue with the Chinese government when he visited Beijing 
in March 1988. All 17 members of the Congressional Human Rights 
Caucus signed a joint letter to the Chinese Embassy in Washington. 51 
In London, Amnesty International sent repeated appeals to the Chi-
nese government. It later designated June 1988 as "Yang Wei 
Month."52 
Compared with Wei Jingsheng and other jailed political dissi-
dents, Yang received a relatively light sentence. Many observers be-
lieved that it was strong and continuous outside pressure that 
compelled the Chinese government to become more lenient in Yang's 
case. "Counterrevolutionary crimes" normally would carry a penalty 
of more than ten years in jail. 53 
49. Wolfgang Saxon, "Chinese Students Across U.S. Protest an Arrest in Shanghai," 
New York Times, December 21, 1987, p. A5. For full text of the letter, see China Spring, 
No. 57, February 1988, p. 41. 
50. Nicholas D. Kristof, supra note 44. 
51. China Spring, No. 55, December 1987, p. 14. 
52. China Spring, No. 63, August 1988, p. 8. 
53. "Wide Repercussion of Yang Wei Case in Chinese Community in U.S.," Chung 
Pao, December 26, 1987, p. 2. 
CHAPTER VIII 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
INTRODUCfiON 
While women and children have benefitted from China's eco-
nomic growth and the economic and political reforms of the post-Mao 
period, they also have been victims of the current reform, particularly 
pregnant women and girls in their teens. For both groups, in fact, 
serious human rights abuses were observed during the period under 
review. 
During late 1987 and 1988, the new "liberalization" policies or 
reforms were misused regularly by employers to discriminate against 
women workers. To the extent there was a new prosperity, the eco-
nomic changes that brought it about also either revived or exacerbated 
many demeaning practices, including the centuries-old vice industry. 
This was noticeable particularly in the coastal areas of China. Nation-
wide, women also continued to suffer grievously under the harsh birth 
control policy. 
The victimization of children was manifested in poor education, 
so contradictory to long-run modernization aspirations, and an in-
crease in child labor. Female infanticide was also rampant. 
JOB DISCRIMINATION AND PROSTITUTION 
Under the rightist economic reform policies, factories are now 
given some degree of autonomy in decision-making. As a result, wo-
men quickly have become the victims of massive lay-offs and have suf-
fered other discrimination as an outcome of stricter work rules. In 
fact, this has become a serious problem. A national trade union sur-
vey of over 600 enterprises revealed that, in the first seven months of 
1987, over 17,000 women lost their positions or were relegated to 
lesser jobs. Another survey of 660 establishments in 11 provinces dur-
ing the same period indicated that only 5.2 percent of employers were 
willing to hire women. 1 Clearly, the ending of the state assignment 
system for jobs and the transfer of authority to employers to hire and 
fire greatly reduced employment opportunities for women. This is 
I. Agence-France Presse dispatch, Beijing, March 4, 1988, in Chung Pao (Centre 
Daily), eastern U.S. edition, March 5, 1988, p. 9. 
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mainly because employers, now responsible for profit and loss of the 
enterprises they run, openly prefer men to women because they want 
to avoid losses caused by maternity leaves and related health care ben-
efits. It is also, no doubt, the product of a revival of traditional values 
long repressed, but not completely eradicated, under Mao. 
In early 1988, a 30-year-old textile woman worker said that, 
under the economic reform, "what is free competition for men is sanc-
tioned inequality for women." In Beijing, during late 1987 and early 
1988, observers noticed that almost all job posters said "male only." 
Even government jobs for college graduates advertised in major news-
papers specified "no female applicants."2 
In early 1988, a journalist writing for the Washington Post and 
reporting from Beijing wrote that "in many ways, millions of women 
factory workers were worse off than before the economic reform." 
They are now the first fired and last hired, he said, and in many cases 
they suffer pay cuts and are denied maternity leaves. 3 According to 
the English-language China Daily, nurseries have been closed at some 
factories and in others young mothers are no longer allowed to nurse 
their infants.4 These conditions, in fact, prompted the National Wo-
men's Association to call on the government to pass laws for the pro-
tection of women's rights. The Association reported that in 1987, 
large numbers of female graduates from prestigious universities were 
rejected by prospective employers, including 100 graduates of Beijing 
University, one of China's top-ranking institutions. 5 
The rise of prostitution and its attending forms of human degra-
dation also have been reported widely in recent years by travellers, as 
well as in China's controlled press. Tourists visiting Hainan province 
in southern China reported that numerous "restaurants" (that are 
really brothels) line new roads in the villages. Known to local people 
as "road side shops" (lubian dian), these restaurants offer no food, but 
rather young girls and private rooms. The girls, most in their teens, 
are brought in from poor villages in other provinces. One girl from 
Guangxi province said she was paid 100 yuan (US$27) a month by her 
employer. She was illiterate. She went to Hainan because she heard 
there were job opportunities in this newly established province marked 
for economic development. 6 
In Shenzhen, the special economic zone near Hong Kong, 
2. Ibid. 
3. Chung Pao, February 20, 1988, p. 3. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. "Roadside Shops Peddle Human Flesh," Chung Pao, June 21, 1988, p. 9. 
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"girlie" bars have proliferated. According to a Reuters dispatch, wait-
resses provide massages and "other services"; frequent police crack-
downs have had little impact. Venereal diseases, the same Reuters 
report says, are on the rise in the southern provinces of Guangdong, 
Guangxi and Fujian. 7 Wu Changzhen, an expert on marriage law at 
the National University of Political Science and Law in Beijing, said, 
at a meeting called to discuss this problem, that prostitution has been 
reported in increasing numbers in all 29 provinces and municipalities 
in China. Wu, also a member of the National People's Political Con-
sultative Conference, pointed out the four characteristics of the situa-
tion: prostitutes were found over wide areas, were relatively young, 
were mostly organized in groups and were connected with various 
criminal activities. 8 
According to another Reuters dispatch, which quoted a report in 
the Harbin Evening News in Northeast China, the selling of brides was 
becoming much more commonplace in various parts of the country. 
The report cited many cases, including one in a Central China prov-
ince, where scantily-clad young women, price tags on their chests, 
were sold in the streets. In one county alone in Sichuan province, the 
number of brides sold rose from 131 in 1985 to 323 in 1986. A 19-
year-old girl from Hunan province was sold to four brothers, all in 
their 30s, as their "common wife." A young woman from Yunnan 
province was sold to a man in Guangdong province, who cut out her 
Achilles' heels to prevent her from running away. Pointing out that 
the Communist government had tried to eradicate "evil customs" in 
China since the 1950s, the Harbin Evening News concluded: "What is 
shocking is the fact that such tragedies are still happening in China in 
the 1980s."9 Similar cases of bride selling, involving girls as young as 
11 years old, also were reported in Zhejiang, Fujian and Anhui 
provinces. 10 
FEMALE INFANTICIDE 
China's draconian birth control policies continued to exact a 
heavy toll not only on women, but on the newborn and the unborn. 
Beijing's one-child policy, coupled with forced, late-pregnancy abor-
tions and mass sterilization drives in the countryside, led to the revival 
of the ancient inhuman practice of female infanticide in the rural vil-
7. Chung Pao, April 27, 1988, p. 9. 
8. "Prostitution Spreads over China," Chung Pao, April 13, 1988, p. 9. 
9. "Brides Sold in the Streets," Chung Pao, May 6, 1988, p. 3. 
10. Chung Pao, May 21, 1988, p. 3; July II, 1988, p. 9. 
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lages, where peasants traditionally favored male offspring. During 
1987-88, fetuses were aborted in large numbers if tests showed them to 
be female. Newborn girls were killed more frequently. While nona-
tional statistics were available and the government only admitted to 
isolated cases of female infanticide, the situation reportedly reached 
alarming proportions in some areas. 
Reporting on the extremely skewed ratio of boys and girls in the 
rural areas of Henan province in central China, a Reuters dispatch 
from Beijing, citing accounts in Guangming Ribao (Guangming 
Daily), warned of an approaching "social crisis" in a "seriously unbal-
anced next generation, withyang(male) flourishing and yin (female) in 
decline." The paper said that in a recent survey in many rural areas, 
boys outnumbered girls by over 60 percent. Without directly mention-
ing the serious situation of infanticide in the province, the newspaper 
spoke of the "extremely high female infant mortality rate" in Henan 
province. 11 There is strong reason for one to believe that what is true 
of Henan province is true of rural areas in other provinces as well. 
Indeed, in the poor Shanxi province north of Henan, an American 
couple, after their departure in August 1988, reported that in the few 
months they worked there, they saw at least seven abandoned baby 
girls by the roadside or on river banks. They found one of the babies 
still alive, and adopted her. 12 
Another evil custom seen more frequently in the last year or so is 
baby-selling, which Zhongguo Funu Bao (Chinese Women's Journal) 
described as "rife" in parts of Central China, with the Party and gov-
ernment taking part in the custom. The newspaper accused peasants 
in one impoverished area of Anhui province of deliberately breeding 
children for sale to childless couples from other areas as a more profit-
able business than farming. "You can sell a son for 2,000 yuan 
(US$540), but you can only get 500 yuan (US$135) for raising a pig." 
"Of course it makes sense to raise children," the paper quoted one 
official as saying. In one village in Anhui, inhabited by 72 families, 
peasants had sold 75 one-month old babies in the past few years, the 
newspaper claimed, quoting local people as saying "Women's bellies 
are like little banks." 13 Party and government officials had been 
caught making money from the trade, but had been punished only 
11. "Boys Far Outnumber Girls in Henan Villages," Chung Pao, October 17, 1988, p. 
3. 
12. Ibid. 
13. "Baby-farming Rife in Central China," Sing Tao International (San Francisco), 
November 15, 1988, p. 3. 
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with light fines. 14 
Customarily the punishment for violating the one-child policy has 
been a heavy fine. Ironically, improved conditions in the countryside 
fostered by economic reform have made fines less effective. With 
higher incomes, many rural families would rather pay the fines and 
knowingly break the law, in order to have second or third opportuni-
ties to give birth to a boy. Many even pay the price by going heavily 
into debt. Rao Changpin, a 35-year-old farm worker in a village 
outside Beijing, for example, had two unauthorized births before she 
had a son. She and her husband were fined a total of 5,000 yuan 
(US$1,348), more than their combined incomes for a year. Heavily in 
debt and under pressure from local officials, she finally agreed to be 
sterilized. 15 
To deal with this situation, local birth control officials have been 
given stricter quotas and are threatened with loss of their jobs or sal-
ary cuts if quotas are exceeded; they have been promised bonuses 
when quotas are met. Various "persuasion tactics" are used, such as 
long "persuasion meetings," cutting off water and electricity to defiant 
families, and wage deductions for pregnant women and their hus-
bands. In pursuit of birth control, officials will intrude into the most 
intimate aspects of couples' lives in ways Americans would find intol-
erable, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing the case of a Ketou 
village on the outskirts of Beijing: 
Officials maintain a detailed dossier on each of the vil-
lage's 210 women of child-bearing age. Two thick notebooks 
list the result of each pregnancy, the birth control method 
used and any fines imposed. In some villages, such files 
chart women's menstrual cycles .... They (officials) fre-
quently visit local households, providing free birth-control 
devices and urging mothers to have abortions and undergo 
sterilization. Female officials even conduct spot checks in 
the homes to make sure intrauterine devices are still in 
place. 16 
Since women try to dodge the officials, many visits take place af-
ter hours. As a consequence, some zealous officials are known to force 
14. Ibid. 
15. Adi Ignatius, "China's Birth Rate Rises Again Despite a Policy of One-Child Fam-
ilies," Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1988, p. AI. 
16. Ibid. 
98 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
women to have abortions even in the last trimester of pregnancy. 17 In 
1986, abortions were so common that nationwide there were 53 abor-
tions for every 100 births. This situation got worse in 1987: 11 mil-
lion pregnancies ended in abortion. 18 The proportion of abortions 
probably increased in 1988-at least in the latter months of the year. 
In June 1988, to stem an upsurge in birth, the government decided to 
train 25,000 family planning workers to add to a force of 180,000 al-
ready in the field, on top of hundreds of thousands of local officials 
who also shared the responsibilities of enforcing birth-control 
policies. 19 
Trying to dodge birth control officials, women desiring another 
child resorted to what has been known as "childbirth on the run," that 
is, pregnant women flee to another town, staying with their relatives 
awaiting birth. However, they were often found and brought back to 
their original residences, where they were coerced into late pregnancy 
abortions. In a 1988 case in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, a woman, 
seven months pregnant, was brought back from her cousin's home in 
another town. She was then taken to the local clinic where, without 
her husband's knowledge, she was given an injection of an abortifa-
cient drug. The shot, commonly known as a "poison shot" in China, 
causes the fetus to be born dead or die 24 to 48 hours later. 20 
Forced abortions and sterilization also are performed commonly 
on Tibetan women, according to eye-witness accounts and reports by 
Tibetan refugees in India. Although Tibetans are officially allowed to 
have two children, while Chinese women are limited to only one, the 
supposed preferential treatment for "minority nationalities" under the 
strict one-child policy does not work out that way in reality. Heavy 
government pressure and threats, prohibitive fines, late pregnancy 
abortions and in-hospital infanticide make the implementation of the 
birth control policy as harsh and inhuman on the Tibetans as it is on 
the Chinese. Considerable evidence indicates it is worse, due to racial 
hatred espoused by Chinese officials in Tibet. The number of women 
in Tibet dying as a result of abortions has been much higher than in 
the rest of China. 
According to a story told by Dr. William B. Kerr, who witnessed 
the Lhasa riots in October 1987 during a visit to Tibet, a Tibetan wo-
17. Ann Scott Tyson, "China Adopts Tough Measures to Curb Population Boom," 
Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 1988, p. 11. 
18. Ibid.; Adi Ignatius, supra note 15. 
19. "China Boosts Birth Control Campaign," Washington Post, June 27, 1988, p. A19. 
20. Steven W. Mosher, " 'One Family, One Child': China's Brutal Birth Ban," Wash-
ington Post, October 18, 1987, p. Dl. 
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man was forced to witness her baby being killed by lethal injection 
after its birth in the Lhasa's People's Hospital. She herself was then 
sterilized against her will. 
Dr. Kerr returned to the Tibetan exile communities in India in 
October 1988 to interview recent refugees. He documented detailed 
accounts of forced abortion and sterilization, infanticide and torture. 
Following are some of his accounts: 
Tibetan monks reported the arrival of Chinese birth control 
teams at a village in northeastern Tibet, which set up a tent next to a 
monastery. "Villagers were informed that all women had to report to 
the tent for abortions and sterilizations or there would be grave conse-
quences, like fines of 1,000 yuan (equivalent to three years' wages)." 
Women who refused to go were taken by force, operated on, and de-
nied medical care. "Women nine months pregnant had their babies 
taken out," the monks who had fled the village reported. During a 
two week period the birth control tent was in the village, all pregnant 
women had abortions followed by sterilization, and every woman of 
childbearing age was sterilized. 
"The monks saw many girls crying, heard screams from inside 
the tent, and witnessed the growing pile of babies and fetuses which 
were left outside the tent to gradually decompose. The stench was 
horrible." 
"Many Tibetan women come into the People's Hospital to have a 
checkup during their second pregnancy. Once the women is in the 
hospital, Chinese doctors inform her that she has to have the baby 
taken out, or she will die. After the abortion, the woman is almost 
always sterilized." 
A nurse at the hospital described the methods of abortions: "If a 
woman is two to four months pregnant, the fetus is taken out by suc-
tion. Women five to nine months pregnant are injected in the abdo-
men to induce abortion. If delivered alive, the fetus is also injected so 
it will die." 
Three women interviewed by Dr. Kerr described how a relative 
or acquaintance of theirs had delivered a normal baby, only to have 
the nurse kill it with a lethal injection in the soft spot on the forehead. 
Because women eight and nine months pregnant are given injections 
to kill the fetus, the incidence of infanticide may be higher than re-
ported, Dr. Kerr pointed out. Chinese law does not consider this in-
fanticide; rather, it is a legal abortion. 
Dr. Kerr further quoted the nurse at the hospital: "Every day at 
the People's Hospital, 20 women have abortions (17 by suction, three 
by injection) and 10 to 12 women are sterilized (tubal ligation). Out of 
100 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
100 abortions followed by sterilization, two to three women die from 
losing too much blood, and 30 percent of the women become sick. 
Women given the injections are more likely to have complications. 
Five to six of these women die out of every 100 operated on."21 
The long arm of Chinese birth control officials even reached the 
United States. In one case, a Chinese graduate student at the Univer-
sity of Arizona, whose wife was pregnant with a second child, received 
repeated warnings from home of sanctions not only against his wife, 
but also against her co-workers back in China. Quan B. Li came to 
the United States seven years ago on a government scholarship to 
study mechanical engineering. His wife, a nurse, joined him four years 
later. "My wife is seven months pregnant. Even though we are living 
in the U.S., the Chinese government has been trying to force us to 
return to China for an abortion," Li said in early 1988. Birth control 
officials, he said, sent them threatening letters and put pressure on 
their families in China. 22 
FORCED STERILIZATION OF THE RETARDED 
In November 1988, in the northwestern province of Gansu, the 
Provincial People's Congress adopted a set of regulations ordering 
forced sterilization of retarded men and women. The regulations, 
prohibiting what were defined as mentally retarded people from hav-
ing reproductive capability, were believed to be the first such provin-
cial regulations in China. Under the regulations, people with all three 
characteristics listed below were defined as mentally retarded: retar-
dation due to heredity or resulting from marriages between close rela-
tives; those with an intelligence quotient of under 49; and those 
displaying patterns of handicap or disorder in language, memory, 
sense of direction and thinking. Retarded people with all three char-
acteristics, whether married or not, must undergo sterilization, ac-
cording to the regulations. Retarded pregnant women, whether 
married or unmarried, must have abortions, followed by sterilization. 
The regulations stipulated that all the procedures were free. 
According to Xiao Shuze, deputy chairman of the Legislative 
Committee of the Gansu People's Congress, there were about 262,000 
retarded people among the province's population of 20 million. The 
retarded people in turn would give birth to about 2,000 retarded in-
21. William B. Kerr, "China's Sterilization of Tibetan Women," unpublished manu-
script, November 30, 1988, pp. 1-6. 
22. Steven W. Mosher, "The Long Arm of 'One-Child' China," Washington Post, April 
10, 1988, p. Bl. 
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fants, thus "putting a heavy burden on both the retarded families and 
society. The regulations were adopted "in order to raise the quality of 
the population," he said. 23 His views were echoed by the official 
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily). The official Party newspaper de-
clared: "Mentally retarded people are not able to work. Their lives 
depend completely on welfare, imposing a great burden on society."24 
Li Y ong, an official of the State Family Planning Commission, 
hailed the Gansu law as a forerunner to a national law on eugenics. Li 
declared: "The arrival of this law is an advance for eugenics. We 
think it reflects progress and civilization. This local law will have a 
profound influence on the country in the drafting of a national law on 
eugenics. The State Family Planning Commission hopes that a law on 
eugenics can be adopted and put into practice as soon as possible," Li 
added.25 
WOMEN FALL BEHIND IN EDUCATION 
One of the long-term results of recent increases in discrimination 
against women is in education. "Chinese women still do not enjoy the 
same right to education as men even though they make up half the 
population," Kang Keqing and Luo Qiong, two of China's most prom-
inent women, declared in April 1988. In a joint speech before the Chi-
nese People's Political Consultative Conference, Kang, chairman of 
the Chinese Women's Association (CWA), and Luo, a former vice 
chairman, pointed out that the number of illiterate or semi-literate wo-
men had actually increased in many places in China, especially in ru-
ral areas. 
According to the State Statistical Bureau, the number of girls in 
primary schools decreased from about 65 million in 1980 to 59.5 mil-
lion in 1986, a drop of nine percent in six years despite a general popu-
lation increase. Most of the girls who had dropped out of school, it 
was revealed, had gone to work as child laborers in rural factories or 
household businesses. Similar downward trends were also registered 
in secondary schools and colleges. The number of female students in 
secondary schools decreased from 22.3 million in 1980 to 21.7 million 
in 1986. 
The number of female college students in China now accounts for 
23. "Gansu Province Law Sterilizes Retarded," Chung Pao, November 29, 1988, p. 9. 
24. "Mentally Retarded to be Sterilized in Chinese Province," San Francisco Chronicle, 
November 26, 1988, p. A9. 
25. Pierre-Antoine Donnet, "China Moves Toward Compulsory Abortions for Re-
tarded," Washington Times, December I, 1988, p. A8. 
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only about a quarter of the total college enrollment, much lower than 
in most other countries. 26 In a joint speech, Kang and Luo said that 
this situation is getting worse. They urged education departments at 
the national and local government levels to adopt effective measures to 
guarantee women's rights to education and work with local Party or-
ganizations and judicial departments to bring the Compulsory Educa-
tion Law (nine years) into effect. They also suggested that rural 
enterprises should be banned from employing child laborers and voca-
tional schools be set up for girls. 27 
The views expressed by Kang and Luo were echoed by another 
prominent woman leader, Hu Dehua, a member of the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress. "Feudal practices," such as 
the selling of brides, trading of wives and arranged marriages, are now 
widespread and on the rise, she said, asserting that there were "far-
reaching underground networks dealing in these practices." She urged 
the establishment of a joint committee at the cabinet level for the safe-
guarding of women's and children's rights, comprising "leading cad-
res" of various ministries, including education, labor, personnel and 
public security. She cited various forms of discrimination against wo-
men in the workplace in hiring, pay and benefits. In the political 
realm, she alluded to the low number of women "at the decision-mak-
ing level," and the fact that female officials at the grassroots level were 
"almost non-existent."28 
Divorce rates also rose in 1987-88 in China, and increasingly the 
proceedings were initiated by women. This reflected a continued and 
even worsening discrimination against women under China's legal sys-
tem. In a district in Shandong province, of the 470 divorce cases re-
corded by the Yinan County Court, 387 cases, or 82.3 percent, were 
filed by women. According to Shi Xianliang, who had studied these 
cases and interviewed many principals, there were eight main reasons 
behind the rising number of divorces in the area. Topping his list were 
arranged marriages that did not work out, early romantic relation-
ships that would not last and extramarital affairs caused by "liberal 
Western ideas." These were followed by lazy husbands, husbands who 
"brutally beat up their wives," and husbands who had "total control 
over family finances" but "refuse[d] to support elderly family mem-
bers from the wife's side." The last of the eight main reasons for di-
vorce cited in the study was the sentencing of husbands to reform 
26. China Daily, (Beijing), April 8, 1988, p. I. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Xinhua News Agency Dispatch from Beijing, June 30, 1988, cited in Inside China 
Mainland, (Taipei), September 1988, p. 23. 
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through labor. "Most wives in this situation will seek divorce in order 
to avoid political and social discrimination," Shi said in his study.29 
CHILD-LABOR ON THE RISE 
Primary education has received less attention in the post-Mao 
years, in large part because Dengist reformers diverted already meager 
education resources to a small number of "key point (elist) schools" 
and to higher education. Their intent was to link education to re-
search and to economic productivity rather than to social programs. 
The long-term result of this policy was made known only recently 
when it was revealed that over 20 percent of the nation's population, 
or more than 230 million people, were illiterate (according to official 
figures reported by Agence-France Presse from Beijing).30 Lack of 
funds for schools and low pay for teachers were also among the rea-
sons behind the deterioration of the quality of elementary school edu-
cation, particularly in the remote and poor villages. 
Economic reforms now ironically are seen to put further strain on 
education: more school-age children were kept out of schools by their 
parents to join the ever-expanding child-labor force, while fewer peo-
ple are joining and more people were deserting the ranks of the "im-
poverished and despised teachers" to go into business. Studies 
indicate this will in the long-term have a negative impact on family 
income.31 But the concern by those making these decisions is short-
term gain. 
School-age children have suffered recently, especially young girls 
in rural areas and in the coastal economic development zones. Parents 
take their children out of schools and put them to work on family 
farms or in factories to supplement family incomes now that, under 
the new "responsibility system," households were allowed to keep 
more as incentives for production. According to a survey taken in 
August 1988 in Henan province, over seven million school-age chil-
dren have dropped out of school. 32 In the poor Shaanxi province in 
northwestern China, 570,000 students have left school early, resulting 
in the closing down of2,800 primary schools in five years from 1982 to 
1986. In Hubei province, 1.5 million primary and secondary school 
29. "Why Are More Women Filing for Divorce?" Nongmin Ribao (Peasants Daily), 
April 18, 1988, p. 10. 
30. Chung Pao, June II, 1988, p. 9. 
31. See Penelope B. Prime, "Low Expectations, High Growth: The Economy and Re-
form in 1987," in Anthony J. Kane (ed.), China Briefing (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 
1988), p. 34. 
32. "Rural School Dropout Rates Alarming," Chung Pao, August 18, 1988, p. 9. 
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students left school in 1987. Official statistics showed that in 1988, 
over 29 percent of children aged 6 to 17 and 45 percent of those be-
tween 15 and 17 in Guangdong province were not in school. 33 
As more parents put their children to work rather than send them 
to schools, the traditional discrimination against girls has deepened. 
At a national conference on education in late April 1988, Liu Bin, 
deputy director of the State Education Commission, cited figures to 
show that 83 percent of elementary school dropouts were girls. Fan 
Chongyan, Party secretary at the National Association of Women, 
pointed out that women constituted 64 percent of the nation's 230 mil-
lion illiterates. Of all the post-graduate degrees granted since the 
founding of the People's Republic, she said, only seven percent went to 
women. 34 
Hu Dehua, a leading deputy to the National People's Congress, 
also expressed grave concern over the alarming school dropout rates 
among young girls. "Of the girls who do attend school, many leave 
after the third or fourth grade to do household chores or to become 
child laborers," Hu said, citing a census figure to show that of all fe-
males aged 12 and above, the illiteracy rate was as high as 45.3. She 
also said that in many cities, child drug addicts and criminals were 
reaching "alarming heights."35 
The official Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily) reported in 
May 1988, that of the three million children who dropped out of 
school to work in small private enterprises in 1987, the majority were 
girls. Child labor, the paper said, had become a very serious problem, 
-especially in the fast-developing coastal areas where private entrepre-
neurs, many unprincipled and unscrupulous, were exploiting under-
aged workers. The newspaper cited a case in Jinjiang County of the 
coastal Fujian province where over 20 young girls worked on sewing 
machines in a crowded factory of 24 square yards in area, including a 
12-year-old girl who had to stand on tiptoes in order to reach the iron-
ing board to work. 36 The paper quoted a popular local saying: "Big 
students (college students) make small money; small students make 
big money.'m Warning against serious damage to the nation's young, 
the paper in another report said that in some rural construction gangs, 
child labor constituted as high as 25 percent of the total work force. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Chung Pao, April 27, 1988, p. 9. 
35. Xinhua News Agency Dispatch from Beijing, June 30, 1988, cited in Inside China 
Mainland, (Taipei), September 1988, p. 23. 
36. "Female Child Labor Fast Rising," Chung Pao, May 31, 1988, p. 9. 
37. Ibid. 
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In one village in Jiangxi province, among "little farmers and little 
merchants," over 85 percent were girls, according to the report. 38 
In a mountainous region of Jiangxi province, a rash of 15 cases of 
suicide pacts were reported in October 1988, involving the death of 51 
young women. China Women's Journal, which reported the news, 
linked the suicide pacts with the despair and low social status of these 
rural girls. According to the newspaper, these young girls drowned 
themselves in village ponds in their best dresses, in the hope that they 
would live a better life in the next reincarnation. Before they commit-
ted suicide, the paper said, the young girls had visited nearby cities. 
Distressed with their poverty, and feeling despair over their lack of 
education, they were resentful of their parents for not allowing them 
to go to middle school or to leave the villages. The paper quoted one 
girl as saying before her suicide: "We have nothing good to eat and 
nothing good to wear. At home, we are controlled by our parents. 
After marriage, we will be controlled by our husbands. In the cities, 
girls wear pretty clothes and go to the movies. . . They are living the 
life of angels. Why are people so different?"39 
38. "Child Labor: Killing Chickens for Eggs," Chung Pao, March 7, 1988, p. 9. 
39. "51 Girls Die in Suicide Pacts in Poor Jiangxi Mountains," Chung Pao, October 
17, 1988, p. 3. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the period under study, it is clear that, from a human 
rights standpoint, the People's Republic of China has experienced 
both progress and back-sliding. In other words, the record is mixed. 
But this is not unexpected; regard for human rights has been an off-
and-on thing in China over the past decade and, indeed, over the past 
four decades. 
It is clear that adopting free market principles, or what some call 
capitalism, and China's opening up to the outside world have helped a 
lot. Most other countries that have adopted a free market and have 
expanded their foreign trade also have shown improvements in their 
human rights conditions. China is no exception to this rule. Respect 
for political and civil rights particularly has improved. There is more 
free speech in China. Freedom of the press has increased, and the 
right to travel and the right of assembly and association have been 
broadened. Under Mao, Chinese citizens got in trouble and were per-
secuted for associating with foreigners. This is no longer true. Few 
enjoyed the right to travel. This has changed. 
But saying that China's human rights condition has improvM is 
largely a value judgement based on one's definition of human rights. 
To say that political and civil freedoms have been expanded and that 
this is very important obviously constitutes a Western bias. Ex-
panding such Western freedoms, as history attests, subsequently helps 
a nation's economic growth prospects and consequently improves its 
economic and societal rights. But what about in the meantime? And 
will this be true specifically for China? Making the transition from a 
totalitarian system is unprecedented. 
China's economic performance in recent years, including the pe-
riod under study, has been good, although uneven. And this has im-
proved the lot of China's overall population. The average person in 
China is much better off physically and materially than before. This is 
easy to see. But there is a downside: income disparity has increased 
markedly in recent years. The rich have gotten richer; relatively, at 
least, the poor have gotten poorer. During 1987 and 1988 this dispar-
ity seemed to become (or at least was becoming) a serious issue. It 
created further societal polarization. Many social problems resulted, 
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including skyrocketing crime rates. Greed was alarming: so was cor-
ruption. In societal terms, many Chinese questioned whether China's 
human rights record was really better. Clearly, social responsibility 
declined. 
Increased freedoms also made it easier for people to discriminate 
against others: women and children and minority groups especially. 
Older people also complained. Clearly the strong took advantage of 
the expanded freedoms more than the weak. Certain people enjoyed 
rights more and used greater freedoms to their advantage and to the 
disadvantage of others. Other explanations are also possible. One, in-
dividual freedom had been suppressed for such a long time that when 
the restraints were lifted, many misused their newly gained freedoms. 
Two, many liberties require some time and cultural conditioning 
before they can be used in gentle and fair ways; this has yet to happen 
in China. 
The fact that Chinese leaders call for "liberal totalitarianism" in 
reforming China-apparently referring to freedoms needed for eco-
nomic growth, but exercised in a way that does not cause chaos and 
undermine the authority of the Communist Party-is instructive. One 
might conclude that there are basic and serious systemic obstacles for 
China in trying to improve its human rights. Totalitarianism has been 
present for so long and has become so much a part of the system (or 
indeed is the system itself) that getting rid of it is not easy. Perhaps by 
its very nature, respect for human rights is difficult to evolve from 
such a system. The fact that reform in China has had such ups and 
downs, as has human rights, supports this view. Some Chinese leaders 
have spoken of authoritarianism in Taiwan and South Korea in the 
past and those countries' successful transition to democracy and good 
human rights records. Those Chinese leaders seem to think in terms 
of China's evolution into a traditional authoritarian system before 
democracy. 
Another fundamental problem in the Chinese polity that has in 
the past affected the practice (and abuse) of human rights and was 
evident during the period under study, is factionalism in the Chinese 
Communist Party and government. Whenever factional fighting esca-
lates, respect for human rights declines. Each side has its definition of 
human rights and uses that to attack the other. Each side attempts to 
alarm the public with talk of political instability. In an environment 
of political infighting, each faction also becomes less secure and hangs 
on to power more desperately. The citizen suffers. Criticism of the 
reforms by the left and their attacks on specific problems during 1987-
88 caused Deng Xiaoping to take a hard look at the practice of rights 
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that might cause political instability or embarrass the reformists. He 
held on to political authority more fiercely and, in that context, was 
little concerned about constitutionalism, the separation of powers and 
legal rights. There was obvious regression in the area of individual 
rights, especially during late 1988. 
A problem unique to the period covered in this study was infla-
tion. Chinese, for historical and cultural reasons, are very sensitive to 
inflation. China virtually had no inflation under Mao. It has been 
noticeable, and problematic, for ten years. By 1987, freeing prices and 
expanding the money supply to stimulate the economy had caused 
rampant inflation. This created uneasiness and apprehension in the 
population. The left, anti-reformists used this against Deng and the 
reformists. This exacerbated factional problems and put many re-
forms that had had a salutary effect on human rights on hold. It also 
justified reestablishing central planning and economic controls, which 
in other countries almost always has reduced individual freedoms and 
liberties. The general human rights condition in China was affected in 
a negative way. 
Another factor to consider in assessing the human rights condi-
tion in the People's Republic of China during this period is the in-
creased amount of publicity give to human rights abuses. Beijing had 
always enjoyed the benefit of the doubt-in the Western media and by 
human rights organizations. This was less so during 1987-88. More 
balanced reporting made Chinese leaders react with considerable sen-
sitivity. They wanted both to look better and cover up what the rest of 
the world might learn. Tibet is a case in point. Tibetans protested 
more and made greater demands because of press attention. Many 
were killed as a result. The Chinese government shut off the informa-
tion flow in late 1987, and in 1988 the human rights situation got 
much worse. In the long run, drawing attention to human rights 
abuses undoubtedly will have a good effect. In the short run, however, 
it did not. 
For the first time, human rights became an issue in China's rela-
tions with other countries. Chinese leaders did not like the condemna-
tions made by the U.S. Congress, the United Nations, Amnesty 
International and other human rights groups. Their reaction was pa-
tently negative. The criticism also had an upsetting effect on internal 
politics and no doubt amplified factional tensions and debates about 
reform and its implications. 
Student and worker or peasant protests, executions and human 
rights problems resulting from population control efforts were ongoing 
issues during the period. The reformers wanted to use student protests 
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to support the reforms. After all, Deng had the support of students 
and intellectuals who despised Maoism, leftism and egalitarianism of 
the past and demanded change and progress. But Deng also feared 
that this might go too far. It might create a backlash. Thus, Deng did 
little to support the intelligentsia economically. He did not want to be 
accused of reviving China's imperial system (as he has been at times). 
The reformers also feared that the students might form an alliance 
with workers. This would be ominous and might lead to uncontrolla-
ble anti-government and anti-party protest. Thus, while Deng favored 
student activism, he wanted to keep it within bounds and wanted it 
predictable. The left meanwhile sought to provoke the students to ex-
cess, or hoped they would radicalize and cause a backlash which could 
be used to exploit Deng. 
Deng himself ordered a tough response to crime. He had initi-
ated the spate of executions that started in 1983, when an attempt was 
made on his life. He obviously felt compelled to continue to use ex-
ecutions to deter crime. He was convinced this worked. Clearly, there 
was no one in China to challenge him on this point. He also used it as 
a response to his opponents that said his reforms had caused crime and 
threatened political instability. Being tough on crime was his answer. 
He looked decisive. He could demonstrate that he was in control. He 
also perceived that other nations did not care. China, he is reported to 
have said, has "an edge" in the Western media. Also, he observed: 
"The majority in Western countries support capital punishment." 
Chinese leaders also felt it necessary to continue their draconian 
birth control policies, despite condemnation from many quarters. The 
reformists' reply was that the problem was created by Mao, who had 
argued that China did not have a population problem (that this was an 
imperialist lie-after Marx' similar argument). Thus, the situation 
had gotten out of hand. It required drastic solutions. However, to 
Chinese leaders this was a domestic issue. It was not a human rights 
question. Chinese leaders gave no indication they wanted to change 
such policies, despite the fact that, in this respect, Taiwan had become 
a model. Forced abortion was never used in Taiwan even though the 
population density there is several times that in China. 
In sum, China's human rights condition during 1987-88 changed 
in many ways. New trends were visible. The reasons for vast human 
rights abuses became a bit clearer. World attention centered on China 
in an unprecedented way. In some ways, China's human rights situa-
tion remains explainable and predictable; in other ways it is changing 
dramatically and its future is unclear. 
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APPENDIX I 
"The Key Is To Have Freedom of Thought" By Yang Yi 
(Excerpts from an article in Gongren Ribao (Worker's Daily), January 
29, 1988, p. 3.) 
Since emancipation of the mind was encouraged by the 3d Plenary 
Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, the broad masses of peo-
ple have gradually freed themselves from the trammels of the false 
Marxism advocated by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," from the 
trammels of the "two whatevers," and from the trammels of many old, 
rigid and outdated theoretical viewpoints, ideological concepts and 
habit of work, that were formed a long time ago. They have moved 
gradually onto the ideological track of being realistic and seeking truth 
from facts. However, we also must see clearly that "the question of 
emancipating the mind has still not been completely solved among our 
cadres, especially among our leading cadres. Quite a few comrades 
have not yet emancipated their minds and have not yet started to use 
their brains. In other words, they are still in a state of rigidity or semi-
rigidity" (remarks of Deng Xiaoping). Not emancipating the mind, 
or not fully emancipating the mind, and a passive attitude in work-
such as being overcautious, attempting and accomplishing nothing, 
and waiting and seeing-all have something to do with insufficient 
freedom of thought. Marx said: "In exploration, since the focus of 
attention is always on the third factor of the right of hypercriticism 
entrusted by law, will the truth not be lost? Is the primary task for 
explorers of truth not to get the truth directly but to gaze around? If I 
have to remember that I should discuss matters in a certain designated 
form that I have born in mind beforehand, does it mean that in this 
way I will not forget the essence of things?" 
In earlier years, many forbidden areas were set up by Lin Biao 
and the "gang of four," and a modern superstition was thus created, 
keeping the people's minds within the bounds of their sham Marxism. 
If anyone went beyond the bounds, he surely would have political la-
bels put on him and be criticized severely. Under such circumstances, 
people could only keep their mouths shut. How could they be bold 
enough to speak out and use their brains? Therefore, in order to 
emancipate the mind, it is necessary to ensure freedom of thought. 
Today, there are fewer forbidden areas, but there are still some. 
We can even say that there are still many taboos and commandments 
muzzling freedom of thought. Some clearly have been written down 
to show people throughout the country, and some are not as clear and 
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are not written down. For this reason, it is still hard to avoid some 
people possibly being wronged again. Thus, who dares to "emancipate 
the mind?" Although people are encouraged to make bold explora-
tions, since they can easily violate those taboos and commandments 
and offend others, they still find it difficult to escape unexpected ca-
lamities. How, then, can they emancipate their minds under such an 
atmosphere? 
Freedom of thought is originally a right every person is endowed 
with by nature. It is also the most basic and most elementary freedom 
for all people. If this freedom is not ensured, we can hardly imagine 
what other personal freedoms people can have. If we say that all other 
freedoms, such as freedom of academic research, freedom of speech, 
and freedom of marriage, should be defined by laws, freedom of 
thought is yet the most thorough and most complete freedom, not re-
stricted by any conditions. It is also the most sacred freedom. 
Marx said: Freedom is the right to engage in all activities that are 
not harmful to others. Since man's mental activity cannot do harm to 
any others, freedom of thought is therefore an absolute freedom. 
However, in practical life, man's freedom of thought has never been 
respected and guaranteed as it should. Some people regard "freedom 
of thought" as fierce floods and savage beasts, and try to lock up peo-
ple's thinking in designated cages, allowing people only to think in a 
certain way and not in any other ways. In "The Internationale," there 
was already the slogan of "shaking off the bonds of old ideas." How-
ever, more than a century has passed, and we are still striving hard for 
"emancipation of the mind." Why is that? Does this not call for deep 
thought? 
We have intervened too much in personal freedom of thought. 
As a result, some people even do not know that they have freedom of 
thought. When you want them to emancipate their minds, they still 
cannot extricate themselves from those old frameworks-they can 
only emancipate their minds in accordance with a particular desig-
nated orientation. As a matter of fact, this kind of emancipation is by 
no means a self-emancipation of the mind. Therefore, it is not a real 
emancipation of the mind. 
A real emancipation of the mind means thinking without any in-
hibitions and restrictions, just like adding free wings to man's think-
ing. It is a true revelation of man's inner world, which is not 
designated or defined by anything else. Do we not say that we en-
courage bold explorations? Are we not advocating emancipation of 
the mind? So, let us start from respecting and ensuring the freedom of 
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thought of every person, or we should not talk about "emancipation of 
the mind," because there will be no true emancipation of the mind. 
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APPENDIX II 
A Report of the Central Committee of the Democratic Alliance on the 
Present Condition of Intellectuals 
[Alliance Central Documents (Documents for internal circulation 
within the Democratic Alliance), November 1987, pp. 3-5. Repro-
duced in Inside China Mainland, (Taipei), June 1988, pp. 13-15. 
Democratic Alliance, consisting mainly of intellectuals, is one of the 
eight window-dressing minority political parties in the People's Re-
public of China.] 
To: The Central Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party: 
In July of this year we reached a decision that the Alliance would 
send out "a questionnaire and sample check on the condition of intel-
lectuals" to seven thousand two hundred intellectuals in eighteen 
provinces and autonomous regions and fifty two municipalities 
throughout the entire country in order to conduct a survey. (Of those 
receiving the questionnaire, fifty-two percent were teachers at universi-
ties or university-level specialized schools.) Twenty seminars were 
held in connection with the survey. Following is a summary of the 
situation revealed by the survey: 
I) The Urgency of the Problem of Intellectuals 
Among intellectuals there are still a number of problems and diffi-
culties of a practical nature that are still awaiting solution. In general, 
they tend to feel that for many years now there has been a great deal of 
talk about solving the problems of intellectuals but there has been little 
practical implementation and even less in the way of substantial mate-
rial benefits. Especially with regard to the concrete problems that in-
tellectuals face in everyday life, a good many intellectuals feel that the 
way they have been treated is unacceptable. Because of the fact that, 
for a long time there has been an upside-down relationship of the real 
income of those who perform physical labor in comparison to the real 
income of those who perform mental labor, in spite of the repeated 
calls on the part of leaders for "respect for intellectuals and respect for 
human talents and abilities," the results in real life have been very 
meagre. Things have gone so far that some intellectuals have lost faith 
in their own professions. There is an ancient saying that goes: "A 
career man cannot be deprived of his aspirations." And now, we are 
faced with a situation in which many intellectuals have, in fact, given 
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up their aspirations. They have the feeling that they have totally failed 
in life. This is a new development that has deepened the problem of 
intellectuals. It must be a cause of concern for us. 
No Money 
II) Major Indications of the Seriousness of the Problem of 
Intellectuals 
a) Declining Income 
Statistics based on the questionnaire indicate: 80.7 percent of 
those responding are suffering from hardships based on their low in-
come. There were more than 65 percent who expressed strong feelings 
about the irrational division of wealth in our society that had led to 
the lowering of their income. Present income from salaries is the ma-
jor economic resource of intellectuals. In the case of more than 66 
percent of those responding, there was basically no income except that 
from salaries. Moreover, more than 63 percent of intellectuals receive 
salaries that are lower than those of factory workers in the same age 
bracket. Their income falls incomparably short of that of individual 
households engaged in private enterprise. What is especially worthy 
of attention is this: a great number of high class intellectuals (includ-
ing professors of the highest and second highest rank), who had for-
merly enjoyed a relatively comfortable life, also frequently reported 
that their standard of living had been lowered to a considerable degree 
because of the relative lowering of their income. The lives of middle-
aged intellectuals are especially hard-pressed. They have both an 
older and a younger generation to take care of. Faced with a situation 
in which their incomes are low while the prices of commodities are 
being inflated, they find the conditions in which they live hard to bear. 
Teachers in middle schools and primary schools receive even 
lower salaries and, accordingly, they express even stronger feelings 
about the hardships under which they live. The situation of teachers 
at schools managed by local governments rather than the central gov-
ernment is especially serious. 
b) Crowded Housing 
Statistics based on the questionnaire reveal that among those who 
responded 88.15 percent expressed various degrees of difficulties in 
their housing situations. Among them, more than 72 percent declared 
their condition hard or very hard to bear. According to a survey of 
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twelve thousand nine hundred and thirteen households living in the 
Hsi-ch'eng District of Peking and making a living from work in ordi-
nary schools, those who did not own a home and had to rent one 
amounted to six thousand seven hundred and eight households or 
51.94 percent of the total. In three thousand nine hundred and eleven 
of these households, the average space was less than four square me-
teres per person. Such households amounted to 30.29 percent of the 
total. In the No. 6 Middle School in Chungking (Chongqing), more 
than seventy families of teachers at the school are housed in one single 
high-raise building. According to their reports, "Whenever we have a 
windy, rainy night, the rain leaks into every family's room." The great 
majority of intellectuals who responded to the questionnaire were of 
the opinion that the total amount of problems connected with housing 
was great and the prospects for any improvement in the housing situa-
tion were dim. A great many people expressed indignation at the dis-
honest practice of building new housing projects under the claim that 
they would be used for housing intellectuals, when in fact they were 
used for some other purpose after they were completed. 
Malnutrition and Neglect 
c) Health Care 
The condition of intellectuals' health and the availability of health 
care for them give cause for concern. A physical examination carried 
out at the First Primary School on Chan-Ian Street in Peking revealed 
that out of ninety nine teachers, ninety three were suffering from vari-
ous ailments. Statistics based on the questionnaire reveal that 46.78 
percent of those who responded go to a doctor only after they have 
tried unsuccessfully to cure their own illnesses. The reason for this is 
that it is inconvenient to see a doctor, because a doctor's allotment for 
medical treatment is inadequate and because the supply of medicine is 
limited. Among middle-aged intellectuals, 37.31 percent suffer from 
ill health. At present, premature aging during middle-age is a com-
mon phenomenon and for intellectuals to die at an early age when they 
should be in the prime of life is a frequent occurrence. 
Hard to Get Ahead 
These facts are connected inseparably with malnutrition, a heavy 
workload, physical and psychological pressure and the fact that ail-
ments are not treated early enough. 
d) Inappropriate Evaluation of Qualifications 
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At present the great majority of intellectuals are in general agree-
ment that methods of evaluating qualifications and assigning people to 
jobs are inappropriate. Statistics based on the questionnaire reveal 
that 80 percent of the people involved believe that the present system 
of evaluating qualifications and assigning people to jobs is not entirely 
reasonable. Among these, forty eight percent claim that their physical 
health has suffered and that they have suffered psychological depres-
sion as a result of the torment inflicted through the method of evaluat-
ing their scholarship in connection with possible promotion. 
Cronyism and Corruption 
According to our survey, the following problems worth noting 
exist in connection with the present system of carrying out evaluations 
of qualifications:· 1) definite quotas are set for the evaluation process 
with the result that many comrades who meet all the requirements 
cannot be given a recommendation for promotion; 2) unhealthy ten-
dencies have infiltrated the academic world with the result that per-
sonal connections, personal antipathies, friendships and the like 
become involved in the process of evaluation; 3) at present a single-
track system is in operation in which everyone must submit to the 
same process. This leads to contradictions in the cases of a number of 
people. The masses especially are displeased with the fact that the 
system even requires non-teaching personnel to submit to an evalua-
tion of their scholarship. A similar situation exists in the process of 
evaluation of qualifications carried out for middle school teachers. 
Square Pegs in Round Holes 
e) Allocation and employment of some intellectuals is 
inappropriate. 
Statistics based on the questionnaire reveal that because an intel-
lectual's specialization is not always geared to fit the needs of the job, 
or because his academic record does not meet with approval, or be-
cause a leader forms an unfavorable estimate of him, eighty one per-
cent of respondents felt that their energies were not being put to full 
use. How retired intellectuals can continue to carry out some function 
is a matter that awaits guarantees still to be introduced into the 
system. 
"Hopeful Solutions" 
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III) Advice on How to Solve the Problem of Intellectuals 
1) We recommend that the Central Committee set up a special 
organ to carry out leadership in work with intellectuals. This organ 
should thoroughly dispose of all problems of a general nature in con-
nection with intellectuals. 
2) We recommend that the Central Committee as quickly as 
possible implement a practical program to improve the living condi-
tions and working of intellectuals by adopting several urgent measures 
such as: raising the income of middle-aged intellectuals by a consider-
able amount and beginning early deliberations on improving the hous-
ing of middle and primary school teachers. 
3) We recommend that gradually the expenditure on education 
should be increased as a percentage of national income. At present, 
we should aim at raising it from four percent to five or six percent. 
Cases of diversion or embezzlement of funds appropriated to educa-
tion, persecution of teachers, invasion and occupation of school dormi-
tories and other such misconduct will have to be dealt with in 
accordance with the law. 
4) We recommend that the Central Committee set up a sub-
committee for inspection and supervision to carry out continuous and 
earnest supervision and coordination of the work of evaluation of 
qualifications in universities and specialized schools at the university 
level, in research organs and in middle and primary schools. This 
group should carry out an improvement in the methods of evaluation. 
We respectfully request that the Central Committee give consid-
eration to the above report. The Central Committee of the Demo-
cratic Alliance of China. September 18, 1987. 
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APPENDIX III 
EXCERPTS FROM THE PANEL "HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1987-88," 30TH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR CHI-
NESE STUDIES, OCTOBER 22-24, 1988, HOOVER INSTITU-
TION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY. 
A. The Yang Wei Case. By Che Shaoli 
(Ms. Che, a doctoral candidate at Baylor College of Medicine in Hous-
ton, Texas, is the wife of Yang Wei. Yang was sentenced to two years 
in prison in December 1987 on charges of "counterrevolutionary prop-
aganda' " for taking part in a student demonstration for democracy in 
Shanghai.) 
I would like to update you on what has occurred with my hus-
band's case since I spoke with you last year. My husband, Yang Wei, 
was finally brought to trial on December 21, 1987, and sentenced to 
two years imprisonment for what the Chinese government calls "coun-
terrevolutionary activity." His crime, in fact, was to do nothing more 
than to write for the journal China Spring while he was a student here 
in the United States and to advocate a move toward democratic princi-
ples for China in his writings. 
When he returned to marry me, with the intention of returning to 
the United States to study, he was kept under surveillance and eventu-
ally was arrested. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution asking for his 
release shortly before the trial, but this was ignored by the Chinese 
government as an interference in the internal affairs of their country. 
His trial, the government had stated, was to be a public trial, but in 
fact only a select few people were allowed to attend, and no Western 
journalists were allowed in. You see, Yang Wei was, for all practical 
purposes, convicted before he ever entered the courtroom. 
It is not the purpose of a trial in China to determine guilt or inno-
cence of the accused. The government enters into the trial with no 
intention of finding anything but a guilty verdict. The law that Yang 
Wei was prosecuted under, and most other criminal laws in the PRC, 
deliberately are worded vaguely so that the government may prosecute 
anyone it wishes. Even though the Constitution of the PRC allows for 
freedom of speech for all of its citizens, under the vague wording of 
the Criminal Code, anything may be considered "counterrevolution-
ary": a speech, a book, a pamphlet, any expression of a person's basic 
right to freedom of thought. This effectively renders the Chinese Con-
stitution null and void, and nothing more than an attempt to appear to 
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live up to those of Western democracies, which they in no way resem-
ble even slightly. 
The Chinese Embassy, in a letter to Senator Phil Gramm of 
Texas, who was inquiring about Yang Wei's case, restated the govern-
ment's position that Yang Wei was a "counterrevolutionary" and indi-
cated that the Chinese government had no intentions of reconsidering 
the matter. If any of you have been led to believe that China is going 
out of its way to appear rational and progressive to the West in the 
area of human rights, you have been misled-and this is a prime 
example. 
The concept of counterrevolution is used in such a broad sense, 
and includes anything or anyone that does not agree with the Party's 
current mode of thought. Counterrevolution is a very old concept-as 
old as the Communist Party itself. The law, then, is in no way an 
attempt to ensure the rights of the accused, but is merely an instru-
ment for the government to use in oppressing its own citizens. 
The prosecutor, in an official court document, accused China 
Spring and the Chinese Alliance for Democracy of attempting to over-
throw the Chinese government. China Spring later responded that 
these charges were ridiculous. We responded that we have no guns, 
no bombs, that the only weapons that we wish to give the people of 
China is the ballot box, to choose their leaders in free and impartial 
elections. Of this, and only this, are we guilty as charged. It is un-
thinkable that the largest nation on Earth, with the largest army, is 
afraid of a weapon as benign as the ballot box. 
To anyone who thinks that China is bending over backwards to-
day to ensure the human rights of its citizens, think again. People's 
basic civil liberties are denied in the PRC everyday, even though this 
clearly violates the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. To those 
of you who study and teach about China I would ask you-do not 
forget the struggle of the Chinese people for freedom and dignity, and 
never allow your quest for closer economic and social ties with China 
to obscure their quest for human rights. Thank you for your time. 
B. The Plight of Chinese Students in the United States. By Dachange 
Cong (Mr. Cong, a student from the People's Republic of China, is 
completing his Ph.D. in anthropology at Yale University.) 
1988 is a year of anxious living for one billion Chinese people and 
over forty thousand Chinese students now studying abroad. The eco-
nomic reforms program carried out by the Chinese government is in 
deep trouble. Inflation, skyrocketing prices, widespread corruption, 
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ineffective bureaucracy and shaky moral standards have triggered a 
tremendous amount of social unrest. Chinese intellectuals, who were 
persecuted politically during Mao's period, are now being punished in 
economic terms. Many intellectuals, especially the teachers, have a 
low social status and are struggling with poverty. It all appears that, 
without overhauling the whole political structure and introducing 
some basic principles of democracy and market economy, China's eco-
nomic reforms program will not succeed. This, in turn, will give an 
upper hand to the conservative leaders. 
Chinese students now studying abroad have every reason to be 
worried and anxious about China's future, as well as their own. Many 
of them have decided not to return to China at all and the majority of 
them are planning to prolong their stay abroad. For the students in 
humanities and social sciences, the existence of a dictatorship regime 
is a threat to their free thinking and academic careers. For the stu-
dents in sciences and engineering, the shortage of funding and facilities 
and the ineffective bureaucracy will endanger their academic research. 
Here, I have to point out that the Chinese government and its 
embassy in the United States do not seem to understand the basic 
problem. They continue to impose unreasonable means of control 
upon the students. 
Early this year, the Education Commission of the State Council 
drafted some new policies that limit and restrain the students now 
studying abroad or planning to go abroad. For example, many stu-
dents have to sign a contract. If they prolong their stay, their co-
signers, parents, friends or professors, will have to pay a huge fine up 
to over 20,000 Chinese dollars. That amount might be equal to 10 
years' salary for an associate professor. These new policies caused a 
big stir among the students. In March, an open letter was sent to the 
Chinese government protesting these new regulations. Fortunately, 
the new policies have not been fully carried out, mainly due to the 
open letter. 
In May 1988, Chinese students and scholars at University of 
Kentucky elected three new leaders for the local chapter of the Friend-
ship Association of Chinese Students and Scholars. The chairman of 
the chapter has been quite outspoken on the issues of democracy and 
human rights, and one of the vice-chairmen is an active member of 
China Spring, which was branded as "counterrevolutionary" by the 
Chinese government. Such election results angered the Chinese Em-
bassy. Two ranking officials were dispatched immediately to the cam-
pus. Through painstaking efforts, including threats, favor-offering and 
tricks, the early election results were overthrown. After the "victory" 
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on the part of the Chinese government, two officials treated those stu-
dents who cooperated, or were coerced into cooperation, to a free 
lunch in a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. This incident clearly 
demonstrates how tightly the Chinese students are controlled by the 
embassy and how little democracy they have. 
In the summer 1988, the Chinese government decided to invite 
about 50 student delegates from abroad to visit China. Upon hearing 
this news many Chinese students on various campuses started to or-
ganize elections in the hope that the delegates would be selected 
through democratic elections and the delegates would speak on behalf 
of the hundreds of concerned students. The Chinese Embassy and the 
general consulates in various locations ignored the desires and con-
cerns of the students, and they handpicked delegates loyal to Chinese 
authority. Again, this incident caused widespread indignation among 
the Chinese students. 
Surely, the Chinese government wants the students to go back. 
But how? I think there are several things that they can do. First of 
all, the government must carry out genuine political reforms and effec-
tive economic reforms. Second, the government must try hard to en-
hance the social status and financial conditions of the intellectuals. 
Third, many ranking Chinese leaders must correct their double stan-
dards, by which I mean that they must stop helping their own children 
get rich and emigrate abroad, while at the same time trying to get 
other overseas students back. Without these necessary moves, the ma-
jority of the Chinese students will remain hesitant to return. 
C. Labor Reform Camps in the PRC. By Harry Hongda Wu 
(Currently completing several research projects at Hoover Institution, 
Mr. Wu spent 19 years as a political prisoner in various Chinese labor 
camps from 1960 to 1979.) 
The three policies of reform through labor, reeducation through 
labor and job placement within labor camps form a complete prison 
system in the People's Republic of China. This labor reform system 
(or prison system), generally known as "labor reform camps," is an 
important part of the penal system of the PRC. Viewed from another 
perspective, labor reform camps are a necessary product of the totali-
tarian system of the PRC. 
First introduced in the 1950s, these policies have been in effect for 
more than 30 years. According to various sources, by rough estimate, 
there are more than 5,000 labor reform camps, and at least 45 million 
people have been sent to the labor reform camps over the past years. 
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The low-paid, submissive, disciplined and hardworking labor force of 
the labor camps plays an important role in the socialist construction of 
the PRC. 
The labor · reform enterprises-special state-operated enter-
prises--comprise an enormous nationwide network extending into 
various sectors of the national economy: agriculture, industry, com-
munications, transportation, engineering and construction. Labor re-
form production thus makes up a significant proportion of the national 
economic system. Articles made by labor camp inmates at slave wages 
have been exported regularly to other countries. 
In 1980, following Deng Xiaoping's economic reform, the labor 
reform system began to use material incentives to spur production at 
the labor camps and their affiliate enterprises. It further began to ex-
periment with "a system of contractual responsibilities in discipline 
and in production," making each individual labor camp or enterprise 
in the labor camp system responsible for its own profit and loss. The 
purpose of the "responsibility" system is to ensure that while the sup-
pressive aspect of the labor reform would continue, two groups in the 
camps would be spurred to work with greater enthusiasm: the public 
security police and the inmates. 
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